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INTRODUCTION
In January 1995, a University of Michigan sophomore named Jake Baker posted
a short story to an Internet site devoted to sexually explicit fiction.1 The story,
ÒPamelaÕs Ordeal,Ó graphically recounted the narratorÕs rape, torture, mutilation,
and murder of a female student with the same name as one of BakerÕs classmates.2
After being alerted to the story by an alumnus, university officials undertook an
inquiry. The investigation revealed that, in addition to writing a number of similar stories, Baker had engaged in an extended e-mail correspondence with another
man, in which the two had shared their desires to commit sexual violence against
young women, discussed how they would go about it, and made vague plans to
meet.3
Based on this information, the university suspended Baker and banned him from
campus.4 Shortly thereafter, he was arrested and charged with violating a federal
statute5 that makes it unlawful to transmit threatening communications in interstate or foreign commerce.6 Although the charges initially included ÒPamelaÕs
Ordeal,Ó they came to focus on the e-mail correspondence, after prosecutors concluded that it would be too difficult to show that the story constituted a threat.7
The case was subsequently dismissed by the district court, which held that
BakerÕs e-mails constituted protected speech under the First Amendment.8 Over a
vigorous dissent, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for Sixth Circuit

1 The facts of the incident are recounted in United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375,
1379-80 (E.D. Mich. 1995), and United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1493 (6th
Cir. 1997); id. at 1497-99 (Krupansky, J., dissenting), and were widely reported in the
media, see, e.g., Megan Garvey, Crossing the Line on the Info Highway, WASH. POST,
Mar. 11, 1995, at H1.
2 The story is reproduced in Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1497-98 n.1 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
3 See id. at 1498; Garvey, supra note 1. Portions of the correspondence are reproduced in Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1499-1501 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
4 See Garvey, supra note 1.
5 18 U.S.C. ¤ 875(c) (1994).
6 See Garvey, supra note 1. Finding that Baker posed a danger to the community, a
federal magistrate initially ordered that he be detained pending trial. See Baker, 890 F.
Supp. at 1379. This order was affirmed by both a district judge, see United States v.
Baker, No. 95-80106 (D. Mich. Feb. 10, 1995), and the court of appeals, see 48 F.3d
1220 (6th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision). Baker was released 29 days later
after a psychological evaluation concluded that he was not dangerous. See Baker, 890
F. Supp. at 1379 & n.5.
7 See Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1380 & n.6.
8 Id. at 1380-90.
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affirmed the dismissal, but on the narrower ground that the e-mails did not amount
to threats within the meaning of the statute.9
The Baker case sparked intense controversy not only within the university and
the local community, but also on the Internet. For some, including Catharine A.
MacKinnon, BakerÕs story constituted a form of assaultive speech that was deeply
degrading to the woman that it named and threatening to her personal safety.10
Such speech, they argued, does not merit protection under the First Amendment.11
Others, including officials of the American Civil Liberties Union, responded that
however abhorrent the story may have been, it was mere fiction or fantasy which
was fully entitled to constitutional protection.12
Despite its unusual facts, the Baker incident in many ways is representative of
contemporary disputes over the First Amendment. Whether they focus on hate
speech,13 pornography,14 flag burning,15 abortion-clinic demonstrations,16 publishing the names of rape victims,17 tobacco advertising,18 violent entertain-

9 See Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1492. The court of appeals expressly declined to address
BakerÕs constitutional claim. See id. at 1493.
10 See, e.g., All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Mar. 15,
1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (remarks of Catharine MacKinnon); Garvey, supra note 1 (quoting views of federal prosecutors that BakerÕs expression constituted threats unprotected by First Amendment).
11 See sources cited supra note 10.
12 See, e.g., Court Upholds E-mail as Free Speech, Agence France Presse, Jan. 30,
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (quoting Howard Simon, executive director of American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, asserting that Ò[e]ven sick
fantasies are free speechÓ protected by First Amendment).
13 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d
1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
14 See, e.g., American Booksellers Assn. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985),
affÕd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
15 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
16 See, e.g., Madsen v. WomenÕs Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
17 See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
18 See, e.g., Penn Adver. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding Baltimore ordinance banning most outdoor advertising of cigarettes), vacated,
518 U.S. 1030 (1996), adopted as amended, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997). In August 1996, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration issued regulations imposing substantial restrictions on tobacco advertising. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco t o
Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996). The regulations were
recently invalidated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which held
that the FDA lacks jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. See Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998). The recent settlement between the
major tobacco companies and the states contains a variety of restrictions on cigarette
advertising and marketing. See Barry Meier, Cigarette Makers and States Draft a $206
Billion Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1998, at A1.
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ment,19 the National Endowment for the Arts,20 Internet regulation,21 or other issues, such controversies tend to have a common structure. Those who advocate
regulation of a particular form of expression contend that it causes substantial harm
to individuals, groups, or the community at large. Opponents are often skeptical
about the seriousness of this harm. In any event, they argue, the First Amendment
denies government the power to prevent such harm through the suppression of
speech.22
Of course, few people would deny that there are situations in which speech may
be regulated without violating the First Amendment.23 Yet we have no welldeveloped and generally accepted view of when regulation is legitimate. In the absence of any common ground or standard to appeal to, contemporary free speech
disputes often appear to be irresolvable.
It is difficult to see how this impasse can be broken without a more general account of the scope of free expressionÑa view that integrates both the justifications
and the limits of that freedom into a coherent whole. This Article makes a start
toward the development of such a theory. Its central thesis is that free speech is a
right that is limited by the fundamental rights of other individuals and the community as a whole.
As I show in Part I, this idea was regarded as axiomatic when the First
Amendment was adopted. Eighteenth-century Americans understood freedom of
speech within the framework of natural rights theory. Free speech was a right inherent in human nature and republican citizenship. Like all such rights, however,
it was bounded by the rights of others. Because government was instituted to protect rights, it had an obligation not only to respect liberty of speech, but also to
ensure that this liberty was not used to violate other fundamental rights.
In this way the natural rights tradition provided a standard by which to assess
the legitimacy of laws regulating free speech. The possibility of such a standard
was undermined, however, by the rise of legal positivism and utilitarianism, which
repudiated the concept of natural rights. In modern jurisprudence, First Amendment issues are conceived of not as conflicts of rights, but as clashes between free
speech and Òsocial interestsÓÑa term within which the rights of others have been

19 See Lawrie Mifflin, Deal on Making Ratings for TV Specify Content, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 1997, at A1, col. 1.
20 See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).
21 See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
22 It is important to note that those who support or oppose regulation often vary from
one issue to another. Thus conservatives often support prohibitions on flag burning,
while liberals oppose them; these positions are largely reversed on the regulation of
cigarette advertising and anti-abortion demonstrations.
23 See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 n.10 (1961) (Harlan,
J.) (observing that an absolutist interpretation of the First Amendment Òcannot be reconciled with the law relating to libel, slander, misrepresentation, obscenity, perjury,
false advertising, solicitation of crime, complicity by encouragement, conspiracy, and
the likeÓ).
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absorbed. There is, however, no clear way to resolve such conflicts. This is a key
reason why contemporary First Amendment problems so often appear to involve
clashes of irreconcilable values.
The intractability of such problems suggests that we should consider returning
to a rights-based conception of the basis and limits of freedom of speech. Part II
develops the main outlines of such a theory, drawing both on the natural rights
tradition and on our modern understanding of fundamental rights. The discussion
begins with an account of rights as grounded in human liberty. Rights represent
what it means to be a free person in various spheres of lifeÑnot only in relation to
the external world, but also in oneÕs inner life and its expression to others, in social relationships and community life, and in the intellectual and spiritual realm.
These four elements of liberty correspond to the major justifications that have been
advanced for freedom of speech: that it is an aspect of external freedom; that it is
essential for individual self-realization; that it is central to democratic selfgovernment; and that it safeguards the search for truth. As I shall show, however,
the same principles that underlie freedom of expression also give rise to other
rights, such as personal security, privacy, reputation, and citizenship. Because
these rights derive from the same grounds as free speech itself, they have the same
fundamental status and value. It follows that speech must generally respect them.
There are some cases, however, in which the value of free speech justifies overriding other rights. Part III discusses how such problems should be analyzed, taking
as an illustration the constitutional law of defamation. This Part concludes by
contrasting the rights-based theory with the Supreme CourtÕs current First
Amendment jurisprudence, through an exploration of the constitutionality of laws
that bar publication of the names of sexual-assault victims.
Part IV brings the rights-based theory to bear on two major controversies:
whether the First Amendment should protect Òfighting words,Ó and whether it
should protect hate speech based on race or other invidious grounds. Finally, we
shall return to the controversy over the Jake Baker case.
I. NATURAL RIGHTS, SOCIAL WELFARE, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Without freedom of thought, there can be no such thing as wisdom; and no
such thing as publick liberty, without freedom of speech: Which is the right
of every man, as far as by it he does not hurt and control the right of anotherÊ.Ê.Ê.
Ñ CatoÕs Letters24
In constructing and maintaining a system of freedom of expression, theÊ.Ê.Ê.
crucial issues have revolved around the question of what limitations, if any,
ought to be imposed upon [free expression] in order to reconcile that interest with other individual and social interests sought by the good society.
24 1 JOHN TRENCHARD AND THOMAS GORDON, C ATOÕS LETTERS NO. 15, at 110 (Ronald
Hamowy ed., Liberty Fund 1995) (1755) [hereinafter CATOÕS LETTERS].
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Ñ Thomas I. Emerson25
Any effort to determine the scope of First Amendment rights must begin with
the constitutional text: ÒCongress shall make no lawÊ.Ê.Ê. abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the pressÊ.Ê.Ê.Ê.Ó26 At first glance, this language appears absolute,
leaving no room for regulation. Yet on closer examination several questions arise.
First, what is meant by Òthe freedom of speechÓ? On one hand, the term might be
understood in a purely descriptive way, to refer to the absence of external restrictions on speech. On this reading, the AmendmentÕs protection would apply to all
acts of speech, regardless of whether they might be considered rightful or wrongful.
Alternatively, Òfreedom of speechÓ may be taken in a normative sense, to refer to
the rightful exercise of the capacity for expression. ÒAbridgingÓ raises a similar
issue: do all regulations of speech abridge its freedom, or only those that are unjustified or illegitimate? Again, what should we make of the fact that the Amendment
refers only to Congress? Even if we assume that the Amendment imposes an absolute ban on federal regulation, is the same true when the principle of free speech is
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment? Issues of this sort are
critical to an understanding of the First Amendment, yet they cannot be resolved
by reference to the text alone. Instead, the AmendmentÕs meaning must be understood in relation to our developing conception of freedom of expression and its
place within the American legal, political, and social order.27
In this Part, I briefly explore how free speech was understood in the early
American Republic, and how this conception was transformed in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. This history will shed crucial light on the
problem at the core of contemporary disputes over the First AmendmentÑthe apparently irreconcilable conflict between free speech and other valuesÑand will indicate a way to escape from this predicament.
A. The Natural Rights Origins of the First Amendment
1. The English Background
To articulate the basis and scope of liberty of speech and press, eighteenthcentury Americans drew on a variety of sources, including the common law and the
civic-republican tradition.28 But the most comprehensive framework they looked
to was provided by the theory of natural rights and the social contract.
25 Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877, 887 (1963) [hereinafter Emerson, General Theory].
26 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
27 For one of the best contemporary statements of this approach to interpretation, see
ROBERT C. POST, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, in CONSTITUTIONAL
D OMAINS 1 (1995) (arguing that Constitution ultimately should be interpreted in light
of evolving ethos of the American community).
28 See infra notes 50-70 and accompanying text (discussing BlackstoneÕs Commentaries); notes 39-49 and accompanying text (discussing CatoÕs Letters).
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As developed in the works of John Locke, this theory sought to determine the
purpose and limits of government by tracing its rise from a state of nature. In that
condition, individuals have a right to natural liberty, defined as the power to control oneÕs own person, actions, and possessions without interference by others.29
This liberty is not unbounded, however, but is subject to the constraints of the law
of nature, which enjoins individuals to respect the freedom, equality, and rights of
others.30 In the state of nature, natural law has little power to restrain the violation of rights, for it lacks effective means of enforcement. For this reason, individuals agree to form a society for mutual protection. In so doing, they alienate a
portion of their natural liberty to the community, which is empowered to regulate
individual conduct to the extent necessary to protect rights and promote the common good.31
Locke insists, however, that some elements of liberty are inalienable. Although
such rights are not subject to legislative regulation for the public good, they are
nevertheless limited by the rights of others.32 In addition to liberty of conscience,
the category of inalienable rights includes freedom of thought in general.33 This
right is not only inherent in individuals, but lies at the foundation of liberty. According to Locke, human freedom is ultimately grounded in reasonÑin our capacity as rational beings to determine our own thoughts and actions.34 Locke therefore condemns rulers who seek to Òenslave[]Ó their subjects Òin that which should
be the freest part of Man, their Understandings.Ó35
As this discussion suggests, LockeÕs account of freedom of thought has not only
an individual but also a political dimension. When individuals enter into the social contract, they give up their natural liberty to judge of and defend their own
rights, and transfer this power to the community, to be used for the protection of
its members.36 Thus all political authority is originally vested in the community.
In turn, the community generally entrusts this power to a particular government.
29 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, II ¤ 4 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1698) [hereinafter LOCKE, TWO TREATISES].
30 See id. II ¤ 6.
31 See id. II ¤ 123-3.
32 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 47 (James Tully ed., Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Co. 1983) (William Popple trans., 1st ed., 1689) [hereinafter LOCKE, TOLERATION].
33 As Locke explains, Òthough Men uniting into politick societies, have resigned
up to the publick the disposing of all their ForceÊ.Ê.Ê. : yet they retain still the power of
ThinkingÓ as they like. JOHN LOCKE, A N ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
bk. II, ch. XXVIII, ¤ 10, at 353 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Clarendon Press 1975) (1700)
[hereinafter cited as LOCKE, ESSAY]. In order to establish peace and order in civil society, individuals must give up the unrestricted power to act or to use force whenever
they see fit. But it is not necessary for them to give up the power to think for themselves, even if it were possible to do so.
34 See id. bk. II, ch. XXI; LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 29, II ¤ 63.
35 LOCKE, ESSAY, supra note 33, bk. IV, ch. XX, at 708.
36 See LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 29, II ¤¤ 87-88, 91, 127-31.
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According to Locke, however, the people always retain the right to judge whether
the government, as their ÒTrustee or Deputy,Ó has acted contrary to its trust.37 In
this way, Locke not only justifies a right to revolution, but implicitly lays the
foundation for the eighteenth-century libertarian doctrine of political freedom of
speech.38
These implications of Lockean thought were developed more fully by later writers, especially the radical Whigs John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon. In CatoÕs
Letters, first published in the 1720s, Trenchard and Gordon defended and popularized LockeÕs theory of natural rights, the social contract, and the right of revolution.39 At the same time, they fused that theory with a strong civic-republican
emphasis on the active role of the people in politics.40 The rhetorical power of
this position is evident in CatoÕs famous essay on freedom of speech. Relying on
the Lockean premise that Ò[t]he administration of government is nothing else, but
the attendance of the trustees of the people upon the interest and affairs of the people,Ó Cato contended that it was the legitimate business of the people to oversee
public affairs and determine whether they were being properly conducted.41 Drawing not only on English history but also on classical republican writers such as
Livy, Plutarch, and Tacitus, Cato asserted that freedom of speech was Òthe great
bulwark of liberty,Ó protecting the people against tyranny by preventing and exposing abuses of power.42
For Cato, the right to Òthink what you would, and speak what you thoughtÓ 43
was not merely a barrier against government oppression; it was also an essential
element of natural liberty. ÒGovernment,Ó Cato argued, Òbeing intended to protect
men from the injuries of one another, and not to direct them in their own affairs, in
which no one is interested but themselves; it is plain that their thoughts and domestick concerns are exempted entirely from its jurisdiction.Ó44 The natural right
37

See id. II ¤¤ 149, 240.
For further exploration of the Lockean origins of freedom of speech, see Steven J.
Heyman, The Liberty of Rational Creatures: Lockean Natural Rights and the Freedom of
Speech and Thought (May 1997) (manuscript on file with author).
39 C ATO ÕS L ETTERS, supra note 24. For discussions of CatoÕs Letters and their influence on the eighteenth-century American conception of freedom of speech, see DAVID S.
BOGEN, BULWARK OF LIBERTY 16-20, 21 (1984); LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A
FREE PRESS 109-14 (1985) [hereinafter LEVY, EMERGENCE] (observing that Ò[i]n the history of political liberty as well as of freedom of speech and press, no eighteenth century
work exerted more influence than CatoÕs LettersÓ).
40 On CatoÕs fusion of Lockean natural rights and the republican tradition, see
MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE NEW REPUBLICANISM 289-319 (1994).
41 C ATOÕS L ETTERS, supra note 24, NO . 15, at 111.
42 Id. at 114. For a modern restatement of this view, see Vincent Blasi, The Checking
Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521 [hereinafter Blasi,
Checking Value].
43 C ATOÕS LETTERS, supra note 24, NO. 15, at 113 (translating TACITUS, HISTORIAE
1.1).
44 Id. NO. 62, at 428.
38
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to free speech was limited only by the obligation to respect the rights of others, by
Òinjur[ing] neither the society, nor any of its members.Ó45 For example, private
defamation was wrongful because it violated the individual right to reputation.46
But Cato expressed strong reservations about the traditional law of seditious libel,
which punished even true statements defamatory of the government or its officials.
Although he acknowledged that political libels might occasionally foment causeless discontents among the people, he argued that this harm was outweighed by
the benefits of having Òsome check upon [official] behaviour,Ê.Ê.Ê. as well as by
warning other people to be upon their guard against oppression.Ó47 The law of libel had to be carefully confined if it was not to become an instrument of tyranny.48
In particular, Cato asserted that truthful accusations of public wrongdoing Òcan
never be a libel in the nature of things.Ó49
The most powerful conservative response to this view came from Sir William
Blackstone, whose Commentaries on the Law of England appeared in the late
1760s. Although he conceded that Ò[t]he liberty of the press isÊ.Ê.Ê. essential to
the nature of a free state,Ó Blackstone insisted that Òthis consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal
matter when published.Ó50 Thus the traditional common law, which punished not
only private libels but also seditious, blasphemous, and offensive publications,
was fully consistent with a free press.51
To a modern reader, BlackstoneÕs position appears not merely narrow but almost incomprehensible. How can liberty of the press allow one to publish whatever one chooses, yet afford no protection against subsequent punishment? To understand BlackstoneÕs view, we must briefly explore his political theory.52
Following Locke, Blackstone held that Òthe principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights, which were vested in
them by the immutable laws of nature.Ó53 He identified those rights as life (and,
more broadly, personal security), personal liberty, and private property.54 A major

45

Id.
See id. NO. 32, at 231.
47 2 id. NO . 100, at 713-17.
48 Id. at 717.
49 1 id. NO. 32, at 228. The radical Whig ideology of natural rights and opposition
to tyranny was also central to the most influential defense of free speech in colonial
America. See JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN
PETER ZENGER (Stanley Nider Katz ed., 2d ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1972) (1736).
50 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE L AWS OF ENGLAND *151-52 (St.
George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, Young & Small 1803).
51 See id. at *151-53.
52 For a valuable discussion of BlackstoneÕs political philosophy, see Herbert J.
Storing, William Blackstone, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 594 (Leo Strauss &
Joseph Cropsey eds., 2d. ed. 1972).
53 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 50, at *124.
54 See id. at *129-40.
46
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objective of the Commentaries was to rationalize the English constitution and
common law by showing the ways in which they protected these rights.55
Yet despite his common ground with Locke and Cato, Blackstone portrayed
natural liberty in a less positive light. Although he held that such freedom is Ò a
right inherent in us by birth, and one of the gifts of God to man at his creation,Ó
Blackstone also subscribed to the traditional Christian doctrine that human nature
has become fallen and corrupt.56 Natural liberty was a Òwild and savageÓ condition which was Òinfinitely [less] desirableÓ than the Òlegal obedience and conformityÓ that characterizes organized society.57 For Blackstone, the function of society was not merely to protect natural rights but also to civilize human beings. He
therefore emphasized the extent to which natural liberty was alienable, and subject
to regulation by laws made by the community for the public goodÑa good that
encompassed not only the rights of individuals, but also social values such as order, morality, and religion.58
Blackstone also gave a different account of political authority. Distancing himself from the Lockean doctrine that all power is initially vested in the people,
Blackstone stated that, when individuals enter into society, they agreed to submit
to the authority of those they regarded as best capable of governing for the public
good.59 The evidence of this general consent was long-standing tradition.60 In
England, the legislative authority, which was the supreme power in any state, was
vested in a Parliament consisting of the king, the aristocracy, and representatives of
the people themselves, while the executive power belonged to the king alone.61
In contrast to Locke and Cato, Blackstone stressed the hierarchical relationship
between rulers and their subjects. Indeed, the very idea of law was that of a Òrule
of action, which is prescribed by some superior, and which the inferior is bound to
obey.Ó62 A Òdue subordination of rankÓ was essential in a well-governed society,
so that Òthe people may knowÊ.Ê.Ê. such as are set over them, in order to yield
them their due respect and obedience.Ó63
Consistent with the Whig tradition, Blackstone recognized that the kingÕs powers as supreme executive were limited by laws declaring the rights of the people,
such as the Magna Carta and Bill of Rights.64 Moreover, he defended the English
Revolution of 1688, in which the Lords and Commons determined that King
55

See id. at *145.
Id. at *125; see id. at *41-42.
57 Id. at *125.
58 See id. at *125 (defining civil liberty as Ònatural liberty so far restrained by human laws (and no farther) as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the
publicÓ); 4 id. at *152, quoted infra at text accompanying note 69.
59 See 1 id. at *48.
60 See id. at *190 (discussing power of king).
61 See id. at *50-51.
62 Id. at *38.
63 Id. at *157-58, *271.
64 See id. at *127-28, *141.
56
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James IIÕs attempts to subvert the constitution amounted to an abdication of the
throne.65 At the same time, however, Blackstone criticized the Lockean theory of
revolution, endorsed by Òsome zealous republicans,Ó which Òwould have reduced
the society almost to a state of nature,Ó leveled all distinctions of property, rank,
and authority, overturned all positive laws, and left the people free to establish a
new social and political regime.66 In short, while CatoÕs Letters synthesized
natural rights theory with civic republicanism, Blackstone fused that theory with
the ideology of the traditional legal, political, and social order.
We are now in a better position to understand BlackstoneÕs views on liberty of
the press. For Blackstone, freedom of thought and expression were elements of
natural liberty. It would be inconsistent with that liberty to compel the press to
submit to prior censorship, for that would make the executive Òan arbitrary and
infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion, and government.Ó67
The press Òbecame properly freeÓ in 1694 when Parliament refused to renew the
law authorizing such censorship.68 The result, however, was merely to place publication on a par with other forms of liberty. For Blackstone, expression was an
alienable right which was subject to regulation for the common good. Publications that violated laws against seditious, blasphemous, or immoral writings constituted not liberty but licentiousness. Accordingly, Blackstone argued that to
subject such writings to subsequent punishment under the law was Ònecessary for
the preservation of peace and good order, of government and religion, the only
solid foundations of civil liberty.Ó69 This was especially true of libels against
public officials; whether true or false, such accusations undermined the respect for
authority upon which government depends.70
65

See id. at *211-15.
Id. at *161-62, *213.
67 4 id. at *151-52.
68 Id. at *152 note a.
69 Id. at *152-53.
70 See 1 id. at *241 (discussing dignity of king); 4 id. at *150-53 (discussing seditious libel). Blackstone did acknowledge that some aspects of liberty were beyond the
legitimate reach of human laws, including liberty of conscience and freedom of thought,
so long as they remained strictly private. See, e.g., 4 id. at *45, *49, *51-52 (on religious liberty); id. at *152 (emphasizing that the common law imposes no restraint o n
private Òfreedom of thought or inquiryÓ). More generally, Blackstone maintained that
civil government had no business interfering with purely private conduct that did not
affect other individuals or the society itself. See 1 id. at *123-24; 4 id. at *41-42. Yet
his political theory precluded him from treating even these narrowly defined rights as
legal limitations on governmental authority. According to that theory, in all governments there must be a body that possesses sovereign authority. Under the English constitution, this Òabsolute despotic powerÓ was vested in Parliament, whose authority
extended even to altering the constitution itself. 1 id. at *48-49, *160-61. For this reason, if Parliament were to pass a law contrary to reason or justice, the judiciary would
not be free to reject it, Òfor that were to set the judicial power above that of the legislature, which would be subversive of all government.Ó Id. at *91.
66
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2. Natural Rights and the Founding of the American Republics
Although the revolutionary ideology of Locke and the radical Whigs was marginal in eighteenth-century England, it had a profound influence on American political thought.71 In addition to providing the justification for the American Revolution, this ideology clearly emerges from the bills of rights affixed to most of the
first state constitutions. Thus, the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights opens with
the assertion that Òall men are born equally free and independent, and have certain
natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.Ó72 Ò[A]ll power,Ó the Declaration continues, is Òoriginally inherent in, and consequently derived from, the people; therefore
all officers of the government, whether legislative or executive, are their trustees
and servants, and at all times accountable to them.Ó73 In addition to many other
personal rights, the Declaration asserts that Òthe people have a right to freedom of
speech, and of writing, and publishing their sentiments: therefore the freedom of the
press ought not to be restrained.Ó74
In this way Pennsylvania placed liberty of speech and press squarely within the
framework of natural rights and popular sovereignty. Similarly, the Virginia Declaration of Rights echoed CatoÕs Letters in asserting that Òthe freedom of the Press
is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by
despotick Governments.Ó75 At the same time, Americans agreed with Cato that,
as a natural right, free expression was limited by the rights of others, including the
right to reputation. For example, while the Massachusetts Declaration provided
that the liberty of the press Òought notÊ.Ê.Ê. to be restrained in the Commonwealth,Ó it also declared that Ò[e]ach individual in the society has a right to be protected by it,Ó and therefore Òought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to
the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property,
or character.Ó76

71 See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 33151 (enlarged ed., 1992); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787 (1969). On the impact of radical Whig thought on the early American conception of free speech, see David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy
on Freedom of Expression in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REV. 795, 821-36
(1985) [hereinafter Rabban, Ahistorical Historian]. For a valuable discussion of free
speech and natural rights in eighteenth-century America, see Philip A. Hamburger,
Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907 (1993).
72 PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. I, in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 264 (1971).
73 PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. IV, in id. at 264-65.
74 PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. XII, in id. at 266.
75 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. 12, in id. at 234.
76 MASS. CONSTITUTION of 1780, pt. 1, arts. X, XI, XVI (emphasis added), in id. at 34142. This position is also clearly expressed in the writings of Thomas Jefferson. In accord with radical Whig ideology, Jefferson regarded freedom of expression as a natural
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When a new Federal Constitution was proposed in 1787, the most powerful objection leveled against it was that it lacked a bill of rights.77 Among the most
important of these rights, Antifederalists contended, were freedom of speech and
press, which they characterized as inalienable rights of human nature and invaluable
bulwarks against tyranny.78 In response, Federalists argued that a bill of rights
was unnecessary. As James Wilson explained, when the people adopted state constitutions, they Òinvested their representatives with every right and authority
which they did not in explicit terms reserve.Ó79 Hence bills of rights might be required to protect liberty against invasion by state governments. By contrast, under
the Federal Constitution the people retained all rights and powers that they did not
positively delegate to the government. In particular, Wilson insisted that Congress had been granted no power to interfere with the liberty of the press.80

right, and freedom of the press as a barrier against governmental oppression. See, e.g.,
Petition to the Virginia House of Delegates (Aug. 1797) (asserting that the people have
a Ònatural right of communicating their sentiments to one another by speaking and
writingÓ), in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 349 (Leonard W. Levy
ed., 1966) [hereinafter FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON]; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Noah
Webster (Dec. 4, 1790) (characterizing freedom of the press as among the Òfences which
experience has proved peculiarly efficacious against wrongÓ), in id. at 342. In his various efforts to draft constitutional protections for these rights, however, Jefferson consistently indicated that they did not extend to false statements injurious to others. See,
e.g., Draft Constitution for Virginia art. IV (June 1776) (ÒPrinting presses shall be free,
except so far as by commission of private injury cause may be given for private action.Ó),
in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 344 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., Library of America 1984);
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rabout de St. Etienne (June 3, 1789) (enclosing draft
charter of rights for France containing similar provision), in id. at 956; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789) (proposing that James MadisonÕs draft
of the First Amendment, see infra text accompanying note 90, be amended to read: ÒThe
people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak to write or otherwise t o
publish any thing but false facts affecting injuriously the life, liberty, property, or reputation of others or affecting the peace of the confederacy with foreign nations.Ó), in FROM
ZENGER TO JEFFERSON, supra, at 340. For a persuasive demonstration that eighteenthcentury Americans regarded free speech as limited by the rights of others, see Hamburger, supra note 71, at 920 & n.41, 928, 936 & n.83, 948-53.
77 On the adoption of the Bill of Rights, see ROBERT A. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE
BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791 (1955).
78 See, e.g., LETTERS OF CENTINEL NO. 2, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 143-44
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER NOS. 2, 6, in id. at
231-32, 262; Speech of Patrick Henry in Virginia Ratifying Convention, in 3 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 449 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOTÕS DEBATES].
79 James Wilson, Speech at a Public Meeting in Philadelphia (Oct. 6, 1787), in 1 THE
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 64 (Bernard Bailyn ed., Library of America 1993).
80 Id. Wilson added that to have included a declaration of the liberty of the press i n
the Constitution would have been not merely useless but dangerous, because it Òmight
have been construed to imply that some degree of power was given, since we undertook
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Yet arguments of this sort were unable to overcome the desire for a bill of
rights.81 Several state conventions accompanied their ratifications with recommended amendments,82 or declined to ratify in the absence of such amendments.83
The proposed amendments were derived largely from the state declarations of rights
and reflected their radical Whig principles. The first state proposal relating to freedom of expression, which came from the Virginia convention, read: ÒThat the
people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments; that the freedom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty, and
ought not to be violated.Ó84 This recommendation, which was to form the basis
for James MadisonÕs draft of the First Amendment, combined the Pennsylvania
DeclarationÕs focus on free speech as a natural right of individuals with the Virginia
DeclarationÕs Catonic description of liberty of the press as a safeguard against abuse
of power.85
In June 1789, Madison introduced his proposal for a bill of rights in the First
Congress. In an important speech, he explained that the purpose of such a document was Òto limit and qualify the powers of Government, by excepting out of the
grant of power those cases in which the Government ought not to act, or to act
only in a particular mode.Ó86 Such limitations, he implied, were subject to judi-

to define its extent.Ó Id. For similar arguments, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander
Hamilton).
81 See WOOD , supra note 71, at 542.
82 See, e.g., New York Ratifying Convention, in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 91118; Virginia Ratifying Convention, in 3 ELLIOTÕS D EBATES, supra note 78, at 657-61.
83 See North Carolina Ratifying Convention, in 4 ELLIOTÕS DEBATES, supra note 78,
at 242-47. In other states, the Antifederalist minority proposed amendments which
were rejected by the Convention, but which were influential in the subsequent debate.
See, e.g., The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention o f
Pennsylvania to Their Constituents (Dec. 18, 1787), in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 78, at 145, 150-52.
84 Virginia Ratifying Convention, Proposed Bill of Rights, art. 16th, in 3 ELLIOTÕS
D EBATES, supra note 78, at 659.
85 It is also clear that these freedoms were regarded as bounded by the rights of others, at least that of reputation, for the amendments included a provision that Òevery
freeman ought to find a certain remedy, by recourse to the laws, for all injuries and
wrongs he may receive in his person, property, or character.Ó Virginia Ratifying Convention, Proposed Bill of Rights, art. 12th, in id. at 658; see Hamburger, supra note 71,
at 950-51. North Carolina called for identical amendments before it would ratify the
Constitution. See North Carolina Ratifying Convention, Proposed Declaration of
Rights, arts. 12th, 16th, in 4 ELLIOTÕS DEBATES, supra note 78, at 244. For other state
proposals on freedom of speech and press, see THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 92-93 (Neil
H. Cogan ed., 1997).
86 James Madison, Speech to House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), in CREATING
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 8 1
(Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter Madison Speech].
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cial enforcement.87 Madison identified two categories of rights that were protected
in bills of rights: (1) natural rights, or ÒthoseÊ.Ê.Ê. which are retained when particular powers are given up to be exercised by the legislatureÓ; and (2) Òpositive
rightsÓ such as trial by jury, which were equally Òessential to secure the liberty of
the people.Ó88 MadisonÕs notes cite freedom of speech as a paradigmatic instance
of a natural right.89 Following the proposal of the Virginia Convention, MadisonÕs draft of the First Amendment provided: ÒThe people shall not be deprived or
abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the
freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.Ó90
Although sparse, the legislative history of the Amendment also contains other indications that it was understood in the context of natural rights.91
In his groundbreaking study of the origins of the First Amendment, Leonard
Levy argued that the Amendment reflected BlackstoneÕs narrow conception of liberty of the press as a mere ban on prior restraints rather than subsequent punishment.92 A basic flaw in this argument was the assumption that anyone who believed that expression could be subjected to subsequent punishment must have
shared BlackstoneÕs position.93 As we have seen, however, virtually everyone in
the eighteenth century, from Blackstonian conservatives to libertarians like Cato
and Jefferson, held that free expression, like other forms of liberty, was bounded by
law. But whereas conservatives regarded expression as an ordinary liberty that was

87

See id. at 83-84.
Id. at 81.
89 James Madison, Notes for Amendments Speech (1789), in 2 S CHWARTZ, supra note
72, at 1042.
90 Madison Resolution (June 8, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note
86, at 12 [hereinafter Madison Resolution].
91 This point emerges with great clarity in the draft of the bill of rights prepared b y
Representative Roger Sherman of Connecticut, a member of the House committee on the
subject. One section of ShermanÕs draft read:
The people have certain natural rights which are retained by them when they enter
into society, [sic] Such are the rights of conscience in matters of religion; of acquiring property, and of pursuing happiness and safety; of Speaking, writing and publishing their Sentiments with decency and freedom; of peaceably Assembling t o
consult their common good, and of applying to Government by petition or remonstrance for redress of grievances. Of these rights therefore they Shall not be deprived by the government of the united States.
Roger ShermanÕs Proposed Committee Report (July 21-28, 1789), in id. at 266; see also
id. at 154, 159 (remarks of Rep. Sedgwick in House debate on First Amendment) (observing that the right of the people to assemble in order to Òfreely converse togetherÓ i s
Òa self-evident unalienable rightÓ)
92 LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND P RESS IN
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960) [hereinafter LEVY, LEGACY].
93 For a striking illustration of this point, see LEVY, EMERGENCE, supra note 39, at
251 (characterizing JeffersonÕs views on freedom of the press, see supra note 76, as
Òpure BlackstoneÓ).
88
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subject to plenary regulation for the public good, libertarians inclined to view it as
an inalienable right that was limited only by the rights of others.
It is certainly true that, at the time the Constitution and Bill of Rights were
adopted, some Americans described freedom of the press in Blackstonian terms.94
In part, as Levy observes, this reflected the persistence of Òthe taught traditions of
[the] law,Ó of which Blackstone was the foremost expositor.95 There were also political reasons for invoking Blackstone. As Gordon Wood has shown, the movement for a stronger federal constitution drew much of its support from conservatives
who believed that, under the post-Revolutionary state governments, America suffered from an excess of popular liberty and democracy.96 For such conservatives,
BlackstoneÕs insistence that the liberty of the press did not prevent regulation of its
ÒlicentiousnessÓ was quite appealing. More generally, this concern about excessive liberty may help to explain the FederalistsÕ resistance to a bill of rights.
Yet if the Constitution was partly motivated by conservative concerns, the demand for a bill of rights represented a reassertion of the radical Whig ideology that
animated the Revolution.97 For this reason it is a mistake to regard Blackstone as
the key to the original meaning of the First Amendment. As we have seen, BlackstoneÕs approach rested on the view that freedom of expression was an aspect of
natural liberty that was alienable and subject to legislative regulation for the common good. By contrast, the object of the Bill of Rights was to specify those freedoms that Americans regarded as essential or inalienable, and to reserve them from
government control. Freedom of speech and press fell in this category, not only as
inherent rights of individuals but also as indispensable means by which the people
could hold public officials to accountÑa view that was contrary to BlackstoneÕs
position that the government, not the people, was sovereign.98 In these respects,
BlackstoneÕs view was fundamentally inconsistent with the logic and purpose of
the First Amendment.

94 See, e.g., 2 ELLIOTÕS DEBATES, supra note 78, at 449-50 (remarks of James Wilson
in Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention) (ÒWhat is meant by the liberty of the press is,
that there should be no antecedent restraint upon it; but that every author is responsible when he attacks the security or welfare of the government, or the safety, character,
and property of the individual.Ó).
95 L EVY, LEGACY , supra note 92, at 237.
96 See WOOD , supra note 71, 393-518.
97 See Bernard Bailyn, Fulfillment: A Commentary on the Constitution, in BAILYN,
supra note 71, at 331-51.
98 See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text; supra note 70. For persuasive
criticism of Levy on this ground, see Rabban, Ahistorical Historian, supra note 71, at
821-54. In his later work, Levy partially retreats from the argument of Legacy of Suppression. See LEVY, EMERGENCE, supra note 39, at vii-xix. In particular, he acknowledges that, for eighteenth-century Americans, Òfreedom of the press meant more than just
freedom from prior restraint,Ó and that it included Òthe right to criticize the government,
its officers, and its policies as well as to comment on any matters of public concern.Ó Id.
at 272.
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These points were central to the controversy over the Sedition Act, enacted in
1798 to insulate the Federalist administration of John Adams from criticism by the
Republican supporters of Thomas Jefferson. The Act made it a crime to publish
Òany false, scandalous and malicious writingÓ against the government, Congress,
or President of the United States, Òwith intent to defame [them] or to bring
themÊ.Ê.Ê. into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against themÊ.Ê.Ê. the hatred of
the good people of the United States.Ó99 In concessions to libertarian doctrine, the
Act made truth a defense and provided that the jury should have power to determine both law and fact.100
Nevertheless, the Act was soon denounced as unconstitutional by the Republican-dominated legislatures of Kentucky and Virginia. In a report on behalf of the
Virginia Resolutions, James Madison set forth the Republican case. The Federalists, he observed, defended the Act on the ground that the First Amendment reflected the Blackstonian view.101 But Òthis idea of the freedom of the press can
never be admitted to be the American idea of it,Ó since it Òwould seem a mockery
to say that no laws should be passed preventing publications from being made, but
that laws might be passed punishing them in case they should be made.Ó102
Madison then traced the difference between the two conceptions to the Òessential
difference between the British Government and the American Constitutions.Ó103 In
Great Britain, the protections of the Magna Carta and Bill of Rights were aimed
only at the king, while the peopleÕs representatives in the legislature were regarded
as unlimited in their power and Òsufficient guardians of the rights of their constituents.Ó104 ÒUnder such a government as this,Ó Madison reasoned, Òan exemption
of the press from previous restraint, by licensors appointed by the king, is all the
freedom that can be secured to it.Ó105 In America, by contrast, the peopleÕs rights
were secured not merely by laws but by constitutions, and were protected against
99

1 Stat. 596, ¤ 2 (1798).
See id. ¤ 3.
101 See, e.g., John Marshall, Report of the Minority on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan.
22, 1799) (defining liberty of the press as Òa liberty to publish, free from previous restraint, any thing and every thing at the discretion of the printer only, but not the liberty of spreading with impunity false and scandalous slanders which may destroy the
peace and mangle the reputation of an individual or of a communityÓ), reprinted in 5
THE FOUNDERSÕ CONSTITUTION 136, 138 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987);
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE, REPORT ON PETITIONS FOR REPEAL OF ALIEN AND SEDITION
LAWS, in 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2986, 2988 (1799) (asserting that the liberty of the press
consists in Òa permission to publish, without previous restraint, whatever [one] may
think proper, being answerable to the public and individuals, for any abuse of this permission to their prejudiceÓ).
102 James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 1800), reprinted in 5
THE FOUNDERSÕ CONSTITUTION, supra note 101, at 141, 142 [hereinafter Madison, Report].
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
100
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violation by the legislature as well as the executive. It followed that in America
the liberty of the press was protected not merely against prior restraint by executive
officials, but also against subsequent punishment under legislative enactments.106
Madison proceeded to address the Federalist claim that, even if this liberty extended beyond protection against prior restraints, its substantive scope must be determined by reference to the English common law. Once more, he argued that the
different nature of the two governments required a broader view. In the United
States, unlike Great Britain, the people had a right to elect both the legislature and
the executive. In order to exercise this right, which constituted Òthe essence of free
and responsible government,Ó the people must be free to discuss the relative merits
and demerits of candidates.107 Moreover, in such a government the people retained the right to judge whether public officials had properly discharged their
trust. Employing the rhetoric of the radical Whig tradition, Madison asserted that,
to the extent that officials failed to do so, Òit is natural and proper, thatÊ.Ê.Ê. they
should be brought into contempt or disrepute, and incur the hatred of the people.Ó108
In opposing the Sedition Act, the Republicans relied not only on freedom of expression, but also on notions of federalism. In MadisonÕs words, they contended
that the First Amendment Òwas meant as a positive denial to Congress of any
power whateverÓ over the press, leaving any legitimate authority over it to the
states.109 This position, which reflected the RepublicansÕ strict constructionist
approach to constitutional interpretation,110 had less clear support in the history
and logic of the First Amendment. It is true, as Madison emphasized, that during
the ratification debate the ConstitutionÕs supporters had responded to Antifederalist
objections by insisting that it gave Congress no power over the press or other essential rights. Yet this argument had proved unconvincing. The intent of the
First Amendment may have been (as Madison argued in 1800) to Òexplicitly declare that no such power was delegatedÓ to the federal government,111 but it may
equally have been to ensure that, if any of CongressÕ powers could affect the press,
they would be limited by the same principles that applied to state governments
under their own declarations of rights. Indeed, MadisonÕs own actions in 1789 are

106

See id.
Id. at 145.
108 Id. at 144.
109 Id. at 143-44.
110 For leading statements of this approach, see 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1944-52 (1791)
(speech of Rep. James Madison in opposition to proposal to create national bank); Kentucky Resolutions (1798), in 4 ELLIOTÕS DEBATES, supra note 78, at 540-44 (attacking
constitutionality of Alien and Sedition Acts).
111 Id. at 144. For contemporary defenses of this position, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE
B ILL OF R IGHTS 20-32 (1998); William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1984).
107
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more consistent with the latter than the former interpretation.112 This strongly
suggests that, when the First Amendment was adopted, there was no clear understanding that it would impose greater restrictions on the federal government than
corresponding provisions imposed on the states.
Although Republicans denied all federal power over the press, they did not regard the freedoms of speech and press themselves as absolute. Some accepted the
law of seditious libel, as modified by the defense of truth, while others repudiated
that law.113 Virtually all Republicans, however, believed that freedom of expression was limited by the rights of other individuals, especially the right to reputation.114 But Republicans insisted that the protection of those rights belonged to

112 As we have noted, MadisonÕs draft of the First Amendment was indirectly drawn
from state constitutional models. See supra notes 84-85, 90, and accompanying text.
More generally, his speech stressed the parallels between the proposed federal bill of
rights and its state counterparts. See Madison Speech, supra note 86, at 80-83. MadisonÕs proposed bill of rights also contained an amendment that would have provided,
in similar language, that Ò[n]o state shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the
freedom of the press,Ó Madison Resolution, supra note 90, at 13, on the ground that Ò i t
is proper that every government should be disarmed of powers which trench upon those
particular rights,Ó Madison Speech, supra note 86, at 85. Madison added that, while
some states already protected those rights in their own constitutions, others did not,
and that no harm would be done by providing Òa double security on those points.Ó Id.
This evidence seems to indicate that Madison regarded his draft of the First Amendment
as imposing the same limits on the federal government that state provisions imposed o n
the states.
113 Compare, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804)
(reaffirming the power of states to restrain Òthe overwhelming torrent of slander, which
is confounding all vice and virtue, all truth & falsehood, in the U.S.Ó), in FROM ZENGER
TO JEFFERSON, supra note 76, at 367, with Minority Report on Repeal of Sedition Act,
ANNALS OF CONG., 5th Cong., 3d Sess., at 3003-14 (1799) (arguing that the doctrine of
seditious libel is ÒobsoleteÓ and Òinconsistent with the nature of our GovernmentÓ),
reprinted in id. at 176-86.
114 For example, St. George Tucker, a leading Republican jurist, described the nature
and limits of free expression as follows:
Liberty of speech and of discussion in all speculative matters, consists in the absolute and uncontrollable right of speaking, writing, and publishing, our opinions
concerning any subject, whether religious, philosophical, or political; and of inquiring into and, examining the nature of truth, whether moral or metaphysical; the
expediency or inexpediency of all public measures, with their tendency and probable effect; the conduct of public men, and generally every other subject, without
restraint, except as to the injury of any other individual, in his person, property, or
good name.
St. George Tucker, Of the Right of Conscience; and of the Freedom of Speech and o f
the Press, in 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 50, app., note G, at 11. Similarly, George Hay, a
Republican lawyer and member of the Virginia House of Delegates, contended that liberty of the press consisted of the Òabsolute freedomÓ to publish whatever one pleases,
Òprovided he does no injury to any other individualÓ through Òslander and defamation.Ó HORTENSIUS [GEORGE HAY], AN ESSAY ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS 23 (1799, 2 d
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the states rather than the federal government. In MadisonÕs words, individuals
were required to seek Òa remedy for their injured reputations, under the same laws,
and in the same tribunals, which protect their lives, their liberties, and their properties.Ó115
In this section, I have suggested that the First Amendment reflected the libertarian tradition of the radical Whigs more than the conservatism of Blackstone. As
the Sedition Act controversy shows, however, both views found considerable support in late eighteenth-century America, and the debate between them continued for
some time to come.116 As with other constitutional provisions, this makes it difficult to attribute any precise original meaning to the First Amendment.117 Nevertheless, this review of the history may enable us to identify not only sharp disagreements, but also a substantial area of consensus. In the late eighteenth century,
Americans generally believed that freedom of thought, belief, and expression were
among the natural rights of individuals. These freedoms were also regarded as inherent in republican citizenship, allowing the people to express their views on public affairs and to guard their liberties against governmental encroachmentÑa right
which extended at least to making true allegations against public officials, as even
the Sedition Act recognized. At the same time, there was broad agreement that, as
natural rights, freedom of speech and press were limited by the rights of others.118
B. Free Speech, Natural Rights, and the Fourteenth Amendment
As originally adopted, the Bill of Rights applied solely to the federal government.119 Only after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment did the fundamenprinting 1803), in GEORGE HAY, TWO ESSAYS ON THE LIBERTY OF THE P RESS (Da Capo
Press 1970).
115 Madison, Report, supra note 102, at 144.
116 Compare, e.g., Tucker, supra note 114 (expressing strong libertarian view of freedom of speech and press) with 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION ¤ ¤
1878-83 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833) (criticizing Tucker and defending Blackstonian view).
117 See LEVY, EMERGENCE, supra note 39, at 268 (observing that Ò[w]hether the
Framers themselves knew what they had in mind is uncertainÓ).
118 This last point is reflected in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790, which declared that Ò[t]he free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable
rights of man; and every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject, being
responsible for the abuse of that liberty.Ó PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, ¤ VII, reprinted i n
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 85, at 95. This language, which was copied i n
many other state constitutions, was susceptible of being read in either libertarian or
conservative terms. On the latter interpretation, expression was subject to regulation
for the public good; on both views, however, it was limited by the rights of others, particularly that of reputation.
119 See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). MadisonÕs draft of the Bill
of Rights included a provision that would have prohibited the states from infringing
religious liberty, freedom of the press, or trial by jury. See supra note 112. Although
this amendment was adopted by the House, it was rejected in the Senate.
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tal rights of individuals gain the protection of the Federal Constitution against
state abridgment.120 The history of this Amendment sheds further light on the
developing American conception of free expression.
The ideological origins of the Fourteenth Amendment lay in the antislavery
movement that gathered force in the decades before the Civil War.121 The opponents of slavery denounced it as a violation of the natural rights proclaimed in the
Declaration of Independence. Beginning in the 1830s, antislavery agitation encountered a wave of repression, through mob violence as well as official censorship.122 In response, antislavery activists strongly defended freedom of expression,
which they described as an inalienable right protected by the American constitutions.123 Following the natural rights tradition, Antislavery figures acknowledged
that this freedom did not authorize violations of the rights of others.124 They in120 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL L AW ¤ 11-2 (2d ed.
1988) (describing the Supreme CourtÕs incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment
of fundamental rights protected against the federal government by the Bill of Rights).
121 See generally E RIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY (1970); JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER L AW (rev. ed. 1965);
WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA,
1760-1848 (1977); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench, The Ideological Origins of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 1 CONST. COMM. 235 (1984).
122 See generally RUSSELL B. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE
SLAVERY CONTROVERSY, 1830-60 (1963). Some of the best recent work on free speech i n
the ante-bellum era has been done by Michael Kent Curtis. See Michael Kent Curtis,
The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy by An Anti-Abolition Mob: Free Speech, Mobs,
Republican Government, and the Privileges of American Citizens, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1109 (1997) [hereinafter Curtis, Lovejoy]; Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History o f
Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835-37, 89 NW . U.L.
REV. 785 (1995) [hereinafter Curtis, Curious History]; Michael Kent Curtis, The 1859
Crisis over Hinton HelperÕs Book, The Impending Crisis: Free Speech, Slavery, and
Some Light on the Meaning of the First Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 6 8
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1113 (1993).
123 See, e.g., DWIGHT L. DUMOND, ANTISLAVERY 230-33 (1961); Curtis, Curious History, supra note 122, at 859-63.
124 See, e.g., JOSEPH C. LOVEJOY & O WEN LOVEJOY, MEMOIR OF THE REV. ELIJAH
LOVEJOY 279-80 (New York, J.S. Taylor 1838) (quoting speech of abolitionist Elijah
Lovejoy to people of Alton, Illinois, demanding to be protected in God-given and constitutional right to free expression, but acknowledging that this right was properly limited by laws protecting reputation of others), quoted in TENBROEK, supra note 121, at
38 n.6. This position was expressed most clearly by James G. Birney, a leading abolitionist. Some rights, Birney wrote,
are inherent in man, as a moral, intelligent, and active being. They do not originate
in constitutions, nor are they conferred by them.Ê.Ê.Ê. Of these no human power can
properly divest [man,] whilst he exercises them so as not to disturb the equally important, and, of course, the equally to be respected rights of others. Among the
rights thus conferred is that of publishing opinions. Printing, writing, and speaking, are but modes of exercising it. These rights, in dignity, are altogether superior
to such as grow out of the positive enactments of human legislation.Ê.Ê.Ê.

HEYMANPUB .DOC

1998]

5/11/99 8:41 AM

RIGHTING THE BALANCE

1297

sisted, however, that discussions of the morality of institutions like slavery did not
fall in this category.125
The antislavery Republican Party came to power in the national elections of
1860. After the Civil War, the Republicans secured the adoption of two constitutional amendments that were intended to more effectually protect natural rights: the
Thirteenth, which abolished slavery, and the Fourteenth, which barred the states
from abridging the fundamental rights of American citizenship.126 It has been
forcefully, and in my view convincingly, argued these rights were understood to
include the protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights.127 In particular, Republicans expressed strong concern for protecting the freedoms of speech and press,
which they characterized as natural rights and rights of citizenship, and which they
stressed had repeatedly been violated by the southern states before, during, and after
the war.128
Notwithstanding the sacredness of these rights, they are subjected to this
limitationÑthat they be not exercised, so as to impair the equally precious rights
of others. A right pushed to this extremity is no longer a rightÑit becomes a
wrongÊ.Ê.Ê.Ê. As a wrong, it is to be restrained by adequate penalties.Ê.Ê.Ê. [For instance, if,] in the exercise of your right, you forget its proper limits, using against
me false and slanderous words, which, if true, would deprive me of the rights I now
enjoy, you commit a wrong, for which all equitable laws will compel you, as far as
practicable, to make reparation.
The Cincinnati Preamble and Resolutions, No. 2, THE PHILANTHROPIST, Feb. 26, 1836,
at 2 (paragraphing altered) [hereinafter PHILANTHROPIST] . Even when speech was
wrongful, Birney added, Òthe liberty of the press and of speechÓ required that the wrong
Òbe prevented, precisely as other wrongs in society are preventedÓÑnot by Òprevious
restraint,Ó which Òamounts to a censorship destructive of the right,Ó but by Òpunishment for its abuse.Ó Id. I am grateful to Professor Curtis for providing me with a copy of
this article.
125 See Curtis, Lovejoy, supra note 122, at 1177. For example, in response to the assertion that abolitionist speech should be suppressed because it Òinjure[d] the acknowledged rights of othersÓ to hold slaves, PHILANTHROPIST, supra note 124 (quoting
resolution adopted by Cincinnati anti-abolition meeting), Birney denied that slaveholding was a rightÑsince it was contrary to Òthe truthÊ.Ê.Ê. that all men are created
equalÓÑor that efforts to persuade slaveholders of its wrongfulness injured any such
right. Id. For a somewhat different view of the abolitionist position, see Curtis, Lovejoy, supra note 122, at 1177 & n.275 (suggesting that the notion that free speech was
limited by the rights of others was characteristic of proslavery but not antislavery discourse).
126 U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV.
127 See AMAR, supra note 111, 163-214; MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, N O STATE SHALL
ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986). For the contrary
view, see RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1989);
Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2
STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
128 See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 127, at 49-54. The RepublicansÕ discussion of freedom of speech and press during the debates surrounding the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments were confined to general terms and shed little light on the scope of these
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C. The Transformation of Free Speech Theory
Thus the natural rights background of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
suggests a rather straightforward principle: that free speech is limited by the fundamental rights of others, and that the law may protect these rights against speech
that violates them. Although this principle was widely held when those Amendments were adopted, it no longer holds a central place in American constitutional
theory or doctrine. Instead, we generally view First Amendment issues in terms of
an opposition between freedom of speech and state interests.
To understand this shift, we must explore the transformation of American jurisprudence after the Civil War. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the theory of natural rights gave way to a more positivist and utilitarian conception of law. On this view the function of law was not to protect the inherent
rights of individuals, but to promote the social good as defined by the community
or the state.
One of the leading figures in this development was Oliver Wendell
Holmes,
Jr.129 Although Holmes Òenlisted in the Civil War Ôas a convinced abolitionist,ÕÓ his experience of its bloodshed and upheaval led him to regard natural rights
doctrines as a threat to social orderÑan attitude that Òhe shared with much of latefreedoms. There is other evidence, however, that they accepted the principle, which was
inherent in the natural rights tradition and generally accepted at the time, that these
freedoms were limited by the rights of others. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st
Sess. 64 (1859-60) (remarks of Sen. Wilson) (implying that direct incitement and threats
are not protected by principle of free speech); id., app. at 205 (remarks of Rep. Lovejoy)
(suggesting that right of free speech must be exercised in Òpeaceful,Ó Òorderly and legal
wayÓ). Mid-nineteenth-century works on constitutional law expressed the same view.
See, e.g., NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT: A TREATISE ON FREE
INSTITUTIONS INCLUDING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 103-06 (Burlington,
Edward Smith 1833) (observing that the right of free speech is limited only by the condition that an individual Òviolate not the rights of others, or injure the community, of
which he is a memberÓ); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE P OWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN
U NION 422 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1868) (noting that Òthe constitutional liberty
of speech and of pressÓ does not protect false and malicious publications that Òinjuriously affect the private character of individualsÓ); WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 123-24 (2d ed., Philadelphia, Philip H.
Nicklin 1829) (asserting that remedies for the abuse of liberty of speech and press Ò w i l l
always be found while the protection of individual rights and the reasonable safeguards
of society itself form parts of the principles of our governmentÓ); 3 STORY, supra note
116, ¤ 1874 (interpreting First Amendment to mean Òthat every man shall have a right
to speak, write, and print his opinions upon any subject whatsoever, without any prior
restraint, so always, that he does not injure any other person in his rights, person,
property, or reputation; and so always, that he does not thereby disturb the public
peace, or attempt to subvert the governmentÓ).
129 For valuable discussions of Holmes and legal positivism, see MORTON J. HORWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 139-42 (1992); Mark deWolfe
Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1951).
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nineteenth-century American culture.Ó130 In his jurisprudential writings, Holmes
rejected Lockean and Kantian notions of the inherent freedom and dignity of individuals.131 In particular, he insisted that legal and constitutional interpretation
should be divorced from ideas of Òthe rights of man in a moral sense.Ó132 Rights
had no independent existence, but derived their force from positive law, which
aimed to promote social ends.133 At bottom, legal disputes involved clashes of
social interests, which could be resolved only by Òweighing considerations of social advantage.Ó134
This interest-oriented approach to law was developed more fully in the sociological jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound, a professor and later dean at Harvard Law
School.135 Like Holmes, Pound rejected traditional natural rights theory and held
instead that, Ò[a]s social institutions, state and law exist for social ends.Ó136 The
legal system promoted these ends partly by recognizing certain individual interests, which thereby gained the status of legal rights. Pound insisted, however, that
such interests were not entitled to protection for their own sake, but only as means
to ÒÔthe general happiness or the common good.ÕÓ137 For example, while the
lawÕs first concern was to prevent violence, it did so not in order to protect Òthe
so-called natural rights of physical integrity and of personal liberty,Ó but rather to
secure Òthe social interest in preserving the peace.Ó138
According to Pound, law is concerned not only with individual interests but
also with Òpublic interests,Ó which he defined as Òthe interests of the state as a ju130

HORWITZ, supra note 129, at 116 (quoting Saul Touster, In Search of Holmes
from Within, 18 VAND. L. REV. 437, 449 (1965)).
131 See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON L AW 37-38 (Mark deWolfe
Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881) [hereinafter HOLMES, COMMON L AW ];
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Ideals and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REV. (now NW. U.L. REV.) 1
(1915); Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John C.H. Wu (Aug. 26, 1926), in THE
MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 431-32 (Max Lerner ed., Modern Library ed. 1954).
Consistent with his repudiation of natural rights theory, Holmes also rejected efforts t o
identify the bounds of liberty by reference to the rights of others. See Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897) [hereinafter Holmes,
Path of the Law] (criticizing ÒMr. Herbert SpencerÕs Every man has a right to do as he
wills, provided he interferes not with a like right on the part of his neighborsÓ).
132 Holmes, Path of the Law, supra note 131, at 460.
133 See id. at 457-61, 469, 474.
134 Id. at 466-67, 474.
135 On Pound, sociological jurisprudence, and freedom of speech, see M ARK A.
GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM
69-74 (1991); David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Progressive Social Thought, 74 TEX.
L. REV. 951, 988-1001 (1996) [hereinafter Rabban, Progressive Social Thought].
PoundÕs views on freedom of speech are expressed most fully in Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality (pts. 1 & 2), 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 445 (1915).
136 Pound, supra note 135, at 347.
137 Id. at 346, 347 (quoting JOHN D EWEY & JAMES H. TUFTS, ETHICS 482-83 (1908)).
138 Id. at 355, 357.
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ristic person,Ó and with Òsocial interests,Ó or Òthe interests of the community at
large.Ó139 As a pragmatist, he believed that human interests ought to be satisfied
as far as possible. Because interests conflict with one another, however, they could
not all be fulfilled. The legal system must therefore weigh and balance competing
interests to determine how far each should be secured.140 Because it is a social institution, however, law is ultimately concerned only with social interests. Strictly
speaking, then, the law does not take account of individual interests as such, but
rather Òthe social interest in securing the individual interest.Ó141
In criticizing individual-rights theories and emphasizing the social purposes of
law, Holmes and Pound articulated themes that were to become central to early
twentieth-century Progressive thought.142 In this way, their views played an important role in the legal and constitutional revolution that culminated in the New
Deal.
Although the Progressive critique of rights was directed primarily against the
extreme defense of property symbolized by Lochner v. New York,143 that critique
also had implications for the status of civil liberties.144 In particular, Holmesian
positivism and sociological jurisprudence had the effect of undermining the traditional American rationale for freedom of expression. Rather than a right of nature
or republican citizenship, free speech on this view represented merely one interest
to be weighed against others.145 There was nothing distinctive about expression
that entitled it to special protection, or that placed it beyond the authority of the
state to regulate like any other form of activity.
This perspective is evident in Schenck v. United States,146 the Supreme CourtÕs
first important effort to address the meaning of the First Amendment. Writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice Holmes upheld the convictions of Socialist Party members for conspiring to obstruct recruitment by sending anti-draft leaflets to men who
had been called for military service in the First World War. Although he conceded
that individuals ordinarily had a right to express their views, Holmes held that this
right did not protect speech that endangered other social interests. ÒThe question
in every case,Ó he wrote, Òis whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.Ó147 As

139

Id. at 344.
See id. at 344, 354-55.
141 Id. at 344.
142 See G RABER , supra note 135, at 65-74; HORWITZ, supra note 129; Rabban, Progressive Social Thought, supra note 135.
143 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
144 See Rabban, Progressive Social Thought, supra note 135, at 955.
145 See, e.g., Pound, supra note 135, at 454-56.
146 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
147 Id. at 52.
140
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Schenck and other cases made clear, this standard was satisfied whenever, in the
legislatureÕs judgment, speech had a tendency to cause social harm.148
In this way the rejection of natural rights threatened to undermine the constitutional basis for protecting free speech. The central challenge of modern First
Amendment theory has been to reconstruct a justification for that freedom within
the framework of post-natural-rights jurisprudence. A leading effort in this direction came from Zechariah Chafee, Jr., a Harvard law professor who was to become
the most influential First Amendment scholar of the first half of the century.149 In
a 1919 article and a book published the following year, Chafee criticized Schenck
and other Espionage Act decisions for treating free speech Òas merely an individual
interest, which must readily give way like other personal desires the moment it
interferes with the social interest in national security.Ó150 Instead, Chafee argued
that the most important purpose served by free speech was the social interest in
Òthe discovery and spread of truth on subjects of general concern.Ó151
This approach was soon adopted by Justice Holmes himself. Dissenting in
Abrams v. United States,152 Holmes began by observing that, when the expression
of opinions threatens important social objectives, suppression appears to be a
Òperfectly logicalÓ response153 Ñessentially the basis of his decision in Schenck.
Nevertheless, he continued, Òwhen men have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is best reached by free
trade in ideasÑthat the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground on

148 See, e.g., Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919) (upholding conviction
of political speaker for obstructing or attempting to obstruct military recruitment where
Òthe words used had [this] as their natural tendency and reasonably probable effectÓ);
David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514, 58586 (1981). Justice HolmesÕ opinion in Schenck was consistent with his long-held
view that individual interests must be sacrificed where necessary to promote the common good. See HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 131, at 37, 40-41, 86-87; HORWITZ,
supra note 129, at 110-11; David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First
Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1265-78 (1983) [hereinafter Rabban,
Emergence].
149 On Chafee, see GRABER, supra note 135, at 122-64; Rabban, Emergence, supra
note 148, at 1283-1303.
150 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 37 (1920); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 959, 968-69 (1919).
151 CHAFEE, supra note 150, at 34; Chafee, supra note 150, at 956. In emphasizing
the importance of free discussion to the Òsocial interest in the attainment of truth,Ó
CHAFEE, supra note 150, at 36, Chafee followed a course that had been marked out a halfcentury earlier, in John Stuart MillÕs comparable effort to defend freedom of speech and
thought on grounds of utility rather than Òabstract right.Ó JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY 12 (David Spitz ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1975) (1859).
152 250 U.S. 616 (1919)
153 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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which their wishes safely can be carried out.Ó154 In referring to Òfighting faiths,Ó
Holmes may well have been thinking in part of the abolitionism to which he had
been committed in his youth, and which he believed had led to the devastation of
the Civil War. In this way, he laid the foundations of modern free speech jurisprudence on the ruins of the natural rights theory which originally supported the First
Amendment.
Although Chafee regarded the social interest in truth as extending to all Òsubjects of general concern,Ó he believed that free speech had special importance in the
political realm, Òso that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of action, but carry it out in the wisest way.Ó155 The relationship between free speech
and democratic self-government was stressed by Justice Brandeis in his concurring
opinion in Whitney v. California,156 which argued that freedom of speech and
thought were Òmeans indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth.Ó157 This recognition of the social values of speech led Holmes and Brandeis
to reinterpret the clear-and-present-danger standard to require not merely some tendency to cause social harm, but an imminent danger of serious evil.158
As Mark A. Graber and David M. Rabban have shown, these early efforts to reconstruct First Amendment theory accorded with the desire of many Progressives
to defend freedom of speech without appealing to fundamental rights, which they
tended to identify with Lochnerism.159 In this way, they could support free speech
as necessary for an open political system, while denying the charge of judicial interference with substantive policy decisions of the legislature. This processoriented view was sketched in Justice StoneÕs famous footnote in United States v.
Carolene Products,160 which suggested that laws interfering with speech or association might be subject to Òmore exacting judicial scrutinyÓ on the ground that
they Òrestrict[ed] those political processes which ordinarily can be expected to
bring about the repeal of undesirable legislation.Ó161
Although Progressives were critical of the notion of fundamental rights, they
nevertheless recognized that free speech was important for individuals as well as for

154

Id.
CHAFEE, supra note 150, at 34, 36; Chafee, supra note 150, at 956, 958.
156 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
157 Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring).
158 See id. at 373-79; Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630-31 (Holmes, J. dissenting).
159 See GRABER, supra note 135, at 122-64; Rabban, Progressive Social Thought,
supra note 135. In this respect, Progressives rejected not only the classical justification for free speech, see supra Part I.A, but also the views of some laissez-faire conservatives and libertarian radicals, who continued to defend free speech on individualist
grounds, see GRABER, supra, at 17-49, 53-65; David M. Rabban, The Free Speech
League, the ACLU, and Changing Conceptions of Free Speech in American History,
45 STAN. L. REV. 47 (1992).
160 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
161 Id. at 152-53 n.4. For a contemporary version of this approach to the First
Amendment, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 93-94, 105-16 (1980).
155
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society. Elaborating PoundÕs observation that individuals had an interest in the
Òfree exercise of [their] mental and spiritual faculties,Ó162 Chafee held that the First
Amendment protected not only the social interest in truth, but also the need of
many individuals to Òexpress their opinions on matters vital to them if life is to be
worth living.Ó163 Of course, as long as this value was understood as Òmerely an
individual interest,Ó it was unlikely to prevail when balanced against important
social interests.164 Yet the notion of fundamental rights was too deeply rooted in
the American constitutional tradition to remain eclipsed for long.165 The role of
the First Amendment in protecting individual liberty was a central theme of Justice
JacksonÕs majority opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette,166 which held that a compulsory flag salute Òinvade[d] the sphere of intellect and spirit which it was the purpose of the First AmendmentÊ.Ê.Ê. to reserve
from all official control.Ó167 Earlier, Justice Brandeis had characterized this liberty
in more positive terms, asserting that the First Amendment had been adopted in
the belief Òthe final end of the state was to make men free to develop their faculties.Ó168 This individual-liberty view has gained increased momentum since the
1960s.169
D. Classical versus Modern Free Speech Theory
These three viewsÑwhich focus on the value of free speech for the attainment of
truth, democratic self-government, and individual libertyÑrepresent the most influential modern efforts to construct a justification for freedom of speech. Of course,
each of these approaches has roots in the classical libertarian tradition of Locke,
Cato, Jefferson, and Madison. It may therefore seem that we have come full circle,
162

Pound, supra note 135, at 453.
CHAFEE, supra note 150, at 36.
164 C HAFEE , supra note 150, at 37; see also Pound, supra note 135, at 454-56.
165 Ironically, one of the first signs of a revival came in the Carolene Products footnote itself, shortly after the demise of Lochner. Although best remembered for its formulation of a process-based approach to constitutional adjudication, the footnote opened
on a different note, suggesting that legislation may also be subject to more intensive
scrutiny when it Òappears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific
when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.Ó United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
166 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
167 Id. at 642.
168 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
169 In recent years, this view has been developed in differing ways by such writers as
C. Edwin Baker, Thomas I. Emerson, Martin H. Redish, David A.J. Richards, and Thomas
Scanlon. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989); MARTIN
H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS ch. 1 (1984); DAVID A.J.
RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 165-230 (1986); Emerson, General Theory, supra note 25, at 879-81; Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Free Expression, 1 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 204 (1972).
163
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and that the result of modern First Amendment theory has been to reproduce the
essential features of classical libertarian theory. But this impression would be mistaken. To begin with, the classical theory regarded the values of free speech as a
relatively unified whole, while the modern justifications are sometimes represented
as distinct from, or even opposed to, one another.170 Over time, however, these
different rationales have often come to be seen as elements of a more general theory
of freedom of expression.171
A more fundamental difference relates to the nature of the justifications offered by
the classical and modern views. Whereas the former sought to justify free speech
primarily on intrinsic grounds, as a right of human nature and republican citizenship, the modern approach is more instrumental, focusing on the individual and
social interests that speech serves. On this view, our constitutional commitment
to free expression ultimately rests on an empirical judgment as to the best means of
promoting the social good. In Justice HolmesÕ words, it is Òan experimentÊ.Ê.Ê.
based upon imperfect knowledge,Ó which is subject to revision or rejection in light
of experience.172
Most importantly for the purposes of this Article, the classical and modern
views conceptualize First Amendment issues in fundamentally different ways. For
the classical view, many free speech problems involved rights on both sides. As
we have seen, Progressive jurisprudence recharacterized rights as interests, and held
that individual interests had value only insofar as they promoted those of society.
In this way, individual rights came to be absorbed into the concept of social interests. Initially, First Amendment problems were reconceived as conflicts between
two sets of social interests: those that were promoted by free speech and those that
might be injured by it. Over time, free expression has once more come to be regarded as a right, whether for intrinsic or instrumental reasons or both. But this
revival of rights in First Amendment jurisprudence has not extended to the values
that may be harmed by speech, which continue to be characterized as social interests. In this way, we have come to a hybrid position which conceives of First
Amendment issues as conflicts between free speech rights and social interests.
This transformation has crucial implications for the way we approach First
Amendment problems. On the classical view, rights had inherent limits, which

170 See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 54-55 (1960) (rejecting
ChafeeÕs view that First Amendment protects an individual as well as a social interest);
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND . L. J.
1, 24-26 (1971) (arguing that First Amendment protects only political speech).
171 See Emerson, General Theory, supra note 25, at 878-86.
172 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Indeed, on this account, our current acceptance of free speech does not even guarantee the
continued existence of constitutional liberty. As Holmes put it in Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925), ÒIf in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only
meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way.Ó Id.
at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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derived from the nature of particular rights, their place within the larger framework
of rights, and the duty to respect the rights of others. Although rights could sometimes conflict, this was the exception rather than the rule. Finally, in determining
the legitimacy of restrictions on freedom, the classical view looked to a relatively
objective standardÑwhether they were necessary to protect the rights of others.
Interest jurisprudence differed on each point. Unlike rights, interests were defined in largely subjective terms, as desires, needs, claims, or demands. 173 Such
interests had no fixed bounds, but extended as far as the desires or demands that
they represented. As a result, interests necessarily conflicted with one another.
Moreover, there was no objective standard by which to resolve such conflicts, other
than the rather elusive and indeterminate notion of social utility.174
Several points follow for the modern understanding of First Amendment problems. First, there is no inherent limit to the interest in free speech, other than the
desire to engage in it. The same is true when free speech is reconceived as a right
coextensive with that interest. By the same token, there are no inherent limits to
the social interests that may come into competition with speech. It follows that
there is an inescapable conflict between free speech and other interests. Finally,
there is no objective standard by which to resolve such conflicts.
The classical and modern views differ not only on the substantive nature of First
Amendment problems, but also on their formal structure. For the classical view,
such problems involved a trilateral relationship between (1) those who desired to
speak or listen to others speak; (2) those whose rights might be affected by that
speech; and (3) the state, which was bound to respect and protect the rights of both
sides. On the modern view, the rights of others are reconceived as social interests,
and the state is regarded as the representative of such interests. Indeed, despite
PoundÕs efforts to distinguish them,175 the terms Òsocial interestsÓ and Òstate interestsÓ are generally used interchangeably. In this way, First Amendment problems come to be viewed in terms of a bipolar opposition between the state and
those who wish to engage in expressionÑa view that is applied not only to cases
involving political speech or criticism of government, but also to cases involving
speech that impacts on private parties.

173 See CHAFEE , supra note 150, at 35 (equating interests with Òdesires and needsÓ);
JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 18 (Roland Gray ed., 2d ed.
1921 & photo. reprint 1972) (ÒBy the interests of a man is meant the things which he
may desire.Ó); Pound, supra note 135, at 343 (referring to individual interests as Ò t h e
demands which individuals may makeÓ); id. at 344 (defining an interest as Òa claim
which a human being or a group of human beings may makeÓ).
174 For a classic statement of this point, see Holmes, Path of the Law, supra note 131,
at 466 (observing that judicial decisions ultimately rest on policy considerations that
are Ònot capable of exact quantitative measurement,Ó and that therefore Òcan do no more
than embody the preference of a given body in a given time and placeÓ).
175 See Pound, supra note 135, at 345.
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E. The Dilemma of Modern First Amendment Theory
In short, modern First Amendment theory perceives an inherent conflict between
freedom of speech and the stateÕs efforts to promote other social values. There are
three basic approaches that one may take to First Amendment problems when they
are understood in this way: (1) a statist position, which would generally defer to
the governmentÕs power to regulate for the common good; (2) a civil libertarian
view, which would generally protect freedom of speech; and (3) an approach that
would seek to balance free speech and state interests. Each of these approaches suffers from serious difficulties, howeverÑa result that should lead us to reexamine
the conceptual framework of modern First Amendment theory.
The statist view would allow government broad power to regulate speech in the
same way that it regulates conduct.176 Although this approach affords protection
to the social interests that may be injured by expression, it provides little or no
protection to freedom of speech. For this reason, it is clearly inadequate as an interpretation of the First Amendment.
By contrast, the civil libertarian view seeks maximal protection for free expression (and other individual rights) against state power. Yet just as statism fails to
define the bounds of that power, civil libertarianism is unable to identify appropriate limits to free speech. Since it no longer appears possible, within a modern
framework, to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate restrictions, the
modern defense of free speech tends toward absolutism.
Arguments for absolutism have taken a variety of forms. The most straightforward relies on a literal reading of the First Amendment.177 Despite its great rhetorical force, this approach is unconvincing, for it is not required by the text and
has doubtful support in the original understanding.178
176 As we have seen, this was the effect of the clear-and-present-danger test in its
original form. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. For a contemporary version
of the statist view, as applied to all but explicitly political speech, see Bork, supra note
170, at 20-35.
177 The foremost proponent of this approach was Justice Hugo Black.
See, e.g.,
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S. 36, 60-62, 75 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting);
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157-58 (1959) (Black, J., concurring); Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 274-75 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). For similar reliance on the
ÒabsoluteÓ language of the First Amendment, see MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 170, at 20-21.
178 See supra notes 26-27, 109-15, and accompanying text. In several opinions, Justice Black relied on the Republican position during the Sedition Act controversy t o
show that the First Amendment was an absolute, and further argued that, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the same absolute prohibition applied to the states. See, e.g.,
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 295-97 (1964) (Black, J., concurring); Smith
v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157-58 (1959) (Black, J., concurring). This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, as we have seen, at the time the First Amendment was
adopted, there was no clear understanding that it was an absolute. See supra notes
109-15 and accompanying text. Second, even if we accept the Republican view of the
original understanding, that would not support an originalist argument for holding
that the First Amendment is equally absolute as applied to the states. The RepublicansÕ
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The case for First Amendment absolutism has also been made on more substantive grounds. First, some writers have advanced what may be called the Òglobal
balancingÓ argument, which holds that a weighing of the costs and benefits of free
speech leads to the conclusion that Òfreedom is always expedient.Ó179 Although it
initially seems plausible, this contention is also unpersuasive. It is undoubtedly
true that, on the whole, the benefits that flow from free speech far exceed the harms,
and that a society with absolute freedom of speech would be far better off than one
with none. The fallacy, of course, lies in the implicit assumption that these are the
only alternatives. From an interest-balancing perspective, the object is to determine the optimal balance between liberty and regulation. On this view, free speech
should receive protection up to the point where its marginal benefits are outweighed by its marginal costs. Of course, rule utilitarianism teaches that such determinations often should be made on the level of general categories rather than individual acts.180 It seems clear, however, that there are many classes of speech
whose regulation would promote social utility.181 It follows that absolute protection for speech cannot be successfully grounded on a balancing of social interests.
Other absolutist arguments avoid balancing and instead contend that freedom of
speech has categorical priority over other social interests. For example, Alexander
Meiklejohn contends that our societyÕs most fundamental purpose is its commitment to democratic self-government.182 Political deliberation orders all other ac-

absolutism was based on notions of federalism, rather than on a substantive conception
of the freedoms of speech and press. As a substantive matter, Republicans believed that
those freedoms were limited by the rights of others. They contended, however, that the
First Amendment was intended to deny the federal government all power over the press,
while leaving any legitimate power to the states. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text. The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment appear to have shared this substantive view of freedom of expression. See supra Part I.B. When the freedoms of speech
and press are applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, it is the substantive understanding of those freedoms that should be applied, rather than any special
federalism-based restrictions the Amendment may have been intended to impose on the
national government. See AMAR , supra note 111, at 233-34.
179 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 170, at 57; see also Emerson, General Theory, supra
note 25, at 916. In Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961), Justice
Black asserts that Òthe First AmendmentÕs unequivocal commandÊ.Ê.Ê. shows that the
men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the ÔbalancingÕ that was to be done in this
field.Ó Id. at 61 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,
275 (Black, J., dissenting). In this form, the argument simply projects modern interest
analysis back onto the eighteenth century.
180 For defenses of ÒcategoricalÓ or ÒdefinitionalÓ balancing, see John Hart Ely, Flag
Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Melville Nimmer, The Right t o
Speak from Times to Time, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968).
181 For examples, see supra note 23.
182 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 170, at 18.
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tivities and determines their value.183 It therefore has Òan authority over them all
which is wholly incongruous with the notion that one of them, or all of them together, might be balanced against it.Ó184 It is on these grounds that Òthe absoluteness of the First Amendment rests.Ó185
An alternative argument appeals not to democratic self-government but to individual liberty. As Thomas Emerson puts it, Òthe purpose of society, and of its
more formal aspect the state, is to promote the welfare of the individual.Ó186 A
person has a Òright to express his beliefs and opinionsÓ both as an individual and
as a member of the community.187 For this reason, Ò[t]o cut off his search for
truth, or his expression of it, isÊ.Ê.Ê. to elevate society and the state to a despotic
command and to reduce the individual to the arbitrary control of others.Ó188 Emerson concludes that, while a Òsociety may seek to achieve other or more inclusive
ends,Ó such as justice, equality, or the self-fulfillment of its citizens, it generally
may not do so by suppressing individual expression, which must be afforded Òfull
protectionÓ under the First Amendment.189
Although this argument persuasively shows that free speech rights may not be
subordinated to social welfare in general, it fails to recognize the possibility that
individuals may also have other fundamental rights, the protection of which may
justify regulation of speech. In this respect, EmersonÕs references to the liberty and
welfare of Òthe individualÓ are somewhat misleading, for many free speech cases
implicate the rights of more than one person. The proposition that oneÕs rights
may not be restricted for the sake of social welfare does not entail that they may not
be limited to protect other rights.190
EmersonÕs view is also subject to a more general objection which applies to
MeiklejohnÕs as well. While such arguments may establish the priority of free
speech over social interests in general, they fail to demonstrate its priority over
other fundamental rights, because the same sorts of arguments can be made on behalf of those rights. For example, while it is true that democratic self-government

183

See id. at 60.
Id.; see also id. at 55.
185 Id. at 55.
186 Emerson, General Theory, supra note 25, at 880.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.; THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 17 (1970) [hereinafter EMERSON, SYSTEM].
190 In a later section of General Theory, Emerson recognizes this point, holding that
individual interests should be treated differently than social goals in general, and that
some such interests, such as reputation and privacy, may justify restrictions on speech.
See Emerson, General Theory, supra note 25, at 920-28. This view is in obvious tension with EmersonÕs more general position that speech should enjoy full protection. It
is therefore not surprising that, in his later work, Emerson sharply retreats from this
view and adheres more closely to an absolutist position. See EMERSON, SYSTEM, supra
note 189, at v, 517-62.
184
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depends on political free speech, the latter seems to depend on individual liberty of
speech and thought. Unless they enjoy such liberty, individuals will be incapable
of participating in self-government. It may seem, therefore, that individual free
speech is a more fundamental right than its political counterpart. In another sense,
however, the reverse may be true: as Meiklejohn contends, individual liberties may
depend on the existence of political freedom. In this way, it becomes clear that
these two aspects of free speech are interdependent, and that neither is more basic
than the other. Freedom of speech must be viewed as a unified system, which includes both individual and collective elements.191
The argument may now be revised to assert that it is freedom of speech as a
whole that has precedence over other social interests. 192 Once more, however, the
same kinds of arguments can be made for the priority of other rights. For instance,
individuals cannot speak freely if they are not secure against violence. In this way,
free speech depends on the right to personal security. Again, it does not necessarily follow that the latter is more fundamental than the former. Instead, just as individual and political free speech turned out to be interdependent, the same is true
of free speech and other fundamental rights. It is only when these rights are taken
as a whole, as a system of constitutional liberty, that they have priority over other
interests.193
Although we cannot fully explore all the arguments that have been made for
First Amendment absolutism, this discussion should suffice to indicate some of
the problems that it faces. Recognizing these difficulties, civil libertarians often
defend freedom of speech in less absolute terms. For example, many follow Chafee
in endorsing a form of balancing that gives heavy weight to free speech.194 Despite its attractions, this approach only compounds the problem: the nearer it
comes to absolutism, the more it is subject to the same objections, while as a form
of balancing it also suffers from the difficulties of that approach.195
In summary, while civil libertarianism provides strong protection for free
speech, it is unable to identify the limits of that freedom. This point might be of
little concern if it simply meant that free speech were overprotected at the expense
of social welfare in general. As civil libertarians point out, this may properly be
regarded as Òthe price to be paid for constitutional freedom.Ó196 For three reasons,
however, the inability to identify limits should be of concern to civil libertarians
themselves. First, the lack of an adequate theory to distinguish justified from unjustified restrictions makes it more difficult to successfully oppose the latter. Second, as we have seen, what modern First Amendment theory labels Òsocial wel191

See EMERSON, SYSTEM, supra note 189, at 6-9.
This is how Emerson appears to present the argument in his later work. See id.
193 See infra note 386 (discussing John RawlsÕ concept of Òthe priority of libertyÓ).
194 See, e.g., CHAFEE, supra note 150, at 34; REDISH, supra note 169, at 52-55.
195 See infra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
196 Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 88 (1976) (Stewart, J., joined b y
Brennan, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting); see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 193 (1978).
192
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fareÓ includes the rights of others. For this reason, a maximalist approach to freedom of speech has the unintended effect of sacrificing other individual
rightsÑrights which, under other circumstances, civil libertarians might themselves defend against infringement by government.197 Finally, by protecting
speech even when it wrongfully invades the rights of others, this approach tends to
undermine the normativity of free speechÑits character as a right. In this way, an
excessive defense of free speech may weaken the legitimacyÑand thus the public
acceptanceÑof the very right that it means to defend.198
The third approach, balancing, seeks to avoid the pitfalls of both statism and
civil libertarianism. In recognizing that both free speech and competing interests
have important value, and that neither should be unreasonably sacrificed to the
other, balancing is appealing from a common sense standpoint. From a theoretical
perspective, however, balancing is perhaps the least coherent of the three approaches, for it is difficult to see how free speech and state interests are to be balanced against each other. As originally conceived by Pound and others, a major
purpose of interest jurisprudence was to reduce competing values to common
termsÑthose of social welfareÑso that they could be weighed on the same scale.
On this view, applied by Chafee to the First Amendment, free speech and other interests should be measured in order to determine what result would most promote
the common good.199 Yet the common good provided only an indeterminate
standard for deciding between social interests.200 Moreover, balancing social interests is often thought to be an essentially legislative function.201 Thus, this ap-

197 For example, the American Civil Liberties Union strongly defends the right t o
privacy against governmental actions disclosing private information about individuals.
See, e.g., E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997) (litigation challenging New
Jersey MeganÕs Law, supported by state ACLU). At the same time, the ACLU holds
that publication of private facts by the media falls within the freedom of speech and
press, and therefore opposes laws allowing recovery for invasion of privacy in such
cases. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, POLICY GUIDE, policy # 6(d)(4), at 13 (Jan.
1993).
198 Insofar as free speech is regarded as one social interest in competition with others,
its supporters cannot be faulted for making the strongest possible claims for it, in the
knowledge that other interests will also have strong advocates. In the case of free
speech, however, those claims generally areÑand must beÑmade in terms of principle.
Excessive claims of this kind may be self-defeating, at least in the long run, because they
tend to discredit the principle that they contend for.
199 See CHAFEE, supra note 150, at 34-35.
200 On the indeterminacy of interest balancing, see supra note 174 and accompanying text.
201 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring
in judgment).
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proachÑwhat may be called quantitative balancingÑfailed to ensure strong protection for free speech.202
For this reason, the thrust of most modern First Amendment theory has been to
reverse the efforts of Pound and Chafee, and to show that freedom of speech is
qualitatively different from other social interests.203 When we view free speech in
this way, however, it is difficult to see what it would mean to balance free speech
against other social interests. This is even more true when free speech is reconceived as an individual right. In short, while a quantitative approach to balancing
fails to adequately protect expression, a qualitative approach appears to be impossible.
F. Conclusion
Each of the three major positions in modern First Amendment thought has serious flaws. These problems stem from the way that civil liberties issues are conceived of in modern jurisprudence, as conflicts between free speech and state interestsÑa term within which the rights of others have been absorbed. When the
problem is understood in this way, strong protection for freedom of speech resultsÑunintentionally but necessarilyÑin sacrificing the rights of others, while
upholding state interests results in sacrificing freedom of speech. Modern First
Amendment theory offers no coherent solution to this dilemma.
This problemÑwhich goes to the heart of modern free speech jurisprudenceÑstems from its failure to recognize the rights of others as an independent
element in First Amendment cases. The inadequacy of this view should lead us to
give renewed consideration to a rights-based approach to free expression. This
does not mean, of course, that we should simply return to the eighteenth-century
understanding, even if that were possible. While a contemporary theory of the
First Amendment must be rooted in our constitutional tradition, it must ultimately reflect our own best understanding of free expression and other rights. The
remainder of this Article seeks to develop such a theory.
II. FREE SPEECH IN A FRAMEWORK OF RIGHTS
A. Introduction
In this and the following Part, I outline the major features of a rights-based theory of freedom of expression. The present section discusses the conception of

202 This point emerged most dramatically in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
510 (1951), in which the Supreme Court upheld the convictions of leaders of the Communist Party under a generalized balancing test.
203 See supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text (discussing views of Meiklejohn
and Emerson). As we have seen, these attempts were often directed to showing that
freedom of speech should receive absolute protection. Although in this respect they
were unsuccessful, they nevertheless succeeded in showing the ways in which free
speech is distinct from other social interests.
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rights on which this view is based, and then describes the basic model of free
speech and its limits.
1. Liberty and Rights
There are many different ways to argue that human beings have fundamental
rightsÑrights that are not derived merely from positive law, and that the law
ought to recognize.204 In this Article, I shall draw on the liberal natural rights
tradition identified with Locke and Kant. As we have seen, this tradition profoundly shaped the understanding of free speech and other civil liberties throughout
much of American history, particularly when the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment were adopted. Despite the impact of legal positivism and utilitarianism, this tradition continues to represent a deep current in American thought, as
evidenced by the contemporary revival of fundamental rights adjudication205 and
contractarian political philosophy.206 For these reasons, this tradition can provide
valuable insight into the proper place of free speech within our legal and constitutional order.
For the natural rights tradition, rights derive from the concept of liberty. The
most basic meaning of liberty is self-determination: a free person is the author of
her own thoughts and actions, rather than being determined by something other
than herself.207 On this account, freedom has two aspects: in a negative sense, it
means independence from determination by external forces or stimuli, while in a
positive sense it means the capacity to actively determine oneÕs own thoughts and
actions.208 Freedom in relation to other persons consists in the (positive) capacity
to determine oneÕs own actions without (negative) interference by others.209
204

For some leading contemporary works on rights theory, see DWORKIN, supra note
196; ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE]; JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM
(1993); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE
REALM OF RIGHTS (1990); THEORIES OF RIGHTS (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
205 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973).
206 See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); RAWLS, THEORY OF
JUSTICE, supra note 204.
207 In this Article I shall alternate between masculine and feminine generic pronouns.
208 This account of negative and positive liberty is implicit in Locke, see LOCKE,
ESSAY, supra note 33, bk. II, ch. XXI, and is more fully developed in the works of Kant
and Hegel, see IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS *446-47
(Lewis W. Beck trans., 2d ed., MacMillan Publishing Co. 1990) [hereinafter KANT,
FOUNDATIONS]; IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS *213-14 (Mary Gregor
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) [hereinafter KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS];
G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT ¤¤ 5-7 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B.
Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991).
209 See LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 29, II ¤ 6; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 50, at
*125. For a discussion of these two aspects of liberty in classical liberal thought, see
Steven J. Heyman, Positive and Negative Liberty, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81 (1992).
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As a free person, I have a right (that is, a justifiable claim) to my liberty and
personality. This status is not unique to me, however, but is one that I share with
other human beings. Thus my rights entail a correlative duty to respect the liberty
and personality of others.210 To put it differently, the concept of freedom includes
immunity from interference. If freedom is to exist, then, it must be bounded by an
obligation to refrain from interfering with the liberty of others.211
Right in general may be understood as freedom insofar as it is consistent with
the equal freedom of others.212 Specific rights such as life, liberty, and property
are instances of this freedom.213 Natural rights theory then develops the content of
rights by exploring what it means to be a free person in different areas of life.
These include (1) the individualÕs existence in the external world, (2) his inner life
of thought and feeling, (3) his relationships with other persons and the community,
and (4) his search for intellectual or spiritual meaning or truth.
2. The Basic Model
These four elements of human liberty correspond to the major justifications that
have been advanced for freedom of speech and thought: that they are instances of
external freedom in general214 ; that they are essential for individual selfrealization215 ; that they are central to democratic self-government216 ; and that they
are necessary for the attainment of truth.217 In this Part, I shall show that, in addition to freedom of expression, these dimensions of liberty also give rise to other
rights, including individual rights such as privacy and personal security, as well as
certain rights of the community itself, such as the authority to preserve the peace
and protect its citizens. Because these rights derive from the same principles as
freedom of speech, they are of the same order of value.
The central principle of the rights-based theory is the one that emerged from the
natural rights background of the First Amendment: that free speech is a right that is
limited by the fundamental rights of other persons and the community. More spe-

210 See, e.g., LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 29, II ¤ 6; HEGEL, supra note 208, ¤ ¤
36, 38.
211 See LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 29, II ¤ 57; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 50,
at *125; KANT, METAPHYSICS OF M ORALS, supra note 208, at *230-33.
212 See KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 208, at *230. Compare RawlsÕs
first principle of justice: ÒEach person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.Ó
RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 204, ¤ 39, at 250.
213 See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 50, at *125, *129.
214 See, e.g., 1 CATOÕS LETTERS, supra note 24, NO. 62.
215 See supra note 169.
216 See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 170.
217 See, e.g., MILL, supra note 151, ch. 2; JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA, i n
AREOPAGITICA AND OF EDUCATION (George H. Sabine ed., Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.
1951) (1644); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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cifically, the theory holds that an act of expression is presumptively wrongful, and
subject to legal regulation, when it (1) causes (2) an infringement of a fundamental
right belonging to another, and (3) is done with a state of mind that should make
the actor responsible for that result. Speech can cause injury to other rights either
directly (as when A threatens B) or indirectly (as when A incites B to attack C).
To ensure broad protection for free speech, causation should be limited to cases in
which an act of expression has a concrete and substantial impact on other rights.218
The precise scope of causation will vary, however, depending on such factors as the
nature and value of the competing rights and the type of liability at issue (criminal,
civil, injunctive, disciplinary).219 Similar factors are relevant to determining the
standard of liability. In many cases, an individual should be held responsible only
when she intentionally violates the rights of others.220 Other contexts may call for
a different standard such as recklessness or negligence.221
The principle that free speech is limited by the rights of others is subject to several important qualifications. First, while rights may be clearly defined at the core,
their outer boundaries are not fixed.222 In determining the scope of a right, courts
must consider the nature and value not only of that right, but also of the rights
with which it may conflict. Thus, in some cases an apparent conflict can be resolved by adjusting the boundaries of the two rights. Second, even when speech is
responsible for infringing another right, there is only a prima facie justification for
regulation, for the value of the speech may be so great that it should be regarded as
privileged.223 These two points will be explored in Part III.

218 Thus contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence rejects the common-law doctrine that speech is unlawful whenever it has a mere ÒtendencyÓ to bring about illegal
action or other social harms. For the common-law doctrine, see 4 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 50, at *152.
219 For example, in view of the high value of political expression under the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court has held that states may not proscribe the advocacy of
law violation unless it is both intended and likely to produce Òimminent lawless action.Ó Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
Presumably, however, this strict standard would not apply to private criminal solicitation, since such speech has far less value, while the threat it poses to other rights may
well be greater. See R. KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE
261-65 (1989). For a fascinating case on the scope of causation, see Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1515 (1998).
220 This is especially true where criminal sanctions are at stake. See, e.g., infra notes
253-54 and accompanying text (describing Brandenburg standard for criminal incitement).
221 For example, under New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), liability for
defamation of a public official may be based on reckless disregard for the truth, while
under Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), private figures may be allowed
to recover on a showing of negligence.
222 See JEREMY W ALDRON, Rights in Conflict, in L IBERAL R IGHTS 203, 224 (1993).
223 A paradigm case is New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which i s
discussed in Part III.B.1 infra.
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Third, in its effort to do justice, the law must take account not only of what is
right or wrong in itself, but also of the lawÕs own nature and limitations.224 For
instance, the law cannot properly regulate speech (or other activity) unless it is able
to define the distinction between rightful and wrongful action in reasonably clear
terms which are capable of being understood by those who must administer or
comply with them.225 Regulation is also inappropriate if it is likely to do more
harm than good to liberty taken as a whole. Again, government should have less
authority to regulate in contexts where it is likely to be biased in favor of restriction.226 I shall refer to considerations of this sort as those of institutional right.
In some cases, they may justify according speech greater protection than it is entitled to as a matter of substantive right. This course should be followed, however,
only where necessary to make the law more consistent with right as a whole.
In the remainder of this Part, I explore the four aspects of human liberty discussed above. In each case, I argue that this element not only supports a fundamental right to freedom of speech, but also grounds other rights that are equally
implicit in the concept of a free person. Finally, I identify the ways that free speech
can violate these rights, and argue that in such cases speech is properly subject to
legal regulation, unless the value of the speech is such that it should be regarded as
privileged.227

224 For recognition of this point in natural rights theory, see HEGEL, supra note 208,
¤ 222; KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 208, at *296-305; ERNEST J.
WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 106-07 (1995); see also LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 29, II ¤ 205.
225 This is the basis of the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth.
226 See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964). For some defenses of
freedom of speech that focus on the tendency of the government or society to restrict expression, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
449 (1985); Emerson, General Theory, supra note 25, at 889-95.
227 In arguing that free speech is limited by other rights, I do not wish to rule out the
possibility that some speech legitimately may be subject to broader regulation. As we
have seen, classical natural rights theory held that some aspects of liberty were inalienable while others were alienable. The former were limited solely by the inherent rights
of others, while the latter were also subject to regulation for the public good. See supra
Part I.A. Similarly, modern constitutional law distinguishes between fundamental
rights, which can be restricted only for compelling reasons, and nonfundamental rights,
which are subject to reasonable regulation to promote the common welfare. While free
speech generally should be regarded as a fundamental or inalienable right, this is not
necessarily true of all categories of speech. For instance, it might be argued that commercial advertising, like other forms of business activity, should generally be considered a nonfundamental right which is subject to reasonable regulation, as in the case of
tobacco-advertising restrictions designed to protect public health, see supra note 18.
For similar views of commercial speech, see BAKER, supra note 169, at 194-224; Thomas
H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and
the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979). I shall not pursue such issues in this
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B. Free Speech and External Rights
According to natural rights theory, rights flow from oneÕs status as a person.
Personality has its basis in self-consciousnessÑin the individualÕs awareness of
himself as a free, self-determining being. Self-consciousness does not exist in the
abstract, however, but within a body and in relation to an external environment.
The claims of personality in relation to this external realm constitute the first category of fundamental rights.
First, an individual has a right to life and, more broadly, to personal security, or
sovereignty over oneÕs own mind and body, free from violence or interference by
others. This power over oneself includes the freedom to direct oneÕs outward actions and movements without constraint. Finally, in order to sustain oneÕs life
and pursue oneÕs actions in the world, one must have at least some control over
external things. In this way we arrive at the traditional rights to life, liberty and
property.228
In this section, I first show how these traditional rights provide a justification
for freedom of speech and thought. I then analyze these rights in greater depth, particularly the right to personal security, and show how they can be violated by assaults and threats of violence. Although this limitation on speech is hardly controversial, exploration of this paradigm case will shed light on other, more difficult
areas.
1. Freedom of Speech as an External Right
Freedom of speech and thought clearly fall within the scope of these traditional
rights. The right to personal security relates to the mind as well as the body, and
thus includes a right over oneÕs own mental activity.229 The right to speak may
be regarded as a species of personal liberty, or the right to direct oneÕs external actions.230
We should note that these rights extend not only to thinking and speaking, but
also to related forms of action. Individuals can express their ideas by producing
sounds, making marks, or engaging in other actions. Of course, all of these actions fall within the concept of personal liberty, as do the acts of listening, reading,
and observing. Moreover, liberty should be understood not merely as a power to

Article, however, but shall focus on the limitations on speech that arise from the rights
of others, and that apply to all forms of expression.
228 For a classic discussion of these rights, see 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 50, at
*121-45.
229 See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 114, at 3 (including freedom of conscience and opinion under the heading of personal security).
230 See, e.g., CATOÕS LETTERS, supra note 24, NO. 62, at 429 (arguing that the magistrate has no legitimate concern with Òwhat gestures I use, or what words I pronounce,
when they please me, and do him and my neighbour no hurtÓ); Pound, supra note 135,
at 453 (describing liberty of belief and expression as Òa sort of free mental motion and
locomotionÓ).
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act, but as a power to act or not act, according to oneÕs own choice.231 Personal
liberty therefore includes not only the right to speak, but also the right to remain
silent.232
2. Other Rights
To say that individuals have a general liberty to direct their own actions does
not, of course, mean that those actions are always permissible. Individuals may
use their freedom in such a way as to unjustifiably infringe the rights of other persons to their own life, liberty and property. Such actions are wrongful and may be
restricted by law.
Acts of expression can clearly violate rights in this way. For example, an adherent of a Òpatriot movementÓ who blows up a federal office building in order to
protest against oppression deprives the people inside of life and personal security.
Similarly, protesters who blockade the entrance and occupy the grounds of an abortion clinic interfere with patientsÕ liberty of movement, as well as with the clinicÕs
right to property.233
As these examples show, the rights at stake may include not only those of individuals, but also those of the public. Individual rights exist under the protection
of the community, both in the sense that the law affords remedies for their violation, and in the sense that the most serious invasions, such as those involving violence, are regarded as wrongs not only against the immediate victims but also
against the community itself. In addition, the state has certain rights as a sovereign, an owner of property, an employer, and so on. Thus in the case of the federal
building, the actor would be liable not only for the tort of wrongful death but also
for the crimes of murder and destruction of government property. Likewise, the
anti-abortion protesters may be guilty of criminal as well as civil trespass.
In all of these cases, of course, the injury results from the noncommunicative
impact of expressionÑthe effect that it would have had regardless of whether the
actors intended to communicate a message or that message was understood by others.234 But expression can also infringe rights because of its communicative impact. This point can best be seen by exploring the concept of personal security in
more depth. In addition to showing the ways in which speech can violate this
right, our analysis will provide valuable analogies for the discussion of other
rights.

231
232

See LOCKE, ESSAY, supra note 33, bk. II, ch. XXI, ¤¤ 7-12.
For further discussion of these points, see infra notes 274-76 and accompanying

text.
233 In shutting down the clinic, the protesters also intentionally interfere with the
patientsÕ rights to reproductive freedom, part of the personal security and liberty protected against state interference by the Fourteenth Amendment under the Supreme
CourtÕs decisions in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
234 On the distinction between communicative and noncommunicative impact, see
Ely, supra note 180, at 1497.
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The right to personal security derives from the relationship between the body
and the self.235 This relationship exists on two levels. On one level, the two are
not separate but form a natural whole: the self exists only in and through its body.
Thus an injury to the body constitutes an injury to the self.236 Moreover, because
the self feels through its body, an injury to the latter generally inflicts harm, in the
form of pain or distress, on the former. In view of this natural unity, Ò[v]iolence
done to my body by others is violence done to me.Ó237 As a free person, such violence is an infringement of my right to personal security, understood here as a passive or negative right to be free from interference by others.
The relationship between self and body is not merely given by nature, however,
but is also constituted by the self. Because a person can exist and act only through
her body, one of her most basic acts of self-determination must be to assert sovereignty over her own body. From this perspective, personal security is an active,
positive right of the self to possess and control its own body.
This discussion suggests a further distinction that will be crucial to understanding the impact that expression can have on personal security. Because it derives
from the relationship between the body and self, personal security has both an objective and a subjective element. The former protects the bodyÑthe object over
which the self has a rightÑwhile the latter protects consciousness in relation to the
bodyÑthe selfÕs freedom from pain and distress, as well as its ability to exercise
control over its body. To put it another way, the objective dimension consists of
the right to be safe from bodily interference, while the subjective dimension consists of the right to reasonably believe oneself to be safe. Corresponding to these
two dimensions are two kinds of wrongs against personal security: an injury to the
objective element constitutes a battery, while an injury to the subjective element
constitutes an assault.
In addition to acts of violence, battery includes such acts as spitting in another
personÕs face or touching him sexually without his consent. Although such acts
may cause little or no physical harm or pain, they nevertheless constitute battery
because of their affront to the victimsÕ dignity.
A classic account of dignity appears in the writings of Kant. As a natural being,
man has a merely finite, extrinsic value, which is based on his usefulness for particular purposes, and which is commensurate with the value of other commodities.
As an autonomous being, on the other hand, man Òis not to be valued merely as a
means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in himself, that
is, he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth).Ó238 This dignity not only

235

The analysis in this and the following paragraph is derived largely from HEGEL,
supra note 208, ¤¤ 47-48, 57.
236 This notion is captured by the use of the word ÒpersonÓ as a synonym for the
body, especially in traditional legal discourse. Thus Òpersonal securityÓ refers primarily to bodily safety.
237 H EGEL , supra note 208, ¤ 48R.
238 K ANT, METAPHYSICS OF M ORALS, supra note 208, at *434-35.
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forms the basis of his own sense of self-esteem or self-respect, but also allows him
to Òexact[] respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world.Ó239
Taken together with our analysis of the two-fold relationship between self and
body, this conception of human dignity provides the basis for an account of the
wrongfulness of offensive battery. First, insofar as there is a unity between self and
body, the dignity of the former extends to the latter as the external side of itself.
Conversely, because the self feels through the body, whatever is done to the body
affects the individualÕs self-consciousness, including her sense of dignity and selfrespect. Second, in asserting its authority over the body, the self invests the latter
with its own dignity. What is done to the body thus affects its own dignity as
well as that of the self. Offensive battery treats anotherÕs body not as the embodiment of a free being with intrinsic worth, but rather as a mere object that can be
treated however the actor pleases. This is why offensive battery is wrongful.
An important point that emerges from this discussion is that the right to oneÕs
body has both a substantive and a formal aspect. A person has a substantive right
against bodily harm, a right that is violated by harmful battery. But he also has a
formal right to the integrity or inviolability of his bodyÑa claim to be free from
any contact with the body that is inconsistent with its dignity, or with the autonomy and intrinsic value of the self.240 This right is violated by offensive battery,
the deliberate infliction of contact that Òoffends a reasonable sense of personal dignity.Ó241
The right to personal security extends beyond protection against battery. One
who fires a gun at another but misses causes no bodily injury, but may nevertheless be liable for assault. The same is true of one who spits at another but misses.
Assault inflicts an injury not to the body but to the consciousness of the victim.
Insofar as there is a unity between self and body, a threat of harmful or offensive
contact to the body is felt as a threat to the safety or dignity of the self. Assault
also undermines the selfÕs secure sense of authority in relation to the body.
In these ways, assault infringes the subjective aspect of personal securityÑthe
right to believe oneself to be safe from bodily invasions. Once more, we can distinguish between substantive and formal aspects of this right. The former is violated by acts that cause the victim to fear for his bodily safety or dignity. Suppose,
however, that a person is aware that she faces imminent attack, yet suffers no fear or
distress (perhaps because she is particularly brave or skilled in self-defense). In this
case, although the act causes no substantive injury, it nevertheless infringes the in-

239

Id. at *435; see also KANT, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 208, at *428-29.
In addition to illuminating the nature of personal security, this distinction between the substantive and formal aspects of a right will turn out to be vital for understanding rights of personality such as privacy. See infra notes 293-95 and accompanying text.
241 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ¤ 19 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
240
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violability of consciousness, by making the victim experience apprehension of a
threat to her rights.242
Let us summarize the analysis up to this point. The right to personal security
has not only an objective but also a subjective dimension. An injury to the objective element constitutes a harmful battery if it causes substantive harm to the body,
and an offensive battery if it violates the formal right to bodily integrity. Injuries
to the subjective element constitute assaults, which again may cause substantive
harm to consciousness (fear) or violate its formal integrity (apprehension).
Thus far, the analysis has emphasized the categorical distinctions between various injuries to personal security. But these injuries can also be viewed on a continuum. In causing substantive harm to the body, harmful battery is the most objective injury. Offensive battery involves an injury to consciousness through the
body, and thereby implicates both the objective and subjective aspects. Finally,
assault is an injury to consciousness in its own right, and is therefore the most
subjective injury.
We are now in a position to identify the ways in which expression can infringe
the right to personal security. As we have seen, substantive bodily injury may be
caused by the noncommunicative impact of expressionÑas in the case of blowing
up the federal building. Communicative impact, on the other hand, is incapable of
directly causing such harm.243 By definition, such impact is the effect that expression has not on the physical world, but on the consciousness of its hearers.
By the same token, however, the communicative aspect of expression is capable
of violating personal security insofar as that right is one of consciousnessÑthat
is, insofar as it has a subjective dimension. It follows that, while communicative
impact cannot inflict a harmful battery, it can play an essential role in causing an
offensive battery or an assaultÑthe two injuries we have discussed that have a subjective element.
The role of communicative impact in offensive battery is illustrated by two wellknown cases. In Alcorn v. Mitchell,244 a litigant spat in his adversaryÕs face in the
presence of a large number of people in the courtroom.245 In Fisher v. Carrousel
Motor Hotel,246 a NASA scientist was standing in a luncheon buffet line during a
conference, when the restaurantÕs manager snatched a plate out of his hand and
shouted that he could not be served there because of his race.247 Both acts caused
contact offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity, and thus constituted bat-

242 See id. ¤ 24, cmt. b (distinguishing between fear and apprehension, and holding
that the latter is sufficient to support an action for assault).
243 The discussion here is confined to the direct effect that expression has on the listener. The communicative aspect of expression may, however, bring about such harm
through its impact on third parties. See infra notes 252-54 and accompanying text
(discussing incitement).
244 63 Ill. 553 (1872).
245 See id. at 553.
246 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967).
247 See id. at 628-29.
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tery. In each case, the offensiveness of the contact derived primarily from its communicative impact. While it is highly unpleasant to be spat upon, and irritating
to have an object snatched from oneÕs hand, by far the greatest element of offense
derived from the contempt that the acts expressed and the humiliation that they
were intended to inflict. As the court remarked in Alcorn, they were acts Òof pure
malignity, done for the mere purpose of insult and indignity.Ó248
Communication plays an essential role in offensive battery because of the way
that the tort implicates both the objective and subjective elements of personal security. The act treats the victimÕs body as a mere object or thing, rather than as the
outward existence of a free being of intrinsic value, entitled to respect as such. In
this way it injures the victimÕs consciousness through his body, and vice versa.
In assault, the element of consciousness comes to the fore. Not even minimal
contact is required; instead, the essence of the injury is to the victimÕs sense of security and inviolability. Assaults can be divided into two categories: attempted
battery and threats to commit battery. In the latter kind of case, the injury may be
caused by the communicative aspect of expressionÑthat is, by words that, taken
together with other acts and circumstances, are intended to cause the victim to suffer fear or apprehension of imminent bodily injury.249 As we shall see, threats of
future violence may also be unlawful.250 It is clear that assaults and threats, like
physical violence, are unprotected by the First Amendment.251
Both assaults and threats violate personal security through their direct impact on
the victimÕs mind. Speech can also infringe this right indirectly, through its effect
on third parties. Thus, solicitation or incitement of violence may violate the objective aspect of personal security if the violence actually comes about, as well as
the subjective aspect, if the victim becomes aware of the danger. Solicitation and
incitement may also violate the communityÕs right to the public peace. Much of
the modern history of the First Amendment involves the Supreme CourtÕs attempts to grapple with the problem of advocacy of illegal conduct.252 The
CourtÕs current formulation appears in Brandenburg v. Ohio,253 which holds that
the government may forbid such advocacy only where it is Òdirected to inciting or

248

63 Ill. at 554.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 241, ¤ 31. Although the common law limited criminal assault to attempted battery, most states have expanded the crime to include threatened battery as well. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW
693-94 (2d ed. 1986).
250 See infra note 255-59 and accompanying text.
251 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (noting that Òthreats
of violence are outside the First AmendmentÓ because of the fear and disruption that
they cause); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) (ÒThe First
Amendment does not protect violenceÓ or Òthreats of violence.Ó).
252 For an overview, see TRIBE, supra note 120, ¤ 12-9.
253 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
249
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producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.Ó254
C. Free Speech and Rights of Personality
In the preceding section, we saw that the right to personal security protects
against invasions ranging from harmful battery to offensive battery to assault. As
one moves along this continuum, the objective or external dimension of the wrong
becomes less important, while the subjective or internal dimensionÑthe injury to
consciousnessÑmoves to the foreground. There is no good reason, however, why
this progression should end with assault. In State Rubbish Collectors Association
v. Siliznoff,255 for example, members of a business association threatened a rival
with personal violence if he failed to comply with their extortionate demands.256
Because the threats related to the future, they did not fall within the traditional
definition of an assault. As William L. Prosser observed, however, it seems arbitrary to allow Òrecovery for the movement of a hand that [may] frighten the plaintiff
for a moment, [but to deny] it for coldly menacing words that [keep] him in terror
of his life for a month.Ó257 In Siliznoff the California Supreme Court accepted this
view, holding that serious threats of future violence were actionable in tort.258 In
addition, such threats may give rise to criminal liability.259
In cases like Siliznoff, it becomes clear that the injury to be prevented is not
merely the threat of violence, but also the serious mental and emotional distress
that such threats may cause. If that is so, however, then there seems to be no principled reason to restrict liability to threats of violence. In Wilkinson v. Downton,260 for instance, the defendant falsely told the plaintiff that her husband had
been seriously injured in an accident, causing her to suffer intense mental anguish.261 Recognizing that acts of this sort constitute serious wrongs, Wilkinson
and subsequent cases fashioned the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.262
In this way, the development of external rights against violence naturally leads
to a recognition of internal rights. Although personal security initially appears to
be external, it turns out to have an internal dimension, deriving from the relation
between the body and the self. As one moves from harmful battery to assault, this
254

Id. at 447.
240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952).
256 See id. at 284-85.
257 William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 3 7
MICH. L. REV. 874, 880 (1939).
258 See 240 P.2d at 285.
259 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES ¤ 211.3 (1980) (providing that i t
shall be a felony to threaten to commit any crime of violence with purpose to terrorize
another).
260 [1897] 2 Q.B.D. 57.
261 See id. at 58.
262 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 241, ¤ 46(1) & cmt. k.
255
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internal dimension becomes more and more central. This development culminates
in a right against infliction of emotional distressÑa right which essentially protects the individualÕs consciousness rather than her bodily existence.
This movement from external to internal rights was an important theme in
Samuel Warren and Louis D. BrandeisÕs classic article on The Right to Privacy.263 Early law, the authors argued, was primarily concerned with protection
against violence and other tangible harm. As civilization progresses, however,
people increasingly find their well-being not merely in material things, but also in
an Òintense intellectual and emotional life.Ó264 It was inevitable that the law
should respond to this development by according protection to individuals in their
thoughts, emotions, and sensations.265 Warren and Brandeis described the basic
right involved as that of Òan inviolate personality.Ó266
This discussion points to the existence of a second set of rights, which I shall
call rights of personality. Like the traditional triad of life, liberty, and property,
these rights are rooted in our nature as autonomous beings. The focus of selfdetermination has shifted, however: rather than acting in the external world, the self
now turns inward to shape its own intellectual and emotional life. Rights of personality reflect what it means to be a free person in this internal realm.
Again, these rights can be understood in terms of both negative and positive
liberty.267 By withdrawing from the external realm into itself, personality frees
itself from all external limitations, thereby attaining the positive capacity to determine itself and its own activity. To translate the point into interpersonal terms,
the individual asserts the power to shape his own inner life, free from unjustified
interference by others.
In many ways, the structure of this second category of rights resembles that of
the first (the external rights to life, liberty, and property). Just as the first category
began with the right to oneÕs body, the second begins with the right to oneÕs personalityÑthe capacity to autonomously determine oneÕs own inner life without
wrongful interference by others. Second, one has a right to express oneself through
oneÕs actions, which include both speech and conduct. This right is parallel to
that of liberty in the external realm. The difference is that, while both rights relate
to action, the latter regards action as outward movement, whereas the former views
it as the expression of inward personality. Finally, through oneÕs actions, one relates to others and makes impressions on them. These impressions, taken as a
whole, constitute an individualÕs reputation. While reputation belongs to the self,
in another sense it is external to the self, existing within the minds of others. In
this way, reputation resembles the right to property, which also is external to the
individual.

263
264
265
266
267

4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
Id. at 195.
See id.
Id. at 205.
See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
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In this section, I shall first discuss the ways in which freedom of speech and
thought can be understood as rights of personality. Then I shall explore the other
rights that flow from personality, and show how they give rise to normative limits
on speech similar to those arising from external rights. Finally, I shall consider
several objections to the notion that the law ought to recognize rights of personality, or that these rights can provide a justification for regulating speech.
1. Speech, Thought, and Personality
a. Speech and Thought as Rights of Personality
At the core of personality is the right to self-determination. Speech and thought
play an essential role in this process. In forming her own thoughts, beliefs, values,
and emotions, an individual defines her identity and shapes her personality. She
further defines herself through the expression of her thoughts and feelings to others.
In both of these waysÑthrough the inward formation of the self and its outward
expressionÑan individual may be said to realize herself.268 Since self-realization
is not a single event but a continuing process, it may also be described in terms of
self-development.269 Finally, if we regard self-realization as an important or even
ultimate end for human beings, it may also be said to promote self-fulfillment.270
Because of their crucial relation to these values, freedom of speech and thought
constitute fundamental rights. As we have seen, such rights reflect what it means
to be a free person in various spheres of life. To be free in a full sense, a person
must be free not only externally, in his body and his relation to the external world,
but also internally, with regard to his own inner life of thought and feeling, and in
the expression of that inner life. Just as respect for persons mandated recognition of
their rights to bodily security, liberty, and property, so it requires respect for individual personality itself, and for the expression and realization of that personality in
the world. Thus unjustified restrictions on free speech are wrongful not merely because of the limitations they impose on external liberty, but also in a deeper way,
because they obstruct the individualÕs right to autonomously determine, express,
and realize his own personality.
Several additional points flow from this account. First, speech has value for
self-realization because it expresses the thoughts and feelings of individuals. The
purpose of the First Amendment is not merely to protect speech itself, but also the
inner life that it expresses. For this reason, freedom of thought, belief, and feeling,
although not mentioned in the constitutional text, should receive no less protec-

268

For leading accounts of freedom of speech as self-realization, see sources cited supra note 169.
269 Self-development plays an important role in John Stuart MillÕs defense of liberty
of expression, which he regards as essential to the mental development of mankind. See,
e.g., MILL, supra note 151, at 32-33.
270 See Emerson, supra note 25, at 879-81.
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tion under the First Amendment than freedom of speech and press.271 Second, the
means by which individuals express their emotions and ideas are not limited to
oral and written language, but also include symbolic action. Therefore, such action should also receive protection under the First Amendment.
While both of these positions are generally accepted, a third is somewhat more
controversial. Many courts and theorists equate ÒspeechÓ for First Amendment
purposes with communication to others.272 If a basic aim of the First Amendment
is to protect individual personality, however, then it should also extend to solitary
forms of expression, such as writing in a diary or lighting a candle in memory of a
loved one. Such an act is an exercise of the freedom to determine oneÕs inner life,
and may be no less important than communication as a form of self-expression and
self-realization.273
Thus far, I have focused on the right of active self-expression, the freedom most
immediately suggested by the constitutional language. But the First AmendmentÕs protection extends to two other rights as well. The first is to the right to
refrain from expression. In discussing external rights, I said that, as a general matter, liberty should be understood as the power to either act or not act according to
oneÕs own choice. For this reason, the right to free speech also included the right
not to speak.274 The same is true of freedom understood not in physical terms but
as a right of personality. The inner self is inviolable; any intrusion into it, or attempt to expose it to others against its will, does violence to this inner freedom.
This is the basis of the Supreme CourtÕs holding in West Virginia State Board of

271

One way to reconcile this position with the constitutional text is as follows.
When one aspect of a right is more controversial than another, a statutory or constitutional provision protecting that right may be drafted in such a way as to expressly refer
only to the former. In interpreting such a provision, it is reasonable to hold that if i t
was intended to protect the more controversial aspect, it was also intended to protect
the less controversial one.
We can understand the First AmendmentÕs application to freedom of thought in these
terms. In protecting free speech, the First Amendment did not mean to leave a personÕs
inner thoughts unprotected. Instead, this right was hardly controversial in the late
eighteenth centuryÑeven those who would allow substantial limitations on speech
recognized that liberty of thought and belief were inalienable rights. See supra note 7 0
(discussing BlackstoneÕs view). It is therefore reasonable to hold that if the First
Amendment protects freedom of speech, a fortiori it also protects freedom of thought.
For an analogous argument in a statutory context, see Robert A. Gorman & Mathew W.
Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of ÒConcertÓ Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286 (1981).
272 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 180, at 1497; Scanlon, supra note 169, at 206; Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
273 See BAKER , supra note 169, at 51-52.
274 See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
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Education v. Barnette275 and subsequent cases that compelled expression violates
the First Amendment.276
Second, on the account developed here, self-expression serves to realize an individualÕs subjective self in the external, objective world. The concept of selfdetermination also includes a right which is the mirror image of thisÑa right to
receive images and ideas from the external world and to use them to form oneÕs
internal self.277 Of course, this includes the right to read, watch, and listen to the
expression of other willing persons. The right should be regarded as broader than
this, however. Just as the right to expression included solitary activity, the right
to receive should not be limited to communications from others, but should also
extend to other activity by which the mind and self are formed. If the right to receive includes the freedom to view a painting of a landscape, or to read a book on
plant biology, it should also include the freedom to contemplate a sunset or to examine plants in a laboratory. The right to receive therefore encompasses a general
freedom of inquiry and observation, as well as a right to receive communications
from others. Conversely, the right to form the self includes at least some right to
choose what one does not wish to be exposed to.278
Up to this point, I have emphasized the value of First Amendment activities for
forming or expressing the self. It is important to recognize, however, that those
activities also may have instrumental value in promoting the purposes of individuals, organizations, or the society. For instance, commercial speech may have value
in allowing individuals to make more informed choices about goods and services.279 Similarly, expression may have value simply for entertainment. Speech

275

319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that compulsory flag salute, by Òrequir[ing]
affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind,Ó Òinvades the sphere of intellect and
spirit which it is the purpose of the First AmendmentÊ.Ê.Ê. to reserve from all official controlÓ).
276 See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
277 This is one of the original meanings of Òinformation,Ó which referred to the ÒformationÓ of the mind through such external means as instruction. See OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), s.v. inform, information. For an example, see LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES, supra note 29, II ¤ 58 (stating that parents have a duty to Òinform the Mind,
and govern the ActionsÓ of their children until they reach the age of reason). On the
recognition of a First Amendment Òright to receive information and ideas,Ó see, for example, Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-68 (1982) (plurality opinion),
and cases cited.
278 See, e.g., Public Utils. CommÕn v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467-69 (1952) (Douglas,
J., dissenting). This is especially true within oneÕs own home, see, e.g., Rowan v.
United States Post Office DepÕt, 397 U.S. 728, 737-38 (1970), and in areas such as the
workplace where one is required to be, see, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 2 1
(1993).
279 See Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial
Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 432-34 (1971).
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of this kind also has a claim to First Amendment protection. Of course, that does
not mean it may not be regulated insofar as it affects the rights of others.280
b. Free Speech and the Rights of Others
Although it includes solitary activities, the notion of self-expression clearly
would be incomplete if it did not also extend to communication with others. Why
should this be the case, however? Self-realization theories of free speech have not
always explored this question, or recognized its crucial importance for the shape of
an adequate theory of the First Amendment. After all, when freedom of speech is
understood in terms of self-realization, it appears to be an essentially self-regarding
activity. If that is so, is there any reason why this activity must involve others?
The answer would seem to lie in the basic notion of self-realization.281 Human
beings cannot be content with being merely potential, but have a drive to realize
themselves, to give their subjectivity an existence in the world. One way they do
this is by asserting themselves in relation to the physical world, for example, by
acquiring property. As a mere thing, however, property is inadequate as an expression of the self. In order to fully realize themselves, individuals must do so in a
medium that is adequate to the selves they are trying to express. And this can
only be other selves. For this reason, individuals cannot be satisfied with merely
having their own solitary thoughts and feelings, but also feel a need to express
themselves to other persons.
In this way, individuals realize themselves not only on their own, but also in
and through the consciousness of others. This raises the possibility, however, that
an individual will use others as a mere means to her own self-realization, contrary
to the Kantian injunction against treating persons solely as means rather than as
ends in themselves.282 If this is not to occur, the right to self-expression must be
exercised in a way that is consistent with respect for other persons and their own
rights of self-realization. Speech transgresses this principle when it infringes the
right to personality itself, the right to self-expression, or the right to reputation.
2. Injuries to Personality
a. Substantive Injury: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Part II.B, we saw that personal security can be understood in terms of the
connection between the self and the body.283 In a similar way, rights of personality can be understood in terms of a relationship between the self and itself. In everyday language, we speak of a person gathering his thoughts, making up his mind,

280 Moreover, some speech, such as commercial advertising, might also be subject t o
broader regulation for the public good. See supra note 227.
281 The argument of this paragraph is derived primarily from HEGEL, supra note 208,
¤¤ 33A, 71, 73, 112.
282 See KANT, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 208, at *429.
283 See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
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getting a grip on himself, and so on. These expressions describe the self in both
active and passive termsÑboth as the subject that determines, and as the object
that is determined.284
This distinction allows us to understand the structure of the right to oneÕs personality. Just as personal security was based on a two-fold relationship between
the self and the body, the right to personality is based on a like relationship between the free, autonomous self, on one hand, and the determined self on the other.
First, the unity between these two sides of the self is even closer than that between
the self and the body. And second, the autonomous self asserts a right over the
determined selfÑa right to determine oneÕs own thoughts and emotions, to shape
oneÕs inner life. It follows that, in both of these respects, an injury to the determined selfÑto the individualÕs mind and feelingsÑconstitutes a wrong against
autonomous personality.
With this background, we can describe in more precise terms what makes intentional infliction wrongful.285 By causing severe mental or emotional distress (or
in some cases lasting psychological damage), such conduct inflicts harm to the determined self, and thereby violates the rights of the autonomous self. In this way,
intentional infliction constitutes a substantive injury to personality, analogous to
harmful battery against the body.286

284

In drawing this distinction, it is important to recognize that these two different
aspects do not necessarily represent separate parts of the self. People shape their own
thoughts and feelings, which may then in turn enter into further acts of selfdetermination. Thus, it is more useful to characterize the two aspects as two different
ways of viewing the self, rather than as distinct parts of the self.
285 The category of substantive injury to personality includes other wrongs such as
negligent infliction of emotional distress, criminal harassment, and racial and sexual
harassment under Title VII. For sake of simplicity, my discussion here will focus on intentional infliction, which is one of the most important ways in which the law protects
against such injury.
286 Intentional infliction is a rather abstract, undifferentiated category which covers a
multitude of sins. To fully understand this wrong, it would be valuable to explore the
various kinds of emotions that it affects, and their importance to personality. In some
cases, the harm is to the victimÕs natural feelingsÑthose she has as a merely existing
being, such as the fear of injury in Siliznoff, see supra notes 255-56 and accompanying
text. In other cases, the wrong is to moral feelings such as self-respect, or the awareness
of oneÕs identity as a free being with intrinsic worth. See generally DIGNITY,
CHARACTER, AND SELF-RESPECT (Robin S. Dillon ed., 1995). This injury occurs in those
cases of intentional infliction that are marked by insult and humiliation; I shall return
to them in Part IV.A, in discussing whether the First Amendment should protect insulting speech. In still other cases, the injury is to oneÕs social feelings, such as the plaintiffÕs attachment to her husband in Wilkinson. No doubt there are also other kinds of
emotions affected by intentional infliction, and many situations may involve more than
one. Identifying the various species of emotional injury may enable us to distinguish
between those injuries that are merely idiosyncratic or unjustified, and those that have
a solid basis in the nature of personality.
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Intentional infliction may also cause injury in a second way, by undermining
the relationship between the autonomous and the determined self, the power of the
former over the latter. In Wilkinson,287 for example, the defendantÕs act not only
caused the plaintiff to suffer intense grief and anxiety, but also for a time shattered
her self-possession and ability to control her own thoughts and feelings. Although
it is neither possible nor desirable to have complete control over oneÕs emotions, a
minimal amount of self-control is essential to free personality. At least in some
cases, intentional infliction undermines this capacity for a time.
As with other rights of personality, the common law was slow to protect the interest in emotional tranquillity as such. The right was first recognized in the context of assault.288 In addition, where an individual had suffered some other tort,
such as battery or trespass, he was often allowed to recover damages for emotional
distress as well.289 During the present century, courts came to recognize intentional infliction of emotional distress as an independent cause of action. Under the
Restatement formulation, liability is imposed for Òextreme and outrageous conductÓ that intentionally or recklessly causes an individual to suffer severe emotional
distress.290
Like most injuries to personality, intentional infliction can take the form of conduct, such as a life insurance companyÕs bad-faith refusal to pay a valid claim by
beneficiaries who are distraught and financially desperate. Because intentional infliction is essentially an injury to consciousness, however, it often takes the form of
expression. This brings it into potential conflict with the First Amendment.
For the liberal tradition, rights and liberty are ultimately grounded in reason,
which is the capacity that makes self-determination possible.291 As reasonable beings, human beings have a fundamental interest in the discovery of truth, a process
that requires exploration of conflicting perspectives and ideas.292 It follows that
individuals have no right to be free from emotional distress caused merely by ideas
with which they disagree. In addition to being inherent in the right against emotional distress itself, this limitation is necessary to reconcile that right with freedom of speech and thought.
This does not mean, however, that the right against emotional distress can
never be violated by speech, as the example of Wilkinson makes clear. Instead, the
distinction that must be drawn is one between ideas, which are protected by the
First Amendment, and personal abuse or other attacks on personality, which
should not be. In many cases this distinction will be clear, while in others it will

287

See supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.
See I. de S. v. W. de S., Y.B. Lib. Assis. f. 99, pl. 60 (1348).
289 See, e.g., Bouillon v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 129 S.W. 401, 402 (Mo. App. 1910).
290 RESTATEMENT, supra note 241, ¤ 46.
291 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing Locke); see also KANT,
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 208; KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 208, at
*214.
292 See infra Part II.E.
288
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be more difficult to draw. We shall return to this problem in Part IV in discussing
whether insults and hate speech should be protected by the First Amendment.
b. Formal Injury: Invasion of Privacy
The category of injuries to personality is not limited to the infliction of emotional distress. Suppose that A repeatedly makes anonymous, graphically obscene
telephone calls to B. If B suffers severe distress, she may well be able to recover for
intentional infliction. Even if she avoids such distress, however, the calls nevertheless constitute a serious and wrongful intrusion into her inner life.
As this example suggests, the right to personality is analogous to that of personal security in the external sphere. As we have seen, personal security includes
not only a right against substantive harm to the body, but also a formal right to
bodily integrity.293 Similarly, the right to personality is not limited to freedom
from substantive harm (emotional distress or psychological damage), but also includes a right to the formal integrity or inviolability of the self, that is, its immunity from external interference. Just as the right to bodily integrity was violated by
unauthorized touching that was inconsistent with personal dignity, so the right to
an Òinviolate personalityÓ is infringed by conduct that impermissibly crosses the
boundary that separates the self from others, thereby treating it in a way that is inconsistent with its dignity and integrity.
Many violations of this formal right of personality fall under the rubric of invasion of privacy.294 Privacy may be understood as the right to maintain the integrity of oneÕs personality and inner life by preserving the boundary that separates
them from other persons.295
The philosophical basis of privacy, and its relationship to free personality, may
be described as follows.296 In the sphere of external right, the individual was oriented toward the outside world. In the realm of personality, on the other hand, the
self turns inward, withdrawing from externality into itself. In so doing, it separates
itself from other selves and creates a boundary between itself and themÑa division
that is much deeper than that between physical bodies. In this respect, privacy is
rooted in negative freedom, both internally and in relation to other persons.

293

See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
In Part IV.A infra, I shall argue that profound insults also violate the dignity and
integrity of personality.
295 For an illuminating history of privacy and related issues in modern American life,
see ROCHELLE GURSTEIN, THE REPEAL OF RETICENCE (1996).
296 For valuable discussions of the nature of privacy, see STANLEY I. BENN, A THEORY
OF FREEDOM 264-305 (1988); KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 208, at *47172; NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds., 1971); ROBERT C. POST, The
Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, i n
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 27, at 51-88; ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM (1967); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968). The account that follows draws on HegelÕs discussion of subjectivity in the Philosophy of Right. See
H EGEL, supra note 208, ¤¤ 94A, 105-41.
294
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Privacy is not merely negative, however. By withdrawing into itself, the self
frees itself from externality, and thereby attains the capacity for self-determination.
This includes the freedom to direct oneÕs own thoughts and actions, within the
boundary that separates the self from others. Thus privacy creates an inviolable
realm of subjectivity within which individuals can develop a rich inner life. This
is the positive dimension of privacy, and its connection with positive freedom.
For these reasons, privacy is a fundamental right. Indeed, a minimum of privacy may be essential to the very existence of human personality.297 A person
differs from a thing in not being merely external, but in having an inward dimension as well. It is this distinction between internal and external that makes it possible for human beings to be autonomous, that is, to be determined by their own
inner selves. Without inwardness, people would be mere objects vulnerable to determination by external forces, or to manipulation or domination by other persons.298 Privacy safeguards the inwardness necessary for autonomous personality.
The right to privacy has two facets. The first is the liberty to determine oneÕs
own thoughts, feelings, and inner life in general, free from unauthorized intrusion
or interference by others. The second is the right to determine what aspects of
oneÕs private life should be revealed to others. These two sides of privacy perform
complementary roles in maintaining the boundary between the self and others: the
former prevents incursions into the personal sphere, while the latter protects that
sphere from involuntary exposure to the outside world.299
The first dimension of privacy is protected by section 652B of the Second Restatement of Torts, which imposes liability on one who Òintentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private
affairs or concerns,Ê.Ê.Ê. if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.Ó300 Acts of this sort (such as obscene or harassing telephone calls) have a
wrongful impact on the plaintiffÕs consciousness, interfering with her subjectivity

297 For an insightful discussion on which this paragraph draws, see Harry M. Clor,
Obscenity and Freedom of Expression, in CENSORSHIP AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 97,
102-04 (Harry M. Clor ed., 1971).
298 Thus Hamlet, in resisting the efforts of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to manipulate him into betraying his private thoughts, exclaims:
Why, look you now, how unworthy a thing you make of me. You would play
upon me, you would seem to know my stops, you would pluck out the heart of my
mystery, you would sound me from my lowest note to the top of my compassÊ.Ê.Ê.Ê.
[D]o you think I am easier to be played upon than a pipe?
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act III, sc. ii, ll. 354-61 (Harold Jenkins ed., Arden ed.,
Routledge 1989).
299 In addition to intrusion and exposure, American law treats two other interests
under the heading of privacy: the right not to be publicly portrayed in a false light, see
RESTATEMENT, supra note 241, ¤ 652E, and the right against use of oneÕs name or likeness for purposes to which one has not consented, see id. ¤ 652C. As I explain below,
these interests are better understood as part of the right to oneÕs image or persona. See
infra notes 327-29 and accompanying text.
300 RESTATEMENT, supra note 241, ¤ 652B.
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in much the same way that offensive battery interferes with her body. In this way
they violate the integrity and dignity of personality, and interfere with the individualÕs freedom to determine his own inner life.
Intrusion need not have a direct impact on the victimÕs consciousness, however.
In Hamberger v. Eastman,301 a landlord surreptitiously installed listening equipment in his tenantsÕ bedroom, and eavesdropped on their sexual relations for more
than a year.302 Although the tenants were unaware of this conduct, it nevertheless
intruded upon the most intimate aspects of private life. It therefore constituted a
violation of personality, in the same way that offensive battery can be committed
(even without the victimÕs knowledge) by making contact, not with the body itself, but with an object so closely connected with it as to be regarded as an extension thereof.303
In addition to intrusion, Hamberger illustrates the second form of invasion of
privacy, exposure. In some cases, the victimsÕ private life is exposed only to
those who have intruded into it, like the landlord in Hamberger.304 In other
cases, the wrong takes the form of revealing it to others or to the public in general.
This would be the case if the defendant in Hamberger had been a reporter for a tabloid television program which had then played recordings of the plaintiffsÕ sexual
activity on the air. Such cases are governed by section 652D of the Restatement,
which imposes liability on one who Ògives publicity to a matter concerning the
private life of another,Ó if the matter Òis of a kind that would be highly offensive to
a reasonable personÓ and Òis not of legitimate concern to the public.Ó305
In the case of intrusion, the injury involved invasion of the subjective realm by
the outside world. Conversely, the harm of exposure is that it transforms inward
subjectivity into a mere object for others. The point is well illustrated by the facts
of Boyles v. Kerr.306 Boyles took Kerr, whom he had been dating for several
months, back to his room and had sex with her. Unknown to Kerr, Boyles and
his friends had previously hidden a video camera in the closet and set it to record
anything that should take place. Boyles later screened the videotape for his college

301 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964). For an exploration of this case from a different perspective, see POST, supra note 296, at 52-59.
302 See id. at 239-40.
303 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 241, ¤ 18, cmt. c.
304 The fact that intrusion and exposure frequently coincide tends to blur the difference between them. The two wrongs are conceptually distinct, however, and each i s
capable of occurring without the other. Thus, obscene telephone calls are an instance of
intrusion that may involve little or no exposure of the victimÕs private life, while a
spouse who sells an intimate video of the honeymoon to a tabloid television program
may cause exposure without having committed a wrongful intrusion. In a broader sense,
however, freedom from intrusion and exposure are simply two sides of the basic concept
of privacy, the right to protect oneÕs private life by preserving the boundary between
oneself and others.
305 RESTATEMENT, supra note 241, ¤ 652D.
306 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993). The facts in this paragraph are taken from id. at 594.
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fraternity brothers. Word of the tape soon spread both at BoylesÕs school and at
the university that Kerr attended.
Boyles is a classic example of invasion of privacy through exposure of private
life.307 The injury of objectification through exposure can be seen on three distinct
levels. First, as discussed previously, an individualÕs body is not merely a physical organism but also the outward side of the self. There are some aspects and
functions of the body, however, in which the physical side of human beings is especially prominent. This is true of sexual activity in particular. Sex can be intensely personal, revealing a personÕs deepest feelings; yet it also reflects the side
of human beings that is shared with other animals. In order not to be seen solely
in this light, people often desire to shield their sexual behavior from the view of
outsiders.308 In KerrÕs case, the videotape was shown to people who had no interest in or regard for her as a person. In this way, she was stripped of the dignity of
personality and reduced to the status of a mere body.
On a second and deeper level, we can see the wrong in Boyles as the exposure
not of the body, but of the self. Those who watched the videotape were enabled to
gain access to KerrÕs most intimate feelings without her consent. Again, the result
was to transform her subjectivity into an object for the enjoyment of others. Third,
the videotape was made and shown to others without KerrÕs knowledge or agreement. In this way, the conduct denied her the respect due to an autonomous individual.309 Of course, all of these wrongs, which were committed without her
awareness, were greatly intensified when she discovered what had been done.
Boyles thus exemplifies the injury of exposure on three different levels: as a
wrong to the body viewed as the external side of the self; as an injury to the feelings of the determined self; and as disrespect to the self as an autonomous person.
In all of these ways, exposure transforms subjectivity into a mere object that others
can treat as they like.
The wrongfulness of exposure can be understood not only in terms of privacy,
but also in relation to self-expression. To have value for self-realization, speech
must be freely chosen by the self.310 Coerced expression, like that in the flag salute cases, not only lacks this value, but also does violence to the autonomy and

307 By setting up the video camera and recording the encounter, Boyles and his
friends also committed the tort of intrusion into KerrÕs private life. This intrusion may
be less obvious than in Hamberger, because the conduct took place in BoylesÕs own
room. But BoylesÕs right to privacy gave him no right to infringe KerrÕs. Although
Kerr consented to have sex with Boyles, and waived her privacy to that extent, she did
not consent to be videotaped. Thus the videotaping exceeded the scope of her consent
and constituted an intrusion into her personal life.
308 See HARRY M. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND P UBLIC MORALITY 224-27 (1969); GURSTEIN,
supra note 295, at 58-59.
309 Cf. Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L.
R EV. 445 (1997) (exploring the ways in which sexual harassment constitutes a denial of
respect).
310 See BAKER , supra note 169, at 54.
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dignity of the self.311 Thus the right to self-expression includes the capacity to
determine whether, how, and to whom one wishes to express oneself. In this way,
the right against unauthorized publicity can be understood as a right to decide for
oneself whether oneÕs private thoughts, feelings, and actions should be revealed to
others.
c. Injury to Social Personality: Defamation, ÒFalse Light,Ó and
Misappropriation of Name or Likeness
Leading commentators in the natural rights tradition, such as Blackstone and
Kent, held reputation to be a fundamental right.312 Yet they had some difficulty in
explaining the nature of this right. Their works classified reputation as an element
of personal security, although it seems quite different from the other rights in this
category (life, limb, body, and health).313 Moreover, the only justification they
offered for this right was an instrumental one. As Blackstone put it, Òreason and
natural justiceÓ require that reputation be protected, Òsince without [this] it is impossible to have the perfect enjoyment of any other advantage or right.Ó314 For example, to accuse an individual of a crime might subject him to prosecution; to assert that he had a loathsome disease might Òexclude him from societyÓ; to impugn
his professional skill or integrity might endanger his livelihood.315 On this view,
reputation deserves protection less for its own sake than because of its relation to
other rights or interests.
This difficulty in accounting for the right to reputation may be traced to the basic assumptions of classical natural rights theory. As we have seen, that theory
conceived of rights largely in external terms. Moreover, it focused on what Blackstone and Kent called Òabsolute rightsÓÑthose that inhered in individuals as separate and independent beings, rather than as members of society.316 It is hardly
surprising, then, that the classical theory would have difficulty with reputation, a
right that is rooted in personality and that has an important social dimension.
By the early nineteenth century, some writers were characterizing reputation in
less instrumentalist terms. As the Jeffersonian jurist St. George Tucker expressed
it, injuries to reputation were, Òto a man of sensibility, and of conscious integrity,Ê.Ê.Ê. the most grievous that can be inflicted.Ó317 On one hand, this view
looked back to an older conception of reputation as honor,318 while on the other it
anticipated a growing recognition of the value of individual personality. Modern
311

See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 50, at *129, *134; 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES
ON AMERICAN LAW *16.
313 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 50, at *129.
314 Id. at *134.
315 3 id. at *123.
316 See 1 BLACKSTONE , supra note 50, at *123; KENT , supra note 312, at *1.
317 Tucker, supra note 114, at 28.
318 See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation
and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 699-707 (1986).
312
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thought also stresses the social context of individual rights. Against this background, we may be able to sketch a deeper and more satisfying account of the right
to reputation, one that regards it as having intrinsic as well as instrumental value.
The starting point is to recognize that individuals relate to one another only
through the images that they have of each other. We have no direct or immediate
access to other selves: our knowledge of them depends on the way they appear to
us. This is not to say that we are incapable of knowing others as they really are; it
is merely to say that any such knowledge must be derived from our perceptions of
them.319
A personÕs image includes not only her name and appearance, but also her reputation, that is, what others say and think about her. In turn, reputation is a function of both (1) an individualÕs own character and activity, and (2) the way these
are viewed by others. A personÕs actions implicitly or explicitly express her self,
revealing her character, thoughts, and emotions. These actions make an impression on others who are affected by them. The latter interpret these actions as reflecting back on the self; they attribute the actions, as well as the thoughts and feelings that they appear to express, to the actor. The sum of what is imputed to an
individual in this way constitutes her reputation.
Image or reputation is not a mere representation of the self, however. Because
people interact only on the basis of their perceptions of one another, an individualÕs image may be said to constitute her social identity, or her self in relation to
others. Indeed, this is the root meaning of personaÑa Latin term which originally
referred to the mask worn by an actor, and hence came to mean the character in
which an individual appears to others.320
In addition to an internal self, then, an individual has an external, social self or
image. These two forms of personality are not simply distinct, however. From
the individualÕs own perspective, his image is or should be an expression of his
inner personality. Likewise, other people identify their image of a person with the
person as he really is. And this has a reflexive effect on the subjects themselves,
who have a strong tendency to internalize the view that others hold of them.321 In
all these ways, the internal and external sides of personality come to be joined.

319 Of course, this point holds not only for our knowledge of persons, but also for
our knowledge of other objects that exist in the world: we lack direct intuitive knowledge of them, and are capable of knowing them only through the way they appear to us.
See LOCKE, ESSAY, supra note 33, bk. II. As I argue below, the difference between our
knowledge of persons and of inanimate things is that the latter are merely passive objects for our observation, whereas the former are autonomous subjects who determine, i n
part, the image that we have of them.
320 See O XFORD E NGLISH D ICTIONARY, supra note 277, s.v. person, persona.
321 I do not mean to imply, of course, that individuals have no choice but to accept
the image that others hold of them. In order to interact with others, however, a person
must either accept this image, make an effort to change it, or become resigned to the existence of a dichotomy between her self-image and how she is viewed by othersÑa particularly deep form of personal and social alienation.
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Thus there is a certain unity between the self and its image, just as there was between the self and the body in the sphere of external rights. More-over, the self asserts a claim to its image, for it is only through this image that it is capable of interacting with others and thus fully realizing itself. It follows that one has a right
to oneÕs image, including oneÕs reputation. This right has two elements. Negatively, it consists in a right not to have actions or characteristics falsely imputed to
oneself.322 Positively, it is the right not to be deprived of the image that one has
legitimately acquired through interaction with others.
The right to image and reputation is partly internal and partly external to personality. On one hand, image is an aspect or dimension of the self; on the other
hand, it has an outward existence in the minds of others.323 In the latter respect, it
resembles the right to property, which also relates to things external to the self.
This discussion also points to the limits of the right to reputation. Because it
exists in the minds of others, reputation is a function not only of the individual
herself, but also of the way that others view her. The very concept of reputation
supposes that others have a right to form impressions and opinions of a person,
insofar as they are affected by her.
Defamation injures an individualÕs reputation by falsely representing her character or actions in a way that lowers her in the esteem of others, either by negative
accusations or by disparaging the positive reputation that she has acquired. Defamation constitutes an intrinsic wrong to personality, and may instrumentally harm
rights and interests of the kind that Blackstone discusses.324 Defamation is
wrongful only if it is false, however, because one has a right to reputation only to
the extent that it accurately reflects the self.
In causing harm to reputation, defamation is analogous to the other substantive
injuries that we have explored, such as harmful battery and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. But reputation also has a dignitary side. As we have seen,
reputation is in part a reflection of the self. In this respect, there is a fundamental
distinction between the images that we form of persons and those we form of
things: the latter are merely passive objects that human beings are free to visualize
as they please, while the former are autonomous subjects with some claim to shape
the way others view them.325 To falsely represent an individualÕs character or ac-

322 Kant characterizes this as the right to be held Òbeyond reproach (iusti), since
before [one] performs any act affecting rights [one] has done no wrong to anyone.Ó According to Kant, this is part of the innate right to freedom. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS, supra note 208, at *237-38. My formulation is somewhat broader than this,
for it includes not only accusations of actions contrary to right, but also other imputations which injure an individualÕs reputation or (as I shall explain below) represent her
in a false and highly offensive light.
323 See G.W.F. HEGEL, LECTURES ON NATURAL RIGHT AND POLITICAL SCIENCE ¤ 45, at
97 (J. Michael Stewart & Peter C. Hodgson trans., 1995) (discussing honor in these
terms).
324 See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
325 See T RIBE , supra note 120, ¤ 15-16, at 1389-90.
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tions for our own purposes is to treat him as a mere object rather than an active
subject, thus infringing the dignity inherent in personality.
This account of reputation recalls our earlier discussion of privacy.326 Both
rights serve to protect the self from improper forms of objectification. Within the
bounds of the right to privacy, an individual is free to develop her own subjectivity
without intrusion from or exposure to the outside world. By contrast, reputation
is concerned not with the inner self but with its outward, social dimension. In this
regard, a person has no right to be free from the observation and judgment of others. The right to reputation does not preclude this, but rather aims to protect individuals from being reduced to the status of mere objects, rather than also being
viewed as autonomous subjects. In short, the right to privacy creates an inner
realm within which the self may not be viewed as an object at all, while the right
to reputation regulates the manner in which the image of the self is constructed in
the social realm.
In exploring other rights, we saw that they could be violated not only in a substantive but also in a formal way, by infringing their dignitary aspect.327 The
same is true here. Falsely representing a personÕs character or actions might not
cause substantive harm to reputation in a particular case, but would nevertheless
violate her dignity as an autonomous being. This is the subject of the tort known
as Òfalse light,Ó which consists of misrepresenting an individual before the public
in a way highly offensive to a reasonable person.328 Although Òfalse lightÓ is often classified as a form of invasion of privacy, it is best understood as protecting
the dignitary dimension of reputation.
Finally, the right to social personality is also violated when oneÕs name or
likeness is appropriated by others without oneÕs consent. Such conduct may also
violate the right to privacy, by involuntarily exposing oneÕs self to the world.329

326
327

See supra Part II.C.2.b.
See, e.g., supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text (discussing offensive bat-

tery).
328

See RESTATEMENT, supra note 241, ¤ 652E.
See id. ¤ 652C. For example, in one leading case, a young woman had her portrait
taken by a photographer, who later sold the photograph without her knowledge or
consent to a company which used it to advertise their products. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). After the New York Court of Appeals
denied recovery, see id., the legislature responded by enacting the first modern privacy
law. See P ROSSER AND KEETON ON THE L AW OF TORTS 850-51 (W. Page Keeton et al.
eds., 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON]. Other states protect against misappropriation of name or likeness as a matter of either statutory or common law. See id.
at 851-52.
In many cases, such as Roberson, the plaintiffÕs name or likeness is used in such a
way that she appears to endorse the defendantÕs product or other purposes. In such instances, the defendantÕs conduct also violates the plaintiffÕs right to self-expression, b y
falsely representing her as expressing a certain view.
329
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3. A Response to Some Objections
In the previous section, I argued that in addition to justifying freedom of expression, the concept of individual self-determination gives rise to a variety of other
rights, including reputation, privacy, and freedom from infliction of emotional distress. These rights are no less essential to self-realization than is free speech itself.
From a civil libertarian perspective, one might object that the law cannot properly protect these Òrights of personalityÓ because they are merely internal and subjective. The power of government consists of external force, and this force can legitimately be used only to regulate outward action that affects the external rights of
others, not to control peopleÕs inner lives, such as their thoughts and beliefs.330
Moreover, the objection continues, injuries to personality are merely subjectiveÑharms that exist only in an individualÕs mind, and which for this reason are
incapable of any objective definition or proof. To allow regulation on this basis
would violate the cardinal First Amendment principle that speech may not be restricted merely because others find it offensive, and would open the door to
Òboundless subjectivityÓ in determining what speech should be restricted.331
I fully agree that the coercive power of law applies only to external interaction,
and cannot rightfully extend to the internal realm of thought and belief. It is crucial to recognize, however, that the terms ÒinternalÓ and ÒexternalÓ are relative:
nothing is either ÒinternalÓ or ÒexternalÓ in an absolute sense, but only in relation
to something else. For this reason, determining when laws legitimately regulate
external interaction and when they improperly intrude into the internal sphere requires a more complex analysis than the objection suggests.
At the core of the internal realm lies the individualÕs ability to determine his
own thoughts, beliefs, and feelings. Because these are wholly internal to the individual and directly affect him alone, they are entirely beyond the external power of
the state.
In contrast, the expression of oneÕs thoughts and feelings to others is a kind of
external interaction, which affects other individuals as well as oneself.332 Nevertheless, insofar as the communication involves only a willing speaker and a willing listener, and does not affect the rights of third persons (as in cases of defamation
and invasion of privacy), it may be regarded as internal to the relationship between
speaker and listener, though it is external to each viewed as a separate individual.

330

See, e.g., LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 32, at 26-27.
FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 152 (1981) (criticizing
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress because of Òthe boundless subjectivity that inheres in judgments like ÔoutrageousnessÕÓ).
332 Recognizing this point, John Stuart Mill observes that the expression of opinions
Òbelongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people.Ó
MILL, supra note 151, at 13. He argues, however, that liberty of expression, Òbeing almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part o n
the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it.Ó Id. Nevertheless, he makes clear
that freedom of speech is limited by the rights of others. See id. at 53.
331
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Government may not properly intrude into this relationship, with regard to which
the government is an outsider, an external force.
The case is very different, however, when a speaker seeks to communicate with
an unwilling listener. Here, there is no voluntary relationship in relation to which
the speech can be considered internal. Instead, the interaction is simply an external
one. That it is external does not, of course, necessarily make it wrongful. But
when expression is not merely directed to an unwilling listener, but also violates
her rights, the speech amounts toÑand is experienced asÑan external attack. This
brings it within the legitimate sphere of government, whose function is to protect
individuals from such assaults.
But are such attacks capable of inflicting harm to personality? Insofar as the self
is purely internal, it cannot suffer injury from without. Yet the self also has a dimension that relates to and interacts with the outside world. In addition to the
connection that it has with its own body and life, the self forms attachments to
other persons and objects. Actual or threatened injury to something that is closely
connected with the self may inflict serious harm to the mind and feelings.
It is sometimes said that the self cannot suffer such harm involuntarily. Bodily
injury may be inflicted against a personÕs will, and the same is true of mental
harms that flow from the noncommunicative aspects of an act (such as the screeching of fingernails on a blackboard). By contrast, harm caused by the content of expressionÑwhat Judith Jarvis Thomson calls Òbelief-mediated distressÓ333 Ñcan
occur only if one listens to, understands, and accepts what the speaker is saying.334 And this depends on the listenerÕs will. It follows that one can suffer such
harm only if one wills to, and voluntary harms do not constitute a wrong.
This objection is successful in showing that some reactions to speech or conduct should not be regarded as injuries. The objection is clearly too broad, however, as Wilkinson shows.335 Surely the shock and grief provoked by sudden news
of a spouseÕs death or serious injury will generally be beyond oneÕs control.
Thus, belief-mediated distress is not always voluntary.
The notion that belief-mediated distress does not constitute an injury might be
based on a different notionÑnot that the distress is subject to oneÕs control at the
time it occurs, but that one can suffer such distress only if one has previously chosen to adopt a particular belief or attitude. Once again, however, this is not always
the case. For instance, the anguish suffered by one who learns that she has a terminal illness may stem from an innate desire for life, or fear of death, rather than
from any attitude or belief that she has chosen to adopt.

333

THOMSON, supra note 204, at 249-71.
See BAKER, supra note 169, at 55-56 (ÒThe key quality distinguishing most
harms caused by protected speech acts from most harms caused by unprotected activities
is that speech-caused harms typically occur only to the extent that people ÔmentallyÕ
adopt perceptions or attitudes.Ó); C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 7 0
S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 989-92 (1997) (elaborating this view).
335 See supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text (discussing Wilkinson).
334
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Moreover, even if all attitudes were adopted voluntarily, this should not lead us
to conclude that any distress connected with them does not constitute an injury. A
desire for life, a belief in oneÕs human dignity, and the love that one feels for other
people are all central to self-fulfillment. Even if it were possible to Òretreat to the
inner citadelÓ and refuse to connect oneself with other persons and things, this in
itself would be a great obstacle to self-realization.336 As we have seen, individuals
have a drive to realize themselves through interaction with the world.337 In this
way, the self forms connections with other persons and things, and thereby becomes vulnerable to harm. In doing so, individuals should not be regarded as
placing themselves beyond protection against deliberate injury.
In short, personality is capable of suffering injury from without. This is especially clear in the case of invasion of privacy, which transgresses the boundary
separating the self from the outside world, and defamation, which injures the outward dimension of personality.
Are the rights that I have discussed truly rights, however, or are they merely
subjective interests that are not entitled to recognition and enforcement by law?
These rights do relate to the subjective or internal life of the individual. But that
does not mean that they are Òmerely subjectiveÓ in the sense of being inessential.
Subjectivity is constitutive of the self; without it, a human being would not be a
person. As we have seen, subjectivity is the basis of individual rights, and its realization is also an intrinsic value for individuals. Indeed, that is precisely the insight on which the self-realization theory of the First Amendment is based. And
that insight applies with equal force to other rights of personality.
We can make a similar response to the assertion that recognizing rights of personality would permit Òboundless subjectivityÓ in determining what restrictions to
impose on speech. Those rights do not authorize government to restrict speech
whenever some people or even a majority consider it offensive. Such offense cannot provide a valid ground for regulating expression that is internal to an individual, or to the relationship between willing speakers and listeners, because such expression by definition does not affect the rights of others.338 Similarly, speech that
is addressed to the public may not be restricted merely because it offends the excessive sensibilities of some, for that too would involve restricting the speech of some
people based on the merely subjective reactions of others.
But speech that is directed toward individuals with the intention of violating
their rights presents a different case. Although the injury may include offense or
some other emotional or mental reaction, it is not the reaction alone that is the
ground for restriction, but the violation of individual rights. And because those

336 See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR
(1969).
337 See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
338 Cf. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 46-47
social order which accords to individual liberty any value
to be protected from distressÓ caused by the mere thought
conduct to which one objects).

ESSAYS

ON

LIBERTY 135-41

(1963) (arguing that Ò[n]o
could also accord the right
that others are engaging i n
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rights are not Òmerely subjectiveÓ but reflect fundamental principles of right, the
law should be able to define them with sufficient clarity for practical purposes.
Finally, some would argue that even if expression causes harms to the subjectivity of others, it should be constitutionally protected if it furthers the speakerÕs own
self-realization. Thus, in Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech, C. Edwin Baker
observes that arguments for regulation sometimes rely on detrimental effects to othersÑfor instance, that Òpublication of unsavory, libelous information damages valued reputations or invades sensitive areas of privacy,Ó or that Òharassing remarks
cause emotional distress and pain.Ó339 Baker concludes, however, that such
speech should be protected on traditional civil libertarian grounds:
(1) Allowing even justifiable restrictions on expression will lead to acceptance of improper suppression. (2) The majority must respect individualsÕ
choices about their own values and not force them to falsify their values. (3)
The state must permit people to speak to express themselves and make their
contribution to changing the world even if some people find the speech
harmful or distasteful.340
ÒBoth the second and the third points,Ó he adds, are Òstraightforward applications
of the principle that the state must respect peopleÕs integrity and autonomy.Ó341
As we have seen, however, while autonomy includes the right to pursue oneÕs
own self-realization, it does not confer a general privilege to violate the rights of
others. Baker accepts this point in principle, holding that speech is not entitled to
protection if it fails to Òrespect the otherÕs autonomy and integrity as a personÓ or
Òimproperly interferes with the otherÕs rights.Ó342 But he largely limits this category to speech which involves violence to person or property, or which coerces or
otherwise distorts the will of another (such as blackmail and fraud).343 He makes
clear that this category does not extend to such rights as privacy and emotional
tranquillity.344 In part, this reflects the view already discussed, that these interests
are merely internal and subjective. And in part, it reflects the tendency of modern
First Amendment theory to conceive of free speech issues as conflicts between individual rights and social interests.345 In the quoted passage, Baker characterizes
the arguments about the injuries caused by expression not as rights-based arguments, but rather as Òefficiency argumentsÓ concerned with the impact of expression on aggregate social welfare.346 In both of these ways, Baker fails to recognize
that privacy and other interests of personality are rights that have precisely the

339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346

B AKER, supra note 169, at 86.
Id. at 87.
Id.
Id. at 56, 58.
See id. at 59-60.
See id. at 86.
See supra Part I.D.
B AKER, supra note 169, at 87.
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same basis as his own account of freedom of speechÑthe value of individual selfrealization.
D. Free Speech and Community
Thus far, we have explored two dimensions of libertyÑfreedom in relation to
the external world and in the development and expression of personality. In addition to justifying freedom of speech and thought, these two principles also support
other rights such as personal security, privacy, and reputation.
External rights and rights of personality are liberties that in principle can be
possessed and enjoyed by a single individual, without any necessary interaction
with others. In the language of classical social contract theory, they are aspects of
natural liberty, or rights that would belong to individuals even in a state of nature.
Of course, human beings live not in a state of nature but in society with others.
What does liberty mean in this sphere? Society imposes limitations on individuals, and in this way may seem antithetical to freedom. A central insight of the liberal tradition, however, is that social constraints can be reconciled with selfdetermination if, and insofar as, they can be regarded as limitations that people
freely impose upon themselves.347 In particular, laws made by the political community are consistent with freedom (1) formally, insofar as they result from a process of collective self-determination in which all citizens have a voice; and (2) substantively, to the extent that they are necessary to protect individual liberty or
advance the common goodÑthat is, those ends that individuals have in common
and would authorize the community to pursue through collective action. According to this view, the essential purpose of society is not to restrict but to promote
freedom. It does this not merely by protecting natural liberty, but also by creating
new opportunities for the realization of individual capacities through social interaction, as well as by enabling people to pursue ends collectively that they could not
achieve as well (or at all) on their own.348
Against this background, we can sketch what it means to be a free person in the
social realm. First, and most fundamentally, it means to be a citizen or member
of the community, and to be treated as such by others and by the community as a
whole.349 We shall return to this point in discussing the problem of hate
speech.350

347 See, e.g., LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 29, II ¤ 95; JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU,
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT bk. I, chs. 6, 8 (Hopkins trans.), in SOCIAL CONTRACT: LOCKE,
HUME, ROUSSEAU (Ernest Barker ed., 1947); KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note
208, at *313-14.
348 On law and society as expanding freedom, see, for example, LOCKE, TWO TREATISES,
supra note 29, II ¤ 57; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 50, at *125-26; [Thomas Tudor
Tucker,] Oration in Commemoration of American Independence (1795), quoted in id.
(ed. note).
349 This understanding is closely related to the etymological origins of Òfreedom.Ó
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word can be traced back to a Germanic root meaning ÒdearÓ or Òto loveÓ (and thus is related to ÒfriendÓ). It came t o
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Second, in a free society individuals are entitled to the two forms of liberty that
we have already exploredÑexternal rights and rights of personalityÑsubject to
such regulation as is necessary to protect the rights of others and of the community. In addition to being protected by ordinary law against other individuals,
such freedom, traditionally known as civil liberty, is also constitutionally safeguarded against invasion by the government itself.
Third, a free person has a claim to social liberty, or the right to form social relationships and to participate in community life. This form of freedom arises only
within society. In the classical legal tradition, it is sometimes referred to as the
ÒprivilegesÓ of society, in contrast to those ÒimmunitiesÓ which consist in the
natural liberty that individuals retain within society.351 Finally, a free person is
entitled to political liberty, or the right to full and equal participation in the process by which the community governs itself and its members.
Taken together, these four elementsÑcitizenship and the civil, social, and political rights that flow from itÑdefine what it means to be free within the sphere of
community. Only in this way can it be said that individuals remain autonomous
even though they are subject to social constraint.
Just as liberty in the first two spheres provided justifications for freedom of
speech, so does liberty in the realm of community. First, free speech is entitled to
constitutional protection as a form of civil libertyÑa rationale that applies to private as well as public speech. Second, speech plays an essential role in overseeing
the use of governmental authority, preventing or exposing abuses of power and
thereby protecting civil liberty against the threat of tyranny. This rationale, which
was central to the eighteenth-century American understanding of freedom of
speech,352 is an important theme in modern First Amendment decisions such as
New York Times v. Sullivan.353
In addition to constituting a barrier against abuse of power, free speech has crucial positive value in relation to political liberty and democratic self-government.
As we have seen, this value was central to Justice BrandeisÕs defense of free speech
in Whitney v. California.354 ÒThose who won our independence,Ó he wrote,
believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their
faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail

have its present meaning through being applied to those members of the household who
shared a bond of kinship, as distinguished from slaves. See OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, supra note 277, s.v. free. In its origins, then, the term ÒfreeÓ combined the
notion of liberty with that of belonging to a particular community. Although this etymology is remote from our current use of the word, we may discern a similar connection
in the notion of constitutional rights as the privileges and immunities of citizenship.
350 See infra Part IV.B.
351 See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 50, at *129.
352 See Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 42.
353 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
354 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also supra note 156-57
and accompanying text.
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over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. * * *
They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of
noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that
public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental
principle of the American government.355
These themes are further developed by Alexander Meiklejohn in a classic series
of lectures first published in 1948.356 American government, Meiklejohn maintains, is founded on a ÒcompactÓ that we have made as free and equal individuals
to constitute a self-governing community.357 Freedom of speech must be protected because it is essential to democratic self-government. Meiklejohn elaborates
this view by reference to the traditional town meeting, in which citizens gather to
discuss and act on matters of public concern. In such a meeting, every individual
Òhas a right and a duty to think his own thoughts, to express them, and to listen
to the arguments of others. The basic principle is that the freedom of speech shall
be unabridged,Ó so that the community can reach the wisest and most fully informed decisions on the issues that come before it.358 This means that no view
Òshall be denied a hearing because it is on one side of the issue rather than another,Ó or because others think it false or dangerous.359
In the nature and requirements of a self-governing community, Meiklejohn finds
not only the basis of political free speech, but also its limits. Again, he makes the
point in the context of the town meeting. The meeting cannot function unless its
members observe certain rules of orderÑrules that, for example, forbid interrupting
one who has the floor, or speaking abusively toward other members. Speech of
this sort obstructs the deliberative process, and thus Òthreatens to defeat the purpose of the meeting.Ó 360 For this reason, it is not protected by the principle of political free speech.
This highlights a crucial point about free speech as political liberty. When
viewed in terms of external rights or self-realization, freedom of speech was an inherently individual right. In contrast, political free speech is best understood as a
relational rightÑa right to interact with others in a particular way.361 As de355 Id. For an insightful reading of this opinion, see Vincent Blasi, The First
Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v.
California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1988).
356 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 170.
357 Id. at 14-19, 27, 88.
358 Id. at 24, 26.
359 Id. at 26-27.
360 Id. at 24-25.
361 This distinction between inherently individual rights and relational rights is a
traditional one. Blackstone and Kent, for example, distinguish between ÒabsoluteÓ
rights, which are inherent in individuals and would exist even in a state of nature, and
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scribed by Brandeis and Meiklejohn, it is a right to discourse with other individuals who have the same rights of citizenship and participation, and who share certain
interests as a community. The right to participate in public deliberation thus carries with it a duty to respect the corresponding rights of other citizens and of the
community itself.
Like the previous justifications, then, the concept of political liberty supports a
right to free speech and at the same time points to limitations on that right. In the
case of political free speech, these limitations are internal to the right itself. Like
other freedoms, political free speech is also subject to external limitations arising
from other rights, such as personal security and reputation. Because of its great
value, however, political speech sometimes should be protected at the expense of
other rights, as in the New York Times case.
Freedom of speech is also an element of social liberty. Communication plays
an essential role in forming and maintaining social relationships. Individuals also
have a right to participate in, and contribute to, the culture of the community.362
Once again, when understood in this way, free speech is best understood as a relational right to take part in shared activity.363
Finally, in addition to its role in promoting social and political ends, we
should recognize the ways in which speech itself is social. When viewed as a form
of external action or self-realization, expression appeared to be an essentially individual activity. In exploring the notion of self-realization, however, we observed
that individuals have a strong drive to express themselves not merely through solitary activity, but also in relation to other people. This led us to conclude that the

ÒrelativeÓ rights, which belong to individuals Òas members of society, and standing i n
various relations to each other.Ó 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 50, at *123; 2 KENT, supra
note 312, at *1. In these terms, personal liberty is an absolute right, while family and
political relationships involve relative rights. To avoid misunderstanding, it should
be noted that, in this traditional terminology, the terms ÒabsoluteÓ and ÒrelativeÓ refer
to the nature rather than the strength of the right: although absolute rights were inherent in individuals, they were limited by the rights of others, and (except insofar as the
right was an inalienable one) subject to regulation for the common good. See Steven J.
Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 532-33 (1991) [hereinafter Heyman, First Duty].
362 See, e.g., Police DepÕt v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972); Emerson, supra
note 25, at 883. In some cases, participation in culture is a private activity that falls
within the notion of civil liberty. For example, people may go to a movie for enjoyment
with no thought of influencing the culture. On the other hand, a critic who discusses
cultural trends is engaged in a more public activity that is analogous to political participation.
363 Although this section has focused on the meaning of liberty within society as a
whole, it should be noted that rights of community also apply to other groups, such as
families, neighborhoods, workplaces, universities, and churches. All of these communities involve interaction with others and require respect for their rights. In some cases,
these rights are protected by public or private law, while in others they are governed b y
the internal rules or understandings of the group itself.
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right of expression must be exercised with due regard for the self-realization of others.364
If we reflect further, however, we can see that the notions of self-expression and
self-realization do not fully capture the nature of speech to others. In many cases, a
speaker desires not merely to express his own thoughts or feelings, but to create a
condition of mutual understanding between himself and the listener. Moreover,
this generally involves not one person speaking and another listening, but discourse between two or more people. In these ways, speech that seeks mutual understanding is more than merely the sum of the expression and reception of the individuals involved. Instead, such speech constitutes not simply self-expression
but communicationÑan inherently social, relational activity.365
This social dimension is essential to many of the functions that speech performs
within the sphere of community. In particular, the formation of social relationships, the development of a common culture, and democratic deliberation all depend upon the possibility of achieving some measure of mutual understanding
among individuals. This social dimension is also central to the final justification
for freedom of speech, its value in relation to truth.
E. Free Speech and the Search for Truth
In contrast to inanimate objects, human beings not only exist but are conscious
of their existence and their relation to the natural and social world that surrounds
them. This consciousness lies at the root of freedom: it is what enables human
beings to be self-determining, rather than wholly determined by external forces.
In analyzing consciousness, we can distinguish between subject and objectÑbetween the conscious self and what the self is conscious of. That is not to
say, of course, that the two must necessarily be different things. In the case of selfknowledge, subject and object are identical: the self that knows is the same as the
object that is known. In other cases, however, subject and object are distinct. One
who observes a natural object or event, for example, is not the same as that which
is observed. In such cases, it is possible for consciousness either to conform with
its object or to fail to do soÑor rather (since this is a matter of degree) for consciousness to be more or less successful in achieving knowledge of the object.

364

See supra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Robin West, Toward a First Amendment Jurisprudence of Respect: A
Comment on George FletcherÕs Constitutional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 759, 761
(1993). I should note that, unlike West, I do not mean to suggest that free speech
should be viewed as communication rather than self-expression. See id. at 761, 765.
As I have argued, the First Amendment should protect solitary expression as well as
that which is communicated to others. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
Moreover, the notion of self-expression naturally develops into that of communication.
Speech does not cease to be expressive when it involves communication with others;
on the contrary, all communication includes an element of self-expression within it.
What makes communication distinctive, and irreducible to self-expression, is that the
former also contains the social dimension of seeking mutual understanding.
365
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Consciousness may be described as true insofar as it accords with its object and
false insofar as it deviates from it.
This brings us to the last traditional justification for freedom of speech and
thoughtÑthat it is essential to the attainment of truth. While usually discussed in
a rather general way, it is important to observe that the search for truth takes place
not in the abstract, but within the different spheres that we have already explored.
Thus, it includes the effort to achieve knowledge of the natural world, of the inward
self, and of the social and political world. This includes not only empirical
knowledge of particular things and events within these spheres, but also theoretical
inquiry into the principles that govern them.
In pursuing natural, personal, and social knowledge, human beings often come
to raise more ultimate questions. For example, what is the relationship between
the different spheres? Can they be understood to form a larger whole? If so, what
are the nature and origins of this whole? What place do human beings have within
it? This is the deepest level on which the search for truth takes place, a realm that
is explored in much art, literature, religion, philosophy, and science.
What value does truth have for human beings?366 To begin with, it has instrumental value in furthering their aims in other realms. Knowledge of the external world is necessary to protect oneÕs personal safety, construct a skyscraper, or
diagnose and treat a disease. Self-knowledge is vital for determining what profession to pursue, or what kind of personal or family life is most likely to be satisfying. Information about social and political matters is essential for democratic selfgovernment. And a personÕs religious and philosophical beliefs influence her view
of what values are worth pursuing.
In addition to its instrumental importance, truth also has intrinsic value. As
Milton and Mill stress, in pursuing truth human beings exercise and develop their
intellectual capacities. In this way, they realize their nature as rational beings, the
source of human dignity.367
In light of these values, self-determining beings would pursue truth both for its
own sake and because it is necessary for effective self-determination in other
spheres. For this reason, the search for truth is an essential aspect of human liberty, and thus a fundamental right. This right includes not only freedom of
thought and belief, but also freedom of speech. Once again, this point can best be
explored in relation to the different spheres.
As I have suggested, we can know objects only through their appearances.368
In the case of external objects, it is difficult to know how far oneÕs perceptions are
accurate, and how far they are limited or distorted by oneÕs own biases and limitations. Thus, to attain accurate knowledge of the external world, individuals need
to correlate their own perceptions with those of others. In addition to its impor-

366 For an insightful discussion of this issue, see Susan H. Williams, A Feminist
Theory of Truth (Aug. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
367 See MILL, supra note 151, at 33-35; MILTON , supra note 217, at 29-30, 37.
368 See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
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tance in everyday life, this process is central to judicial factfinding, scientific investigation, and other modes of inquiry.
The search for truth takes a very different form in the personal realm. There, instead of seeking objective perception of the external world, the individual turns inward in search of self-knowledge. For the most part, such knowledge can be derived only from introspection, not from other people. Even in this sphere,
however, discussion is important in several ways. First, individuals are not always fully aware of their own thoughts and feelings. Expressing oneÕs attitudes in
a journal, or in conversation with others, is often useful not only in clarifying what
they are, but also in shaping and determining what they should be. Second, individuals realize themselves not only in their inner lives but also through interaction
with others. An important dimension of self-knowledge involves understanding
how oneÕs actions affect other people, and how one is regarded by them. Communication is necessary for this purpose as well.369 Finally, while every individual
is unique, he also possesses many characteristics in common with others (such as
being an American, a Midwesterner, a male, a musician, a Catholic, a human being, and so on). Discussion with others who share these qualities (or conversely,
who differ from oneself in some of these respects) is valuable in exploring what
meaning or value these attributes have and what role, if any, they should have play
in oneÕs identity.
This recognition of the social aspect of personality brings us to the social and
political realm. In this sphere, the search for truth takes the form of an effort by the
members of society to develop shared understandings of such matters as justice and
the common good, which constitute the object of truth within this realm, just as
the external world and the self did in the first two spheres.
The search for social and political truth can be understood in several different
ways. Perhaps the most familiar is Justice HolmesÕs image of the marketplace of
ideas.370 According to laissez-faire economic theory, the pursuit of individual selfinterest leads, through the workings of the market, to the greatest aggregate welfare
of society as a whole. In addition, market competition results in the success of
those products that best satisfy the needs and desires of consumers. Similarly, in
his famous dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, Holmes suggests that
Òthe best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,Ó and that the truth which emerges in this way offers the best
chance of bringing about Òthe ultimate goodÓ that people desire.371

369 The attainment of self-knowledge in these and other ways is a central theme in the
novels of Jane Austen. See, e.g., JANE AUSTEN, EMMA bk. III, ch. XI (R.W. Chapman ed.,
rev. ed. 1969); JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE bk. II, ch. XIII (R.W. Chapman ed.,
rev. ed. 1969).
370 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
371 Id.

HEYMANPUB .DOC

1998]

5/11/99 8:41 AM

RIGHTING THE BALANCE

1349

Despite its powerful impact on American thought, HolmesÕs marketplace metaphor is unpersuasive as an account of the search for social and political truth.372
As I have noted, individuals regarded as market participants pursue their own private good. Thus the participants in a marketplace of ideas would opt for those
ideas that best promoted their own subjective interests or beliefs, and the ideas that
prevailed would be those that best satisfied the subjective beliefs or interests of the
greatest number of people. The outcome of the process, however, would not be an
objective truth but merely an aggregate subjective belief. Although this belief
might accord with the interests and views of a majority, there is no reason why it
should necessarily be consistent with those of other individuals or groups.
HolmesÕs account therefore fails to explain how the subjective perspectives of individuals and groups can be transformed into truths shared by the society as a whole.
In contrast to HolmesÕs economic metaphor, Justice Brandeis and Alexander
Meiklejohn articulate a civic model of the search for truth.373 According to this
view, public discourse is best understood as a forum within which free and equal
citizens articulate competing views on justice and the public good, in a common
effort to advance these ends. Only in this way can we arrive at political truth.
This view does not necessarily assume that discussion will lead to consensus. Indeed, diversity of opinion is valuable so that issues may be illuminated from every
perspective.374 For the civic conception, the most important truth is not any particular outcome of the process, but rather a commitment to public discourse itself.
Ultimately, this is the bond that holds the political community together and
makes it possible for citizens to reach common ground.
This civic conception is superior to HolmesÕs marketplace of ideas in showing
how it is possible to arrive at common understandings through free discussion.
Yet if the marketplace model conceives of individuals in an overly private way, the
civic conception may err in the opposite direction. According to Meiklejohn, individuals possess two Òradically differentÓ capacitiesÑtheir role as citizens and
their role as private persons.375 Likewise, he draws a fundamental distinction between public speech, which relates to the common good, and speech that is directed toward private interests.376 As Meiklejohn himself recognizes, however, in
a liberal society Òthe public interest is not another different interest superimposed
upon our individual desires and intentions,Ó but rather Òis made up out of the
separate purposes of the citizens.Ó377 If this is so, then the search for political truth
requires that we give a hearing not only to competing conceptions of the common
good, but also to the particular interests of which it is composed. For this reason,
372 For some other critiques of the marketplace theory, see BAKER, supra note 169, at
6-24; Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from
a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW . U.L. R EV. 1212, 1281 (1983).
373 See supra notes 354-60 and accompanying text.
374 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 170, at 27-28.
375 See id. at 80.
376 See id. at 79-80.
377 Id. at 81.
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political speech should not be thought of as occurring solely on a public level.
Instead, such speech mediates between the private and public realms by showing
how the interests of particular individuals and groups should be understood as
forming part of the communityÕs good. On this revised civic conception, the
search for social and political truth involves the effort to arrive at mutual understanding through the transformation of subjective views that reflect particular interests, as well as through debate over more general conceptions of justice and the
common good. This view incorporates elements of both the civic and the marketplace model, with their respective views of individuals as public and private actors.
To summarize, truth exists when subjective consciousness accords with its object. In the case of external knowledge, the object is the dominant element. By
contrast, in the personal sphere subjectivity is central, for the object is nothing
other than the self. Social and political knowledge involves the integration of
oneÕs subjective views with those of others in order to develop common ground
and mutual understanding. In each of these realms, the search for truth requires not
merely individual thought but also discussion with others.
As I have suggested, we can conceive of the pursuit of ultimate meaning and
value as an effort to understand the relationship between these three spheres,
whether they form a whole, the nature and origins of this whole, and the place of
human beings within it. Because this effort draws upon knowledge from the other
spheres, the search for truth on this level also presupposes involvement by other
people.
It is on this level that many of the great controversies over freedom of expression
have occurred. A traditional justification for censorship was that it was necessary
to prevent the spread of ideas that would undermine the fundamental truths on
which a particular social order was based. Advocates of free expression such as
Milton, Locke, and Mill responded in several ways. First, they argued that this
justification failed to recognize the subjective dimension of truth. Even if a belief
is objectively true, it will lack vital force unless it is actually held by those who
profess it.378 Second, these writers asserted that the supporters of censorship were
mistaken in identifying their own views, or the dominant beliefs of the society,
with objective truth. Truth is not directly accessible to human beings, but can be
arrived at only through the clash of conflicting perspectives.379 Finally, they implied, one of the most important truths about human beings is that they are rational beings whose dignity and fulfillment requires that they actively pursue
truth.380 For all these reasons, freedom of thought and expression are necessary for
the search for truth regarding ultimate meaning and value.
In exploring external freedom, personality, and community, we saw that the
same values that supported freedom of expression also pointed to certain con378 See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 32, at 26-27, 38; MILL, supra note 151, at 3842; MILTON, supra note 217, at 37.
379 See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 32, at 27-28; MILL, supra note 151, at 44-50;
M ILTON, supra note 217, at 17-19, 41-46.
380 See M ILL, supra note 151, at 33-35; MILTON , supra note 217, at 29-30, 37.
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straints on this freedom. The same may be said of the right to pursue truth. First,
this right is rooted in the fact that an individual is a subject endowed with consciousness. But this is true of other human beings as well. It follows that for an
individual to view others as mere objects, rather than as subjects in their own
right, would contradict the very basis on which the search for truth rests. While
such a belief might reflect the subjective consciousness of an individual, it is necessarily contrary to the truth about human beings. That is not to say that such beliefs have no value at all in connection with the search for truth.381 It is merely to
say that any value that they have cannot derive from the possibility that they may
turn out to be true. Second, we have seen that, in many different ways, the pursuit
of truth requires interaction with others. Insofar as this is true, the search for truth
is a relational right, which should be exercised with due respect for other participants. In short, the truth rationale points to two limitations on the proper use of
free speech: (1) the negative constraint that individuals should not view others as
mere objects; and (2) the positive constraint that they should recognize others as
participants in a common enterprise of searching for truth.
I should stress the limited function of these constraints. I do not mean to suggest that they provide an affirmative justification for restricting free expression. For
the liberal tradition, the coercive powers of government do not extend to matters of
thought or belief as such; government may never restrict expression simply because
of disagreement with it or fear that it will undermine the truth.382 Instead, the role
of these constraints is merely a negative one: that of showing that expression has
less value for the search for truth when it either represents others as mere objects or
refuses to acknowledge their own capacity to participate in this search. In some
contexts, this attenuated value may mean that, where the expression violates the
rights of others, it should not be protected because of its value in relation to truth.
We will return to this point when we come to the question of whether and to what
extent insulting speech and hate speech should receive constitutional protection.383
III. CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS
A. A Three-Fold Inquiry
Although freedom of speech must be exercised with due regard for the basic
rights of others, that does not mean that it must always give way to those rights.
In some instances, what appears to be a conflict can be resolved by adjusting the
boundaries of the competing rights. Even where this is not possible, speech that

381

See, e.g., MILL, supra note 151, at 34-44 (arguing that even false beliefs have
value in promoting a clearer perception of truth).
382 See, e.g., LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 32, at 46 (Ò[T]he business of Laws is not
to provide for the Truth of Opinions, but for the Safety and Security of the Commonwealth, and of every particular mans Goods and Person.Ó); MILL, supra note 151, ch. 2.
383 See infra Part IV.
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infringes other rights is only prima facie wrongful, for it may have such value that
it should be regarded as justified or privileged despite the injury it causes.
Whether one conceives of the problem in terms of ÒadjustmentÓ or ÒprivilegeÓ
depends in part on the nature of the rights with which speech conflicts. If the right
is one that is injured solely, or at least typically, by speech, it is natural to view
the issue as one of determining the boundary between the two rights.384 On the
other hand, rights that can be injured both by speech and by conduct are often defined most easily without reference to speech. In such cases, the issue is best formulated as whether speech should be privileged to override the right.385 Regardless of how the problem is framed, a similar analysis should apply. Under the
rights-based theory, there are three related ways to approach conflicts between freedom of speech and other rights.
1. Balancing of Rights
The first method, balancing, seeks to determine which right has more value.
This determination should be made at the marginÑthat is, instead of asking
whether freedom of speech or (for example) the right to privacy has greater value in
general, we should ask (1) to what extent the value of privacy would be impaired
by the speech at issue, and (2) to what extent the value of free speech would be diminished by regulations to protect privacy. In this analysis, the existence of alternatives has great importance. A regulation of speech is not justified if there is a
less restrictive alternative that would afford the same protection to other rights. By
the same token, speakers are not justified in infringing other rights if the values
underlying free speech would be promoted equally well without such infringement.
Of course, to assess the value of competing rights, we need a common standard
by which to measure them. For the rights-based theory, that standard may be
found in the same principles that justify these rights in the first place. Thus, rights
have value as aspects of (1) external freedom, (2) internal freedom to develop and
express oneÕs personality, (3) freedom to participate in social and political life, and
(4) intellectual and spiritual freedom. Ultimately, the value of a right reflects its
importance as an aspect of human liberty and self-determination.
The value of rights is subject to a crucial constraint, however: an asserted right
can derive no value from its negation of another right. For example, one who
threatens another with violence might contend that his speech has value as a form
of self-realization. From a rights-based perspective, however, the actorÕs self-

384

For example, the conflict between the right to privacy and the publicÕs right to be
informed on matters of public concern is best viewed in this way.
385 The way in which the problem is conceived is also partly a function of the source
of the rights and the jurisdiction of the court. Where both rights derive from the same
source (e.g., state law), the issue can often be viewed as one of adjustment. Many constitutional cases, on the other hand, involve a conflict between state-law rights and the
First Amendment. In such cases, federal courts lack power to adjust the boundaries of
rights that have been authoritatively defined by state law, and the court can rule in favor of free speech only by finding a constitutional privilege to override such rights.
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realization cannot count as a value insofar as it depends on causing another to fear
violence. If the right to personal security has positive value, the negation of that
right cannot also have such value. That is not to say that the actorÕs speech has
no value at all: it may have value as an exercise of external freedom, or even as a
form of self-realization, insofar as this derives from something other than the infliction of fear. Of course, these values are unlikely to justify serious invasions of personal security.
In short, when a particular act of speech comes into conflict with another right,
balancing seeks to determine whether a restriction of speech is warranted by weighing (1) the value of the speech and (2) the extent of the restriction, against (3) the
value of the other right and (4) the impact of unregulated speech on that right. The
aim of this approach is to harmonize the competing rights by protecting both insofar as possible and, to the extent that they conflict, by protecting the right that
(at the margin) constitutes the most important aspect of liberty.
It is essential to observe that, while this method involves balancing, it is fundamentally different from a generalized weighing of social interests. The latter approach regards speech, like other interests, as valuable insofar as it promotes social
welfare. By contrast, the present approach assesses rights in terms of their value for
human liberty. Under this approach, speech may be restricted only when necessary
to protect another right that, under the circumstances, is more valuable as an aspect
of freedom. This approach, unlike interest balancing, is therefore consistent with
what John Rawls calls Òthe priority of liberty.Ó386
A final point concerns the level of generality at which the characterization and
balancing of rights should occur. On one hand, it would be neither meaningful nor
useful to ask whether, in the abstract, freedom of speech has more value than other
rights such as personal security or privacy. As we have seen, all of these rights are
fundamental and have a common basis in human liberty. Moreover, rights are not
abstractions, but have force and meaning only insofar as they are realized in the
world. Thus, the question is not the relative value of free speech or privacy in the
abstract, but their value in actual instances.
On the other hand, an ad hoc balancing of rights in each case would be equally
unsatisfactory. Rights are not mere claims to act in a specific way (or to be free
from such action) in a particular situation. Instead, they reflect more general principles of liberty. Ad hoc balancing risks overlooking this deeper dimension of
rights and deciding cases on the basis of merely subjective reactions and predilections.

386 RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 204, ¤ 39, at 243. The priority of liberty
holds that basic liberties may not be traded off against welfare. Id. ¤ 39. At the same
time, Rawls observes that Òwhen the liberties are left unrestricted they collide with one
another,Ó making it necessary Òto balance one liberty against anotherÓ in order to promote the most extensive system of liberty as a whole. Id. ¤ 32, at 203. Ronald Dworkin
also recognizes the need to balance rights when they conflict. See DWORKIN, supra
note 196, at 193-94.
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In resolving conflicts of rights, then, we should not proceed on a level of either
abstract generality or ad hoc particularity. Instead, the rights at issue should be
delineated by applying the general concept of the right to the particular facts, or
(what amounts to the same thing) by viewing specific facts in light of the general
concept. The result is to identify certain sorts of speech and other rights.387 In
other words, rights should be balanced at what has been called the ÒdefinitionalÓ
rather than the ad hoc level.388
2. Internal Relationships Between Rights
Although balancing is one useful method for resolving conflicts of rights, it is
not the only one. In contrast to balancing, which involves an external comparison
between rights, a second approach explores whether there is any internal relationship between them.389 In some instances, one right is partly defined in relation to
another. As we have seen, for example, the right to reputation presupposes that
others have a right to form accurate images of oneself. It follows that this right
cannot be violated by true statements, however damaging they may be.390
In other cases, it may be argued that one right should prevail over another because it is more fundamental. For example, individuals cannot freely engage in
speech unless they are safe against violence; a modicum of personal security is necessary for the enjoyment of other rights. In this sense, personal security is the
most basic of freedoms. It follows that when free speech is used to seriously
threaten the personal security of others, the latter right must prevail.
As we have seen, however, such relationships do not necessarily run in only one
direction. Thus, while personal security is necessary for freedom of speech, the
converse is also true. Free speech is essential to political freedom, the ultimate
safeguard of all other rights.391 For this reason, political speech should be restricted only when it causes serious injury to other rights.
3. The System of Constitutional Liberty
This exploration of the relationship between rights suggests a further point: that
they are integral to a larger whole. This leads to a third way of resolving conflicts,

387 As applied to New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), for example, this
approach would characterize the rights neither as Òfree speechÓ and Òreputation,Ó o n
one hand, nor as the right to publish this specific advertisement or to be free from these
particular accusations, on the other hand. Instead, it would characterize these rights, as
the Court did, at an intermediate levelÑas the right to criticize the official conduct of
public officials, and the right to be free from false and defamatory statements about such
conduct.
388 Nimmer, supra note 180, at 942.
389 On this approach, see WALDRON , supra note 222, at 220-24.
390 See supra notes 323-24 and accompanying text.
391 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (observing that freedom of
speech and thought Òis the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other
form of freedomÓ).
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which is to ask which right, under the circumstances, is most important to the system of constitutional liberty as a whole. To recast an earlier example, if individuals were permitted to assault or threaten others, the result would be to greatly
weaken the overall system of liberty. On the other hand, the system would also be
undermined if speech could be restricted because of distant or speculative fears of
violence.392 Interpretations of the First Amendment that would lead to either result should therefore be rejected.
4. Elaborating the Approach
These three methods are closely related to one another. Each seeks to resolve
conflicts of rights by identifying what is common to them and using this as a criterion to determine which should prevail. The first approach locates this common
ground in the principles that underlie the competing rights; the second, in the internal relationship between them; and the third, in their relative importance to constitutional liberty as a whole. Rather than being mutually exclusive, these three
approaches overlap with and reinforce each other. Constitutional arguments and
decisions frequently rely on more than one to reach their conclusions.
Thus far, our discussion has focused on conflicts between free speech and some
other right. It is crucial to recognize, however, that conflicts can also take place
within free speech itself. For example, hecklers who attempt to drown out a speech
at a public rally interfere both with the speakerÕs First Amendment rights and with
those of the audience. While in this instance the interference results from the noncommunicative effect of speech, in others it may derive from communicative impact. That would be the case, for example, if one participant in an argument over
politics threatened to strike another.
In such cases, First Amendment values are at stake on both sides. Conflicts of
this sort can be analyzed through the same three-fold approach outlined above.
First, loud noises and threats of violence clearly have less value, in terms of the
four elements of liberty, than does the right to engage in political discourse. Second, personal security and the ability to be heard are necessary conditions for all
freedom of speech. Speech that negates these conditions therefore undermines its
own normative basis. Finally, it is clear that political expression holds a higher
place in the system of constitutional liberty than the two forms of speech with
which it here conflicts. In such cases, speech may properly be restricted for the
sake of free speech itself.
Our discussion so far has also assumed, for purposes of clarity, that only two
competing rights are involved. First Amendment problems often are more complex than this, however, involving multiple rights of individuals and the community. Suppose that an extremist speaker at a rally urges her followers to attack opponents who are staging a counter-demonstration nearby. To determine whether
this speech should be protected, it is necessary to consider not only the speakerÕs
right to free expression and the opponentsÕ rights to personal security, but also the

392

See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989).
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rights of the audience and the public to hear the speech, as well as the communityÕs right to preserve the peace.
Resolving conflicts of rights is therefore a multifaceted process. Sometimes the
answer is intuitively clear: no one would hold threats of imminent violence to be
protected speech. Other problems call for more complex and difficult reasoning. In
such cases, while a rights-based approach does not yield clear, uncontroversial results, it serves to focus our attention on the crucial issuesÑthe relative value and
importance of different aspects of liberty.
B. An Illustration: Defamation and the First Amendment
1. Public Officials
To illustrate how this theory would approach conflicts of rights, I want to
briefly explore a central issue in modern free speech jurisprudenceÑhow defamation
should be treated under the First Amendment. The common law afforded strong
protection to reputation, imposing a form of strict liability for false statements that
injured an individualÕs reputation.393 In the landmark case of New York Times v.
Sullivan,394 the Supreme Court was asked to determine what limits, if any, the
First Amendment placed on the authority of states to impose liability for defamatory statements concerning the official conduct of government officials. The Court
ruled that in such cases, officials could recover only on a clear-and-convincing
showing that the defendant acted with Òactual malice,Ó that is, that the statement
was knowingly or recklessly false.395
From a rights-based perspective, New York Times was clearly correct to resolve
the conflict strongly in favor of speech. Although the right to reputation is an important one, in cases involving government officials the values served by free
speech are at least as fundamental. As Justice Brennan emphasized in a related
case, the ability of the people to debate public issues and assess the conduct of
public officials is Òthe essence of self-government.Ó396 Such speech is therefore vital to political freedom, as well as to the protection of civil liberty against governmental oppression (which was a central theme of the allegedly defamatory advertisement in New York Times397 ). Moreover, restrictions on good-faith criticism
may have a substantial impact on the willingness of individuals to criticize government officials, 398 while allowing such speech may have much less marginal

393

See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 329, at 804.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
395 See id. at 279-80.
396 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
397 The advertisement is reproduced as an appendix to the CourtÕs opinion. See 376
U.S. at 305.
398 See id. at 279.
394
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impact on reputation, since officials can often effectively respond to attacks through
counterspeech.399
Thus, a balancing of rights points toward strong protection of speech. This
conclusion is greatly reinforced by the second approach, which explores the internal
relationship between the two rights. An individualÕs reputation consists in what
others say and think about him. The very concept of reputation presupposes that
others will assess a person and his actions.400 It follows that reputation may be
understood as a relational rightÑa right to interact with others in a particular way.
Such rights are inherently limited by the corresponding rights of othersÑin this
case, their right to freely discuss an individual and his actions.401
This free speech right is a mirror image of the right to reputation; it represents
the same relationship between observer and observed, now viewed from the observerÕs perspective. It too is a relational right: it is a right to assess the character
and conduct of an individual, insofar as one is affected by him, and to thereby
shape his reputation. As a relational right, it is limited by the rights of the observed individual. As we have seen, reputation is, or should be, a reflection of a
personÕs own actions as well as the way these are viewed by others. To misrepresent a person is to treat him as a mere object rather than as an autonomous subject.
In short, (1) the right to reputation and (2) the right to shape the reputation of
others through speech may both be understood as relational rights, which represent
two different aspects of the same relationship between persons as observers and observed. This relationship does not, however, exist merely in the abstract. Instead,
it takes different forms in particular contexts. The form that the relationship takes
will have a crucial bearing on the force of the respective rights.
In some contexts, observers and observed relate to one another as equals.402 In
cases like New York Times, however, the relationship is a very different one. In a
democratic society, government officials are regarded as representatives of the people, who as the ultimate sovereign have an inherent right to oversee their conduct.
The relationship between the public and officials is therefore one of principal and
agent, superior and subordinate.403 Because this relationship is an unequal one,
so are the rights that inhere in it. It follows that the peopleÕs right to judge the
character and actions of government officials is more fundamental than the latterÕs
right to reputation.
In discussing the relationship between free speech and official reputation, we
have been led to explore where each fits within the overall structure of constitutional liberty. This inquiry, the third way of approaching conflicts of rights,
clearly supports the same result, for this form of free speech is the cornerstone of
constitutional democracy.
399

See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
401 See supra note 361 and accompanying text (discussing concept of relational
rights).
402 See infra Part III.B.2.
403 For the historical roots of this view, see supra Part I.A.
400
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In short, New York Times was clearly right to afford a high level of constitutional protection to criticism of government officials. The standard of knowing or
reckless falsity that the Court announced in that case seems to be a reasonable way
of attaining this end.404
2. Public and Private Figures
A rights-based analysis also suggests that it was reasonable for the Court to extend the New York Times rule to cases involving public figures.405 Some prominent persons have an influence on political affairs comparable to that of public officials. In other instances, public figures play an important role in shaping the
society and its culture.406 Although such individuals may not be elected, their
status and influence derives from public recognition. A strong right to discuss the

404 In their concurring opinions, Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg contended
that, rather than adopting an Òactual maliceÓ standard, the Court should have recognized Òan absolute, unconditional privilege to criticize official conduct despite the
harm which may flow from excesses and abuses.Ó 376 U.S. at 296 (Goldberg, J., joined
by Douglas, J., concurring in result); see also id. at 297 (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J.,
concurring) (ÒAn unconditional right to say what one wants about public affairs i s
what I consider to be the minimum guarantee of the First Amendment.Ó). From the
standpoint of substantive right, this position is unconvincing. As Justice Brennan argued in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), while good-faith criticism of government officials must be protected by the First Amendment, Òcalculated falsehoodÓ undermines rather than promotes the communityÕs ability to make informed judgments. Id.
at 73-75. A rule of absolute protection would sacrifice legitimate rights of reputation
without advancing the paramount rights of the public.
As we have seen, however, the law must take account of institutional as well as substantive justice. See supra notes 224-26 and accompanying text. The concurring Justices emphasize the difficulty of determining a speakerÕs state of mind and the danger
that juries will use libel law to suppress unpopular views. See 376 U.S. at 293-95
(Black, J. concurring); id. at 300 (Goldberg. J., concurring in result). These concerns
clearly justify New York TimesÕs adoption of a demanding standard of liability, a requirement of clear and convincing evidence, and independent judicial review of libel
awards. The question is whether these measures are sufficient, or whether an absolute
First Amendment privilege is necessary to ensure adequate latitude to criticize government officials.
Issues of this sort cannot be resolved on a theoretical level, but only through the exercise of informed practical judgment. In making such a judgment, it is important to remember that free speech and other rights are not sharply antithetical to one another, but
essential elements of a broader system of constitutional liberty. The aim of constitutional adjudication should be to reconcile such rights as far as possible. Thus, a right
that is justified in principle should be limited for institutional reasons only to the extent necessary to promote right as a whole. For further discussion of the role of institutional right, see infra notes 523-27 and accompanying text.
405 Curtis PublÕg Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
406 See supra notes 362-63 and accompanying text.
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character and conduct of public figures is therefore supported by considerations
similar to those in New York Times.
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,407 a plurality of the Court contended that
the First Amendment should afford the same high level of protection to all communication on matters of public concern, regardless of whether they involve government officials or public figures.408 For this reason, the plurality held that private individuals who were falsely accused in the media could recover only if they
could meet the New York Times standard of knowing or reckless falsity.409 Three
years later, however, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,410 the Court overruled
Rosenbloom, concluding that it unduly restricted the authority of states to protect
private reputation.411 A rights-based analysis suggests that this conclusion was
sound.
As the social aspect of personality, reputation is central to individual dignity
and self-realization.412 Moreover, in contrast to those who seek public office or
other forms of prominence, individuals who remain in the private sphere cannot be
regarded as giving up this right, nor do they generally have effective means of responding to defamatory reports.413
On the other hand, it is true, as Justice Brennan argued in Rosenbloom, that the
conduct of private individuals is often a matter of public concern.414 In order to
assess the strength of this interest, we must begin by recognizing that ÒpublicÓ has
more than one meaning. In one sense, it refers to the people collectively, that is,
to the polity or community as a whole. In another sense, it refers to the people
regarded as an aggregate of private individuals.415
Individual conduct can be a matter of public concern in both senses. First, as
private individuals, people often show a strong desire and interest in knowing
about the lives of others. As businesses, the media have an interest in meeting the
demand for such information. This activity is a legitimate one, so long as it respects privacy, reputation, and other rights.
It should be clear, however, that the relationship between free speech and reputation is quite different in this context than it was in New York Times. In that setting, the individuals who were subject to observation were the agents and subordinates of those who desired to observe their conductÑthe people in their capacity as
citizens. For this reason, the right to free speech was more fundamental than that
of reputation. By contrast, no such inequality exists between private figures and
other private parties who wish to report upon or learn about their lives. To be
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415

403 U.S. 29 (1971).
See id. at 43-44 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 52.
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
See id. at 345-46.
See supra Part II.C.2.c.
See 418 U.S. at 344-45.
See 403 U.S. at 43-44.
See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. II, ch. 3, at 1261b20-32 (Carnes Lord trans., 1984).
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sure, individuals do have a right to make judgments about the character and conduct of others. In the present context, however, the observers and observed are on
a level of equality. The right of the former to judge is no stronger than the right of
the latter to be represented in a way that accurately reflects their actions and character.
Insofar as individual conduct affects the community, it may also be of public
concern in the collective sense. Thus, the public has a legitimate interest in knowing about crimes and other conduct that violates the norms of the community.416
Again, however, individuals are not subordinate to the community in the same
sense that public officials and figures are. While the latter owe their status and influence to the society, the society is obligated to recognize the status and rights of
individuals. Although the community has a right to make judgments about the
conduct of its members, individuals equally have a right that such judgments be as
accurate as possible. In the same way that there is a right to due process in legal
proceedings, there should be an analogous right when a person is tried in the court
of public opinion.
This analysis of the relationship between free speech and private reputation suggests that neither of these rights is more fundamental than the other. Exploring
their role in the system of constitutional liberty leads to the same conclusion. The
New York Times decision was based on the Madisonian view that the Òright of
freely examining public characters and measuresÊ.Ê.Ê. [is] the only effectual guardian
of every other right.Ó417 The right of private reputation, on the other hand, is
among the fundamental rights that society is intended to protect. As Justice Stewart observed, this right Òreflects no more than our basic concept of the essential
dignity and worth of every human beingÑa concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.Ó418
It follows that free speech confers no general right to violate private reputation.
Because these rights are of the same order of value, it was reasonable for Gertz to
hold that defendants may be held responsible for injury to reputation when they are
at fault, that is, when they fail to use reasonable care to determine whether a defamatory statement is actually true.419
C. Conclusion
Parts II and III have outlined a rights-based theory of the First Amendment.
According to this view, the same aspects of human liberty that justify freedom of
speech and thought also give rise to other fundamental rights, including personal
security, privacy, reputation, and citizenship. Free speech may not infringe these
rights without adequate justification. Conflicts between rights should be resolved

416 On the formation of social norms, see Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997).
417 Madison, Report, supra note 102, at 144.
418 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
419 See 418 U.S. at 347.
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in light of their relative value, the relationship between them, and their respective
roles in the system of constitutional liberty.
1. The Rights-Based Theory Contrasted with Contemporary First Amendment
Jurisprudence: Florida Star v. B.J.F.
The contrast between this view and contemporary jurisprudence is strikingly illustrated by the 1989 case of Florida Star v. B.J.F.420 After being raped and
robbed at knifepoint by an unknown assailant, B.J.F. reported the incident to the
county sheriffÕs department. A crime report posted in the departmentÕs pressroom
inadvertently failed to delete the victimÕs name. A reporter for the Florida Star
took down all the information in the report, although she knew from a sign in the
pressroom that the names of rape victims were not matters of public record and
could not be published under Florida law. The Star then published an account of
the rape, identifying B.J.F. by name. In addition to comments from coworkers
and acquaintances, B.J.F. and her family received several telephone calls from a
man who threatened to rape her again. These events forced her to move, to change
her telephone number, and to seek police protection as well as psychological counseling. B.J.F. brought a civil action against the Star for violating a Florida statute
which made it unlawful to publish the name of a sexual-assault victim in any instrument of mass communication.421 Finding that the newspaper had Òacted with
reckless indifference to the rights of others,Ó the jury awarded her $75,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages.422
On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the award under the First Amendment. Reflecting the assumptions of modern free speech jurisprudence, Justice
Marshall framed the issue as a clash between the right of the press to publish
truthful, lawfully obtained information, and the Òstate interest[s]Ó in protecting the
privacy and safety of rape victims and in encouraging them to report assaults.423
Although the Court acknowledged that these were Òhighly significant interests,Ó it
held that, under the circumstances, the statute was not necessary to protect them,
for the government could have prevented the harm simply by not disclosing the
information.424 Moreover, the law was underinclusive because it applied only to
dissemination by the media, not by individuals, a fact that raised serious doubts
about whether it was effective in promoting these state interests.425 For these reasons, the statute could not survive strict scrutiny.

420

491 U.S. 524 (1989). The facts in this paragraph are taken from Justice MarshallÕs
majority opinion, see id. at 527-29, supplemented by Justice WhiteÕs dissent, see id. at
546.
421 See Florida Stat. ¤ 794.03 (1987).
422 491 U.S. at 529.
423 Id. at 533-34.
424 Id. at 537.
425 See id. at 540-41; see also id. at 541-42 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment).
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The Florida Star case would look very different from a rights-based perspective.
On this view, it is clear that the statuteÕs aim was not to promote the interests of
the state but to protect the rights of the victim. The governmentÕs inadvertent
failure to comply with the law should not have the effect of waiving B.J.F.Õs
rights, or relieving the newspaper of its own responsibility to respect them. As to
the statuteÕs scope, it is reasonable to believe that publication causes more serious
injury than mere private discussion and that a ban on the latter would be unnecessarily intrusive. Moreover, even if the Florida law could be faulted for underprotecting privacy, it is difficult to see why that should lead us to deny protection to
that right in a case that falls within the statuteÕs scope.
Rather than applying a standard heavily weighted toward one side of the balance, the rights-based theory would compare the competing rights in terms of their
value for human liberty. In a case like Florida Star, publishing the victimÕs name
causes serious injury to fundamental rights of privacy and personal security. As
Justice Marshall implicitly conceded, although there is an important public interest
in learning about Òthe commission, and investigation, of a violent crime which
has been reported to the authorities,Ó that interest does not necessarily extend to
the Òspecific identityÓ of the victim.426 On the rights-based view, then, the First
Amendment should not prevent states from protecting the identities of rape victims
in cases of this sort.427
2. Two Objections
a. May Speech Be Restricted to Protect Nonconstitutional Rights?
In concluding this overview, I would like to consider two objections to the
rights-based theory. First, it might be argued that, even if free speech can properly
be restricted for the sake of other rights, this may be done only to protect rights
that themselves enjoy constitutional statusÑnot those such as reputation, which
derive merely from state law. Although this objection is plausible, a little reflection shows that it would lead to unacceptable results. For example, few would
deny that the law may restrict speech that threatens imminent violence. Yet the
right to be free from private violence, like the right to reputation, is protected not
by the Constitution but by state law.
In responding to this objection, we should begin by noting that it reflects the
assumptions of legal positivism. According to that view, rights have no independent existence, but derive their force from positive law.428 It may seem to follow that rights that are protected by the Federal Constitution necessarily have
426

Id. at 536-37.
A more difficult problem would be presented in contexts where a substantial public interest would be served by publication, such as reporting public proceedings in a
criminal trial. See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (rape victimÕs
name obtained from public judicial records).
428 See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text (discussing Holmesian positivism).
427
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greater authority than those that are safeguarded merely by statutory or common
law. In cases of conflict, therefore, the latter rights must yield to the former.
As we have seen, however, the Constitution, Bill of Rights, and Fourteenth
Amendment were grounded in a very different understanding of the nature of rights.
On that view, individuals derive their rights not from positive law but from nature.
Society and government are formed to protect these rights against invasion by
other individuals. Once government is established, it also becomes necessary to
safeguard these rights against the power of government itself. The object of a bill
of rights is not to create fundamental rights, but merely to secure those rights
against the government.
According to this view, rights safeguarded by ordinary civil and criminal law
may be no less fundamental than those protected by the Constitution itself. The
importance of a right ultimately depends on its relation to human liberty, not on
the particular form in which the right is protected by positive law. As we have
seen, the rights explored in Part II derive from the same principles as free speech
itself. For this reason, they have the same fundamental value, even if they are not
themselves constitutional rights.
That is not to say, of course, that the Constitution should not prevail in cases
where it conflicts with ordinary law. It is merely to say that, in interpreting the
scope of the First Amendment, we should not readily assume that it abrogates fundamental rights protected by other laws. To put it differently, the Constitution not
only secures rights, but also grants certain powers to the federal government, while
reserving others to the states. These powers include the authority to make and
enforce laws for the protection of rights. Strictly speaking, then, the rights-based
theory does not hold that constitutional rights can be limited by nonconstitutional
ones. Instead, it merely holds that constitutional rights must be interpreted in the
context of the Constitution as a whole, including those provisions that grant or
recognize the authority to protect other fundamental rights. The rights-based theory is therefore fully consistent with the status of the Constitution as supreme
law.429

429 Indeed, it can be argued that the Constitution not only authorizes but requires
the government to protect fundamental rights. According to the natural rights tradition,
government has a duty to protect its citizens against the invasion of their rights by others. This notion was a central feature of American constitutional thought between the
Revolution and the Civil War. A strong case can be made that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, concerned about the denial of protection to Southern blacks following the war, intended to incorporate such a right to protection into the first section of
the Amendment. See Heyman, First Duty, supra note 361. If the Fourteenth Amendment were interpreted in this wayÑcontrary to the Supreme CourtÕs view in DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989)Ñthen one
could argue that the government has a constitutional obligation to protect fundamental
rights against violation by others, whether that violation takes the form of speech or
conduct. We need not go that far for the purposes of this Article, however, for even if
the Constitution does not require government to regulate speech where necessary t o
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Moreover, in an important sense it would be incorrect to say that the Constitution does not recognize the rights discussed in Part II. Although it generally does
not protect those rights against private parties,430 the Constitution does safeguard
many of them against the government itself. The rights to life, liberty, and property are protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Along with the
Fourth Amendment,431 these provisions have also been held to protect certain
rights of privacy.432 The right to individual self-determination is an important
theme in the CourtÕs liberty and privacy decisions.433 The right to citizenship is
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment,434 and rights of political participation have
been held protected by that Amendment as well as other constitutional provisions.435 Finally, the Ninth Amendment reminds us that the people retain other
rights which should not be Òden[ied] or disparage[d]Ó on the ground that they are
not specifically mentioned in the Constitution.436 All of these rights, which are
shielded by constitutional law against the power of government, should be regarded as equally fundamental when protected against private violation by civil and
criminal law.
Thus, the rights discussed in Part II should not be discounted on the ground
that they lack constitutional status. This point was expressed most eloquently by
Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion in Rosenblatt v. Baer.437 After observing that the right to reputation is essential to individual dignity, Justice Stewart
added, ÒThe protection of private personality, like the protection of life itself, is
left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
protect the fundamental rights of others, it should be interpreted to permit government
to do so.
430 An exception is the Thirteenth Amendment, which outlaws slavery whether or
not supported by state action.
431 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see also Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
432 See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (observing that the
CourtÕs privacy decisions under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and other constitutional provisions have recognized two distinct interests in privacy, Òthe individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal mattersÓ and Òthe interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisionsÓ); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973) (holding that Òthe Fourteenth AmendmentÕs concept of personal libertyÓ includes a Òright of privacyÓ that Òis broad enough to encompass a womanÕs decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancyÓ).
433 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion).
434 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, ¤ 1 (ÒAll persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside.Ó).
435 On the Supreme CourtÕs decisions on the right to political participation, see generally TRIBE, supra note 120, ch. 13.
436 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
437 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
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But this does not mean that the right is entitled to any less recognitionÊ.Ê.Ê. as a
basic of our constitutional system.Ó438
b. Does a Rights-Based Approach Undermine Freedom of Expression?
It may be objected further that, while the rights-based approach affords strong
protection to other fundamental rights, it does so at too high a cost to free speech.
Far from undermining freedom of expression, however, a rights-based approach actually strengthens the normative basis of that right in two ways. First, the more
that free speech is regarded as authorizing the violation of other important rights,
the more difficult it becomes to discern a difference between speech as a right and as
a wrongful invasion of the rights of others. The result is to undermine the rightfulness of free speech. Thus, a defense of free speech that tends towards absolutism
ironically may weaken the normative basis of that right, as well as diminish public
support for it. By contrast, free speech may enjoy the strongest status as a right
when it must be exercised with due regard for the rights of others.
A second point relates to the teleology of free speech. Americans have traditionally thought of freedom of speech as promoting the good of society and its members.439 As we have seen, however, rights such as personal security, privacy, and
reputation reflect the same fundamental values as free speech itself, and are also essential to the individual and social good. It is impossible, however, for a society
to attain all goods to an unlimited degree. Where different goods compete, achieving one will result in some sacrifice of another. When speech that has relatively
little value for human liberty infringes rights that have substantial value, protecting
the speech has the result of diminishing rather than promoting the good. Thus,
free speech furthers the individual and social good most effectively when it is required to respect the rights of others.
IV. APPLICATIONS
I now wish to explore how the rights-based model would apply to two important issues in contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence. I shall begin with
the problem of Òfighting words,Ó and then turn to that of hate speech.
A. Insulting or Fighting Words
1. The Chaplinsky Case
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,440 the Supreme Court unanimously upheld a
statute making it an offense to Òaddress any offensive, derisive, or annoying word
to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, [or] call
438

Id. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that Òthe ultimate good desiredÓ by members of society can best be
achieved through freedom of speech).
440 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
439
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him by any offensive or derisive name.Ó441 Chaplinsky had called a city official Ò a
God damned racketeerÓ and Òa damned Fascist.Ó442 Affirming the conviction, Justice Murphy held that the First Amendment did not protect Òinsulting or ÔfightingÕ words,Ó which he defined as Òthose which by their very utterance inflict injury
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.Ó443 Such words, he wrote, Òare
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality.Ó444
Chaplinsky is a paradigm case of the modern tendency to conceptualize First
Amendment problems as conflicts between free speech and social interestsÑin this
case the Òinterest in order and morality.Ó445 This understanding of the problem
has led to a vigorous debate. On one hand, Chaplinsky has come under fire from
many civil libertarians, who fear that it imposes an unjustified limitation on free
speech.446 On the other hand, the doctrine has found defenders on both the right
and the left, who argue that it is necessary in order to preserve civility447 or to protect disadvantaged groups from psychological injury and social subordination.448
When posed in this way, the problem appears to present a Òtragic conflictÓ in
which we can protect freedom of expression only by sacrificing other essential values such as civility or equality, and can protect the latter only by doing violence to
the ideal of free speech.449
2. Tendency to Provoke a Breach of the Peace
How would this problem look if it were recast in terms of opposing rights?
Traditionally, the law regarded insults as wrongful because of their tendency to incite a breach of the peace. At first blush, this rationale appears inconsistent with a

441

Id. at 569.
Id.
443 Id. at 571-72.
444 Id. at 572.
445 See supra Part I.D. In formulating the problem in this way, the Court explicitly
followed Chafee. See 315 U.S. at 572 (citing ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE
UNITED STATES 149-50 (1941)).
446 See, e.g., HAIMAN, supra note 331, at 252-60; Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words
as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 531 (1980); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 508-14.
447 See Hadley Arkes, Civility and the Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the
Defamation of Groups, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 281, 305-17.
448 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 173-74 (1982); Charles
Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990
D UKE L.J. 431, 449-57 (1990).
449 For the view that free speech problems often involve Òtragic choicesÓ of this kind,
see Susan H. Williams, Feminist Jurisprudence and Free Speech Theory, 68 TUL. L.
R EV. 1563, 1579 (1994).
442
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rights-based theory, for it seems to allow rights to be restricted merely because
others may respond lawlessly. Rather than punishing the speaker, would it not be
preferable for the law to simply hold people responsible for their own violent
acts?450
This objection has great force when applied to a broad notion of fighting words
that would make the lawfulness of speech turn simply on the reaction of others.
One who is properly exercising her First Amendment rights should not be restricted simply because others may act wrongfully.451 The objection is itself too
sweeping, however, because it fails to distinguish between rightful and wrongful
acts of speech. Under a rights-based model, speech may properly be restricted
when it is likely to provoke violence because of its wrongful character.
Speech is wrongful when it constitutes a form of aggression against others. As
Alexander Bickel puts it, ÒThere is such a thing as verbal violence, a kind of cursing, assaultive speech that amounts to almost physical aggression, bullying that is
no less punishing because it is simulated.Ó452 The 1982 case of Gomez v. Hug453
provides a dramatic example. After ordering a county employee to walk over to
him, the defendant, a county commissioner, allegedly shouted, ÒYou are a fucking
spic.Ê.Ê.Ê. A fucking Mexican greaser like you, that is all you are. You are nothing but a fucking Mexican greaser, nothing but a pile of shit.Ó454 He then added,
ÒAre you going to do something, you coward, you greaser, you fucking spic?
What are you going to do? DonÕt stand there like a damn fool because that is all
you are is a pile of shit.Ó455
It is hardly surprising that speech of this sort, which seeks to abuse or dominate
others on a visceral level, often leads to violence. Human beings have a deeply
450

See HAIMAN, supra note 331, at 258.
See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 326-27 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
452 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 72 (1975). Bickel extends this
notion beyond the fighting words context, to the use of profane language in public discourse. For criticism of this aspect of BickelÕs argument, see Daniel A. Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An Article on Professor Bickel, Justice Harlan, and the Enduring Significance of Cohen v. California, 1980 DUKE L.J. 283.
453 645 P.2d 916 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982). Many of the examples in this Part contain
profoundly offensive language, for which I apologize. Unfortunately, discussions of the
First Amendment frequently take place on an abstract level, without considering the
exact nature of the expression at issueÑsomething that I believe we must do to reach
thoughtful judgments about whether it should be constitutionally protected.
454 Id. at 918.
455 Id. For similar facts, see Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Ill. 1984). In
that case, the plaintiffÕs employer allegedly called him a ÒniggerÓ several times and told
him that Òall you niggers are alike.Ó Id. at 925. When the plaintiff said that he did not
appreciate the racial slurs and that he Òwanted to be treated Ôlike a human being,ÕÓ the
employer responded, ÒYouÕre not a human being, youÕre a nigger.Ó Id. As the employee began to leave, the employer called him a sissy and said that if he were a man he
would stay. See id. The court denied a motion to dismiss the employeeÕs claims for
civil rights and Title VII violations. See id. at 934.
451
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ingrained tendency to respond to others in the same way that they themselves are
treated. Thus, individuals who are confronted with aggression often respond in
kind. To be sure, fighting words constitute merely verbal assaults. But speech of
this sort does not recognize a clear distinction between verbal and physical attack.
Moreover, because it aims at superiority over others, verbal aggression tends to
initiate an escalating cycle of hostilities that may swiftly culminate in violence.
In addition to freedom from aggression, fighting words often violate other individual rights, including the right to personal dignity.456 But human beings have
a tendency to react with force when their rights are attacked. This is a second reason why fighting words are wrongful, and why they tend to provoke a violent response.
At the same time, it is important to stress that the fighting words doctrine does
not imply that individuals may rightfully respond to insults with violence. The
law expects citizens to refrain from violence, except where necessary to defend
themselves or their property against imminent attack.457 People who respond to
fighting words with violence may themselves be found guilty of breaching the
peace. The Chaplinsky doctrine therefore does not imply that individuals will not
be held responsible for their own acts. It merely means that a speaker who deliberately uses words likely to provoke violence should also bear responsibility for the
resulting confrontation.458
This defense of the fighting words doctrine may be summarized as follows. It is
precisely because fighting words Òinflict injuryÓ that they Òtend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.Ó Fighting words cause injury through visceral aggression and by attacking the targetÕs rights. Individuals who are injured in this way
have a strong tendency to respond on the same level, even though that response
may itself be wrongful. Properly understood, then, the fighting words doctrine
does not allow an individualÕs legitimate exercise of free speech to be restricted
merely because of the wrongful conduct of others. Instead, it is because of their
456

See infra note 463 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 249, ¤¤ 5.7-5.9 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing
self-defense, defense of others, and defense of property); RESTATEMENT, supra note 241,
¤¤ 63-86 (same).
458 In many cases, fighting words are used with the intention of challenging another
to fight. In Gomez, for example, the defendantÕs invective included calling the plaintiff
a ÒcowardÓ and demanding to know what he was Ògoing to doÓ about it. 645 P.2d at
918. The defendant in Binyon v. Bailey used similar language. See supra note 455. In
such cases, it seems even more clear that the speaker should be regarded as partly responsible for the resulting threat to the peace. The Model Penal Code adopts this view
when it recognizes an offense of Òharassment by fighting words,Ó which it defines as
occurring when one, Òwith purpose to harass another,Ê.Ê.Ê. insults, taunts or challenges
another in a manner likely to provoke violent or disorderly response.Ó MODEL PENAL
CODE, supra note 259, ¤ 250.4(2) (emphasis added). In a comment, the Code traces the
concept of fighting words in part to the common lawÕs recognition of an offense of challenging another to fight. Id. at 364. For the common-law position, see 4 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 50, at *150.
457

HEYMANPUB .DOC

1998]

5/11/99 8:41 AM

RIGHTING THE BALANCE

1369

wrongful character that fighting words have a tendency to provoke violence. In this
way fighting words violate individual rights as well as the communityÕs right to
the peace.
3. Words That Inflict Injury by Their Very Utterance
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has emphasized one branch of the
Chaplinsky definitionÑthe speechÕs tendency to provoke a violent responseÑto
the apparent exclusion of the otherÑits capacity to inflict injury Òby its very utterance.Ó459 As several writers have observed, however, under this approach abusive
language is entitled to greater constitutional protection the less that the target is
able to defend herself.460 Such an approach would make perfect sense if the sole
purpose of Chaplinsky were to prevent the addressee from responding with violence. We may well believe, however, that a relatively defenseless person should
be entitled to at least as much protection from abusive speech as one who is able to
defend herself. As I have suggested, abusive speech tends to provoke violence precisely because of the injury that it inflicts. This injury may be a serious one even
when violence is not likely to ensue.
Insults can inflict injury in several ways. First, as we have seen, they may constitute a form of aggression against others. OneÕs right to be free from such aggression should not depend on whether one is likely to respond with force. Instead, it
should be understood as a facet of the right to personal security.
Abusive speech may also constitute an attack on personality. In some cases, the
injury may be severe enough to allow recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Gomez, for example, the court allowed the plaintiff to proceed
with such an action.461 Suppose, however, that Gomez did not suffer severe distress from the incident, either because of great fortitude or because he had become
inured to repeated abuse. In that case, he would not be able to satisfy the requirements for intentional infliction.462 Yet it seems clear that he would have suffered a
serious injury to personality.

459 See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (holding state statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because not limited to words that by their very utterance tend to incite immediate breach of peace). But cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377 (1992) (assuming for purposes of argument that Chaplinsky definition as a
whole remains good law).
460 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 4 2
RUTGERS L. REV. 287 (1990); Lawrence, supra note 448, at 453-54. As Greenawalt
points out, for example, speech that would constitute unprotected fighting words when
directed toward a strong young man could be used with impunity toward an elderly
disabled person. See Greenawalt, supra, at 297-98.
461 Gomez v. Hug, 645 P.2d 916, 922 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982).
462 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 241, ¤ 46 & cmt. j (limiting recovery to cases i n
which Òthe distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected t o
endure itÓ).
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How can we understand the nature of this injury? In Part II.C, I argued that the
right to personality includes not only freedom from substantive injuryÑinfliction
of emotional distressÑbut also a formal right to the inviolability of personality.
This right was violated by invasion of privacy, the unreasonable intrusion into or
exposure of an individualÕs private life.463 Like invasion of privacy, profoundly
abusive speech should be understood as an attack on the right to an inviolate personality. Regardless of whether it causes severe distress in a particular case, the
sort of speech involved in Gomez impacts the victimÕs consciousness in much the
same way that offensive contact impacts the body. In effect, abusive speech constitutes an offensive battery to personality.
This is not to suggest that individuals have a right to be free from all offense.
Like other rights, the right to personal dignity is rooted in a conception of people
as rational and autonomous beings. As we have seen, individuals cannot reasonably complain of offense caused by the expression of ideas contrary to their own.464
Moreover, while everyday interaction generally does not require nonconsensual
bodily contact, it does involve contact with the minds and feelings of others. It
follows that, in contrast to the law of offensive battery, slight contact with the consciousness of others cannot be regarded as a wrong, even if they reasonably find it
offensive. Instead, such contact is wrongful only if it is intended to and does cause
a high level of offense. In defining the subcategory of words Òwhich by their very
utterance inflict injury,Ó465 we might look to the law of privacy and require that
the speech intentionally attack the dignity of another in a way that is Òhighly offensive to a reasonable person.Ó466
4. Conclusion
To summarize, abusive speech should be considered wrongful if it intentionally
(1) constitutes visceral aggression against or violates the fundamental rights of the
target, and is thereby likely to result in a breach of the peace, or (2) violates the
targetÕs right to personality by inflicting severe emotional distress or assailing his
dignity in a way that a reasonable person would find highly offensive. Before we
can determine whether Chaplinsky was correct in holding such speech unprotected
by the First Amendment, however, we must first consider whether the value of
such speech is sufficient to justify the injuries that it causes to other rights.
Of course, carefully drawn laws against Òinsulting or Ôfighting wordsÕÓ would
have little impact on free speech regarded simply as a form of physical liberty. It

463

See supra Part II.C.2.b.
See supra notes 291-92 and accompanying text.
465 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
466 RESTATEMENT, supra note 241, ¤¤ 652B (defining tort of intrusion upon seclusion), 652D(a) (defining tort of giving publicity to private life). If this standard is considered too low, we might look instead to the RestatementÕs definition of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and require that the attack amount to Òextreme and outrageous conduct.Ó Id. ¤ 46.
464
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has been argued, however, that insults may have value as self-expression.467 But
any value that such speech has for the speakerÕs own self-realization clearly derives
from its negation of the personality and rights of the target. For this reason, this
value cannot serve to justify the speech under a rights-based theory.468
If we view speech as involving not merely self-expression but communication,469 it is even more clear that such speech cannot be justified under the First
Amendment. Communication presupposes that the participants regard each other
as persons capable of engaging in discussion. This premise is undermined by
speech like that in Gomez, that treats the other as a mere object of hostility and
contempt. Thus the freedom to engage in reasoned discussion is, if anything, enhanced rather than diminished by restrictions on abusive speech.470
In some instances, insulting or fighting words may have political content. That
might be the case, for example, when the Ku Klux Klan burns a cross in front of
someoneÕs home. I shall discuss this problem below in connection with hate
speech. The facts of Chaplinsky itself present a more straightforward issue. Although the defendantÕs language to the city official may have contained an element
of personal abuse, it can best be understood as a forceful protest against his official
conduct, and as a criticism of the city government and its officials. Such speech
should be protected because of its value as political speech, for much the same reasons as in New York Times v. Sullivan.
B. Hate Speech
Finally, let us turn to the problem of hate speechÑwhether the First Amendment should protect expression that abuses or degrades others on the basis of such
traits as race, ethnicity, gender, and religion.471 In approaching this issue, the
rights-based theory begins with the concept of recognition.
For the natural rights tradition, rights are ultimately rooted in personhood. It
follows that an individual cannot enjoy rights in relation to others unless they recognize him as a free person. Recognition is the most fundamental right that individuals have in relation to others, a right that lies at the basis of all of their other

467

See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 169, at 55-56.
See supra Part III.A.1.
469 On the distinction, see supra note 365 and accompanying text.
470 See Lawrence, supra note 448, at 452-56. This view is consistent with MeiklejohnÕs notion that rules of order make free discussion possible. See supra note 360 and
accompanying text; see also RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 204, ¤ 32, at 203
(following MeiklejohnÕs view).
471 The literature on hate speech is vast. For some collections of major writings, see
HENRY LOUIS GATES ET AL., SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX: HATE SPEECH, CIVIL
RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1994); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., W ORDS THAT WOUND:
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993); HATE
SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION (Steven J. Heyman ed., 1996). On the history of the issue,
see SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY (1994).
468
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rights. For this reason, individuals have an inherent obligation to recognize and
treat others as free and equal persons.472
This view provides a powerful perspective from which to approach the hate
speech issue. Hate speech can best be understood as expression that intentionally
denies recognition to others, and expresses hostility toward them, on the basis of
such traits as race, ethnicity, gender, and religion. In addition to conflicting with
fundamental principles of right, such speech in many cases violates the concrete
rights of individuals and the community. In such cases, the expression is properly
subject to regulation under the rights-based approach, unless its value is sufficient
to outweigh the injuries that it causes. In developing this view, it will be useful
to begin with private hate speech, or that directed toward particular individuals,
and then turn to the problem of public or political hate speech.
1. Private Hate Speech
a. Should Private Hate Speech Be Protected by the First Amendment?
In many cases, private hate speech violates the targetÕs right to personal security, the communityÕs right to the public peace, or both. Such speech amounts to
an assault when (together with other acts or circumstances) it intentionally causes
apprehension of imminent attack.473 Threats of future harm may also constitute a

472 For a discussion of recognition in Hobbes, Locke, and other early modern natural
rights theorists, see Steven J. Heyman, Hate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression,
in HATE SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 471, at xli-xlii, xlvii-xlix [hereinafter
Heyman, Hate Speech]. The concept of recognition and its relationship with right are
more fully developed by later writers, especially Fichte and Hegel. See, e.g., J.G. FICHTE,
SCIENCE OF RIGHTS (A.E. Kroeger trans., London, Trubner & Co. 1889) (1796); HEGEL,
supra note 208, ¤¤ 36, 57, 71, 84-85, 95, 331; G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT
¤¤ 178-96 (A.V. Miller trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1977) (5th ed., J. Hoffmeister ed.,
1952). See generally AXEL HONNETH, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION (1995); ROBERT
R. WILLIAMS, RECOGNITION (1992). For an excellent discussion of recognition and contemporary controversies on campus, see Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, i n
MULTICULTURALISM AND ÒT HE POLITICS OF RECOGNITIONÓ 25-73 (Amy Guttmann ed.,
Princeton Univ. Press, 1992).
473 For example, in a widely reported case, a black man from Brooklyn, New York,
named Christopher Wilson was abducted on January 1, 1993, in a suburb of Tampa,
Florida, by three white men, Mark Kohut, Jeffrey Pellett, and Charles Rourk. The three
forced Wilson to drive to an isolated field, holding a gun to his side and taunting him
with racial insults. They then told him to get out of the car and said, ÒNow youÕre going to die, nigger.Ó Ignoring his pleas for mercy, they poured gasoline over him, set him
on fire, and departed, leaving beside him a misspelled note reading, ÒOne les nigger,
more to go. KKK.Ó Wilson suffered severe burns but survived the attack. Kohut and
Rourk were convicted of attempted murder, kidnapping, and armed robbery, and sentenced to life in prison. See 2 Are Given Life Terms For Burning Black Man, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 1993, ¤ 1, at 8; Larry Rohter, Brooklyn Man Tells a Florida Jury About
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crime474 and may result in civil liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress.475 Group-based insults constitute one of the most common forms of insulting or Òfighting words.Ó476 And expressions of hatred can be punished as criminal
incitement477 when they are intended and likely to provoke others to unlawful violence against the targets.478

Being Kidnapped and Set Ablaze, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1993, ¤ 1, at 7; 3 Whites
Charged in Burning of a Black, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1993, at A13.
474 See, e.g., United States v. Garner, 985 F.2d 554 (table), 1993 WL 24791 (4th Cir.
1993) (affirming sentence of Ku Klux Klan member under Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
¤ 3631(a) (1988), for making written and verbal threats to kill a black coworker, his
white girlfriend, and their child unless they moved out of the area; defendant then made
an explosive device and told an informant that he planned to destroy the coworkerÕs
house with it); State v. Wyant, No. 90-CA-2, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 5589, at *3 (Ohio
Ct. App. Dec. 6, 1990) (upholding conviction under state aggravated menacing and
ethnic intimidation laws of a white man who, after a black man at a neighboring camp
site complained to park officials that he was making too much noise, shouted that Ò w e
didnÕt have this problem until those niggers moved in next to usÓ; Òthe black motherfucker over there, I will take my gun and kill himÓ; and Òin fact, I will go over there and
get his black ass nowÓ), affirmed after remand, 68 Ohio St. 3d 162 (1994).
475 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 241, ¤ 46, illus. 20 (going to anotherÕs door at
night with a mob and threatening to lynch him unless he leaves town).
476 See, e.g., supra notes 453-55 and accompanying text (discussing Gomez v. Hug
and Bailey v. Binyon).
477 The facts of Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993), provide a good example.
After watching the movie Mississippi Burning with a group of other young black men,
Mitchell urged the group to Òmove on some white people.Ó Id. at 479-80. Shortly
thereafter, as a white boy walked past the group, Mitchell said, ÒThere goes a white
boy; go get him.Ó Id. He then counted to three and pointed in the boyÕs direction. See
id. The group ran towards the boy and beat him so severely that he remained unconscious for four days. See id. Upon conviction of aggravated battery for inciting the attack, Mitchell was sentenced under a Òhate crimesÓ law providing for enhanced punishment when a defendant intentionally selects his victim on account of race. See id. at
480-81. In Mitchell, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected a First Amendment challenge to such laws. Mitchell did not challenge the conviction itself, however, for his
speech clearly constituted unprotected incitement under Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969).
478 A 1989 incident at Arizona State University provides a dramatic example of all of
these offenses. A fight started between a black student, Toby Wright, and a white fraternity member, Sean Hedgecock, after Hedgecock allegedly said, ÒFuck you, nigger.Ó
Two dozen fraternity members then emerged from their house and surrounded Wright
and two other blacks, chanting racial slurs. The fight was broken up by police, who
alleged that Hedgecock continued to shout epithets and threatened to Òget those niggers and kill them.Ó Later that night, Hedgecock saw two other black students and
shouted, ÒThose are the niggers! TheyÕre back!Ó Several hundred people then flooded
out of nearby fraternity houses and surrounded the blacks, watching while a group of
white fraternity members beat them up. The incident is recounted in Jon Wiener, Words
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In addition to personal security and the public peace, hate speech often violates
its targetsÕ personality rights. As Gomez v. Hug illustrates, hate speech can inflict
severe emotional injury, giving rise to a claim for intentional infliction.479 Hate
speech may also violate the right to privacy when, for example, it takes the form of
anonymous, threatening, or obscene messages or telephone calls.480 Finally, hate
speech violates the right to equality by denying all these rights on the basis of race
or other invidious grounds.481
Insofar as they violate these rights of individuals or the community, acts of private hate speech are presumptively wrongful. Under the rights-based theory, they
should therefore be held unprotected unless they have sufficient value to justify the
injuries that they cause.
As an illustration, consider the classic form of hate speech in the United
StatesÑthe burning of a cross to express hostility toward racial, ethnic and religious minorities. Suppose that the Ku Klux Klan burns a cross in front of the home
of an African-American family that has recently moved into a white neighborhood,
in order to terrorize the family and induce them to move. It is difficult to imagine
a more serious invasion of personal security. The act will constitute an assault if
family members observe it and suffer imminent fear for their safety. It may also
violate laws forbidding threats of future violence. If the cross-burning occurs inside
the familyÕs yard, it will also infringe their property rights, as well as criminal
laws against trespass and arson.
The KlanÕs conduct also violates the family membersÕ rights of personality.
The act is a flagrant and deeply offensive intrusion into their private lives and thus
constitutes invasion of privacy. In addition, it is difficult to conceive of a clearer
case of intentional infliction of emotional distress through Òextreme and outrageous
conduct.Ó
Does cross-burning, when directed against particular individuals, have sufficient
value to justify the injuries that it causes? Undoubtedly it constitutes a form of
That Wound: Free Speech for Campus Bigots?, 250 THE NATION 272, 272-73 (Feb. 26,
1990).
479 For the facts of Gomez, see supra notes 453-55 and accompanying text.
480 For examples of such conduct, see United States v. McAninch, 994 F.2d 1380 (9th
Cir. 1993) (affirming sentence under 18 U.S.C. ¤ 876 for mailing threatening communications over many months to people the defendant thought were interracially married);
SOUTHERN POVERTY L AW CENTER, KLANWATCH INTELLIGENCE REP., Oct. 1994, at 10 (reporting that three Jewish residents of Reedsport, Oregon, were the targets of antiSemitic graffiti, hate mail and threatening phone calls; the building they rented was
later burned); id. at 11 (reporting that black restaurant owner in Polkton, North Carolina, Òreceived five threatening, racist phone calls and two notes bearing ÔKKKÕ and a
drawing of a lynchingÓ over a two-month period).
481 Of course, this is a central theme in the critical-race-theory literature on hate
speech. See, e.g., MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 471; see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
O NLY W ORDS (1993) (arguing that hate speech, pornography, and racial and sexual harassment constitute denials of equality). On the right to equality in the rights-based
theory, see Heyman, Hate Speech, supra note 472, at lviii-lix.
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self-expression. As we have seen, however, an act of expression cannot be privileged on account of the very aspect that makes it wrongful in the first place.482 Individuals have no right to pursue their own self-realization when it is defined in
terms of denying the self-realization of others, and is directed toward them.
It might also be argued that the KlansmenÕs conduct should be privileged because it is intended, at least in part, to express a political view. Even if crossburning is entitled to protection as political speech, howeverÑan issue that I shall
come to shortly483 Ñit does not follow that this protection should apply to acts
directed against particular persons. The Klan could communicate its political
message just as effectively by burning a cross elsewhere, without inflicting serious
injuries to specific individuals. Or, if this is not true, then the increased effectiveness arises solely from the wrongful aspect of the conduct, the terror and degradation it inflicts on the family. For these reasons, cross-burning directed toward particular persons should not be protected as free expression.
In sum, private hate speech often invades its targetsÕ rights to personality and
personal security, as well as the public peace. In such cases, the speech may violate civil or criminal laws against assault, threats, fighting words, incitement, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or invasion of privacy. Under the rightsbased model, such speech generally should be held unprotected by the First
Amendment.
b. Is All Wrongful Speech Equal? Hate Speech and the R.A.V. Decision
Thus far, the argument has treated hate speech in the same way as any other expression that violates general laws for the protection of rights. This leads to the
further question of whether there is anything distinctive about hate speech that
might justify greater regulation than other instances of wrongful speech. This was
a central issue in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,484 the Supreme CourtÕs most recent
decision on the constitutionality of hate speech regulation.
R.A.V. was charged with burning a cross on the lawn of an African-American
family, in violation of a St. Paul ordinance making it a misdemeanor to Òplace[]
on public or private property a symbolÊ.Ê.Ê. , including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know
arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.Ó485 The defendantÕs First Amendment challenge to the ordinance
was rejected by the Minnesota Supreme Court, which construed it narrowly to apply only to expression that amounted to fighting words under Chaplinsky.486

482

See supra Part III.A.1.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
484 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
485 Id. at 380 (quoting St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, Minn.
Legis. Code ¤ 292.02 (1990)).
486 In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991).
483
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Writing for five members of the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Antonin Scalia accepted this narrow interpretation of the ordinance.487 He further assumed, for purposes of argument, that Chaplinsky remained good law, and that a jurisdiction
could prohibit all words that Òby their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace.Ó488 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia held the ordinance unconstitutional because it banned not fighting words in general, but rather
only those that insulted or provoked violence on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.489 ÒSelectivity of this sort,Ó he assertedÑeven within a generally unprotected category of speechÑÒcreates the possibility that the city is seeking to handicap the expression of particular ideasÓ simply because of hostility
toward them.490
Justice Scalia conceded, however, that distinctions based on content can legitimately be drawn within an unprotected category of speech when the basis for the
distinction Òconsists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speechÊ.Ê.Ê. is
proscribable.Ó491 For example, Òthe Federal Government can criminalize only
those threats of violence that are directed against the President,Ê.Ê.Ê. since the reasons why threats of violence are outside the protection of the First AmendmentÊ.Ê.Ê.
have special force when applied to the person of the President.Ó492
Our account of hate speech, however, makes clear that the same rationale applies
to laws that regulate fighting words, or other unprotected categories of speech, only
when they are based on invidious grounds such as race. The reason why these
categories (which I shall call Òassaultive speechÓ) are unprotected is that they violate the rights of the target, as well as the communityÕs right to the peace. But
hate speech denies the targetÕs status as a person and a member of the community,
and thereby challenges the very existence of these rights. For this reason, when
hate speech takes the form of assaultive speech, it attacks these rights at a much
deeper level than do more ordinary forms of assaultive speech, such as mere personal insults. Thus the reasons for restricting assaultive speech Òhave special
forceÓ when applied to hate speech, and regulations limited to such speech should
not be regarded as violating the rule against content discrimination.493

487

505 U.S. at 381.
Id.; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
489 See 505 U.S. at 391.
490 Id. at 393-94. Four Justices rejected the majorityÕs reasoning, but would have
invalidated the ordinance on overbreadth grounds. See id. at 397 (White, J., joined b y
Blackmun, OÕConnor & Stevens, JJ., concurring in judgment).
491 Id. at 388.
492 Id.
493 To be sure, the distinction between assaultive speech that denies recognition t o
others and that which does not do so does not correspond perfectly to the distinction
between assaultive speech based on race or other invidious grounds and other assaultive speech. Although it is generally true that assaultive speech based on these group
characteristics involves a denial of personhood to a greater or lesser degree, that may
not be true in every case. On the other hand, assaultive speech that is not based o n
488
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In response to the contention that the Òharms caused by racial, religious, and
gender-based invective are qualitatively different from that caused by other fighting
words,Ó494 Justice Scalia replies that, if this is true, it is due entirely to the fact
that such harms are Òcaused by a distinctive ideaÊ.Ê.Ê.Ê. It is obvious that the
symbols which will arouse Ôanger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion or genderÕ are those symbols that communicate a message of hostility based on one of these characteristics.Ó495 But this would be just
as true of the hate-based insults that Justice Scalia assumes would be proscribable
under a general fighting words statute. Indeed, the harm caused by all fighting
words stems from the Òmessage of hostilityÓ that they convey, whether that hostility is directed against the targets personally or against the groups to which they
belong.496 Thus, the fact that the harms caused by racial, religious, and genderbased insults reflect Òa distinctive messageÓ does not mean that they are not more
serious than the harms caused by other assaultive speech, or that they do not justify greater regulation.
In short, Justice ScaliaÕs argument that laws like St. PaulÕs (those that regulate
hate speech as a subset of an unprotected category of speech) necessarily involve
unjustified content discrimination is unconvincing. Hate speech inflicts deeper injuries to the personhood and rights of its targets than do other forms of assaultive
speech, and therefore merits a stronger response.497
2. Public Hate Speech
Of course, Justice ScaliaÕs ultimate concern in R.A.V. is that hate speech regulations may be aimed at the political message expressed by the speech. This brings
us to the most difficult and controversial problemÑthat of public or political hate
speech.
Suppose that, as in the Skokie case, a group of neo-Nazis or Klansmen plan to
hold a march wearing full regalia through a predominantly Jewish or AfricanAmerican neighborhood, in order to express their view that such groups should be

these group characteristics may in some cases deny the victimÕs personhood. But the
law often has to draw distinctions that are reasonable even though not exact. Because
assaultive speech based on these characteristics generally involves a denial of the victimÕs right to recognition, while more ordinary assaultive speech generally does not, i t
is reasonable for the law to distinguish between them on this basis.
494 505 U.S. at 424 (Stevens, J., joined by White & Blackmun, JJ., concurring i n
judgment).
495 Id. at 392-93.
496 See id. at 408-09 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
497 For a fuller critique of R.A.V., see Heyman, Hate Speech, supra note 472, at xliiixlvi. For other explorations of the case, see Akhil Reed Amar, Comment: The Case o f
the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124 (1992);
Steven H. Shiffrin, Racist Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence, and the Meaning of America, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 43 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI.
L. REV. 795, 822-29 (1993).
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subjected to segregation, deportation, or genocide.498 Should such expression be
protected under the First Amendment? Freedom of speech on political matters is
an inherent right of democratic citizenship. As we have seen, however, that right
is not absolute, but must be exercised with due regard for the rights of others.499
Under the rights-based approach, we must first determine whether the expression
violates those rights, and then inquire whether it should nevertheless be protected
because of its political character.
a. Is Public Hate Speech Wrongful?
In view of the history of violence by Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan, the march described above is likely, and may very well be intended, to diminish the personal
security of the groups against whom it is directed. This has some bearing on
whether the speech is wrongful. Unless the march creates a reasonable fear of violence in the near future, however, its impact on personal security should not be regarded as sufficient to justify regulation.
The march does, however, constitute a serious violation of its targetsÕ rights of
personality. By treating them not as persons but as inferior beings who may be
oppressed or murdered, such expression may inflict severe distress, or even lasting
trauma, on many target-group members. Whether or not it does so, the expression
constitutes a fundamental attack on their right to dignity and inviolate personality.
In response, it may be said that the targets can avoid this attack simply by staying away from the march.500 This objection might be persuasive if the expression
took place in private: individuals cannot legitimately complain of injury to their
sensibilities from expression that is communicated only to others and that does not
relate to themselves. The objection fails, however, precisely because of the public
nature of the speech. Speech that is political and that occurs in public is intended,
and must be deemed, to be communicated to the public at large, not merely to
those who are present at the time. As citizens, target-group members have both a
right and a duty to attend to the political speech of others, while as the targets of
such speech they have a compelling interest in doing so. Thus even if they were
to stay away from the march, they could hardly avoid its impact.

498 For the Skokie litigation, see Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1200 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of
America, 373 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1978). The controversy generated a rich and extensive literature. See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986); DONALD DOWNS, NAZIS IN SKOKIE: FREEDOM,
COMMUNITY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1985); ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY:
AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE, AND THE RISKS OF FREEDOM (1979); Raphael CohenAlmagor, Harm Principle, Offense Principle, and the Skokie Affair, 41 POL. STUD. 453
(1993), reprinted in HATE SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 471, at 277-94;
Farber, supra note 452.
499 See supra note 361 and accompanying text.
500 See Collin, 578 F.2d at 1206-07.
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It is also true, as Justice Harlan observes in Cohen v. California,501 that in
public we are ÒoftenÊ.Ê.Ê. subject to objectionable speech,Ó and that public discourse may not be restricted simply because it offends some listeners.502 It would
be a serious mistake, however, to conceive of the public realm as one in which personality has no protection. Individuals do not cease to be persons when they participate in the public life of the community, and they should not be required to
wholly sacrifice their rights of personality to do so.503 It is difficult to imagine a
form of public discourse that injures these rights more deeply than does hate
speech.
Public hate speech also violates the speakersÕ duty to others as members of the
political community. As we have seen, political speech is a relational rightÑa
right to engage in discourse with oneÕs fellow citizens on issues of common concern. As such, it entails an obligation to respect the corresponding rights of others.504 Public hate speech violates those rights by denying recognition to its targets not only as persons but as citizens. In this way, it constitutes an assault on
what I shall call their civic personality.
To develop this notion, we should recall our account of personality in general.505 The right to personality was rooted in oneÕs awareness of oneself as a free,
self-determining being. Personality also had a social dimension, which was constituted by the relationship between the self and others.
Within the social aspect of personality, we can now identify a civic element.
Civic personality is constituted by the relationship between the individual and the
community. It exists when an individual is conscious of herself as a member of
the community, and when she is recognized as such by other members and by the
community as a whole. Individuals have a right to civic personality in the same
way that they have a right to the other aspects of personhood.
We can now understand how public hate speech violates this right. By denying
recognition to its targets, such speech attacks not only their own consciousness of
membership in the community, but also the recognition of this status by other
members. In both of these ways, hate speech infringes the dignity and inviolability of its targetsÕ civic personality, in addition to any substantive impact it may
have on their status in the community.506

501

403 U.S. 15 (1971).
Id. at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted).
503 Justice Harlan acknowledges this point to some extent when he observes that restrictions on speech may be justified where Òsubstantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.Ó Id. at 21. Although he speaks of Òprivacy,Ó it seems reasonable to extend his statement to include other rights of personality
as well, such as personal dignity and emotional well-being.
504 See supra notes 361 and accompanying text.
505 See supra Part II.C.
506 Public hate speech thus inflicts a dignitary wrong analogous to profound insults,
which infringe personal dignity, and to defamation, Òfalse light,Ó and misappropriation,
which violate the dignity of social personality. See supra Parts II.C.2.c, IV.A.3.
502
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Public hate speech also violates the rights of the community itself. As we have
seen, political discourse is often understood on MeiklejohnÕs model of the town
meeting.507 Free speech is essential to reach informed decisions on matters of
common concern. At the same time, Meiklejohn stresses that speakers can be required to observe certain rules of order. These rules do not violate freedom of
speech, but rather make free deliberation possible. In particular, he observes that
Ò[i]f a speakerÊ.Ê.Ê. is abusive or in other ways threatens to defeat the purpose of the
meeting, he may be and should be declared Ôout of order.ÕÓ508
It would seem to follow from this view that public hate speech should not be
protected under the First Amendment. Like abusive speech in a town meeting,
hate speech violates the integrity of the deliberative process by undermining the
possibility of reasoned discourse. As Meiklejohn observes, such discourse cannot
take place except on the basis of mutual respect among citizens who regard one another as capable of engaging in rational self-government.509
Of course, public debate in a large modern society differs in many ways from
MeiklejohnÕs town meeting, and a great deal of speech that would be improper in
that setting is considered acceptable within the polity at large. But MeiklejohnÕs
basic insight is a valid one. Democratic self-government is impossible in the absence of a minimal degree of civility and mutual respect among citizens. Although
that minimum standard will differ depending on the nature, size, customs, and values of each society, its members must observe such a standard or they cease to
constitute a community. And however minimal our societyÕs version of that standard is taken to be, it clearly is violated by speech that denies recognition to others
on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, or religion.510
In a democratic polity, citizens not only govern but also are governed. This
distinction suggests a further way in which public hate speech is wrongful. For the
American constitutional tradition, ultimate sovereignty resides in the people. The
community, and the government that it establishes, have an obligation to recognize individuals as persons and citizens, and to respect their fundamental rights.
This may be regarded as the core meaning of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments. But this duty of recognition, I would argue, obliges not only the
community itself but also its members. As citizens, individuals are entitled to
share in the political power of the community. With this right comes a corresponding obligation to use that power in accordance with the same duties that the

507

See supra notes 358-60 and accompanying text.
M EIKLEJOHN, supra note 170, at 24-25.
509 Id. at 69-70.
510 Of course, this standard is an evolving one. One may hope, for example, that the
recent tragic events in Wyoming will lead to a fuller recognition in American society
that all individuals are entitled to fundamental human rights without regard to sexual
orientation. See, e.g., Hate Mail Lauds Killing of Gay Wyoming Student, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 14, 1998, ¤ 1, at 10 (describing outbreak of anti-homosexual hate speech following
brutal murder of Matthew Shepard, a gay University of Wyoming student).
508
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community itself has.511 This duty is owed both to the community itself and to
oneÕs fellow citizens.
As rulers, then, citizens have a duty to recognize their fellow citizens in their
capacity as ruled, and to use their political power only for the common good and
the protection of rights. By engaging in hate speech, a citizen violates this duty of
recognition. In addition, if we regard political speech as itself a form of political
participation, hate speech may also be understood as a use of political power contrary to the rights of its targets. In these ways, an individual violates his duty as a
citizen, just as a legislator would act contrary to his oath if he failed to respect the
constitutional rights of citizens.
b. Should Public Hate Speech Be Protected Under the First Amendment?
The previous section argued that public hate speech is presumptively wrongful
for several reasons: it diminishes the personal security of its targets, violates their
rights of personal dignity and citizenship, contravenes essential rules of public debate, and breaches the duty of citizens to recognize those over whom they exercise
political power. Should such expression nevertheless be protected because of its
character as political speech or its contribution to the search for truth?512
The protection of political expression is rightly regarded as a core concern of the
First Amendment. In my view, however, public hate speech is not entitled to
such protection, at least as a matter of substantive right.513
At the outset, it is important to stress that the rationale developed here does not
contravene the basic principle against political censorship as set forth by Meiklejohn. That principle, as we have seen, holds that

511 The principle on which this argument relies is fundamental and applies in a wide
range of situations. When individuals act as a members of a collective body, they are
obligated to act in accordance with the obligations that apply to the body as a whole.
For example, while Article I and the First Amendment to the Constitution apply t o
Congress as a whole, each member is required to take an oath to support the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. Similarly, individual jurors are required to take an
oath to do justice, even though it is the jury as a whole that is ultimately responsible
for reaching a just decision.
512 For the reasons already discussed, the general-liberty and individual selfrealization rationales would not support a privilege for public hate speech. A ban o n
cross-burning and similar expression imposes only a slight restriction on liberty of
conduct in comparison with the severity of the injuries that they cause. And, while a
Klansman might feel that such expression promotes his self-realization and selfexpression, these values can be largely or wholly satisfied through thought or expression that is not communicated to the targets or to the public in general, unless the
KlansmanÕs self-realization depends on negating the self-realization of othersÑthe
very reason why the expression is wrongful in the first place.
513 Whether such speech should receive protection for reasons of institutional right
is a separate question which is touched upon below. See infra notes 523-27 and accompanying text. On the distinction between substantive and institutional right, see
supra notes 224-26 and accompanying text.
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no suggestion of policy shall be denied a hearing because it is on one side of
the issue rather than another. And this means that though citizens may, on
other grounds, be barred from speaking, they may not be barred because their
views are thought to be false or dangerous.Ê.Ê.Ê. [T]he reason for this equality
of status in the field of ideas lies deep in the very foundations of the selfgoverning process. When men govern themselves, it is theyÑand no one
elseÑwho must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger.
And that means that unwise ideas must have a hearing as well as wise ones,
unfair as well as fair, dangerous as well as safe, un-American as well as
American.514
Justice Brandeis expresses a similar view in Whitney v. California,515 and adds
that Ò[i]f there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to
avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence.Ó516
The view expressed by Meiklejohn and Brandeis constitutes an essential element of any adequate theory of free speech. For this reason, a convincing argument
for hate speech regulation cannot be based merely on disagreement with the speech
or on the danger that it might prevail in public debate. Such a view would disrespect the capacity of the citizenry to determine for themselves that the speech is
false, dangerous, and unfair. For this we must rely, as Brandeis says, on more
speech.517
Instead, the present argument is based on the contention that hate speech violates the rights of others and is therefore wrongful. The key question, then, is
whether hate speech, even though it violates these rights, should be protected because of its value as political speech. In my view it should not, for hate speech
lacks full value as political speech, and its value does not justify the injuries it
causes.
For Brandeis and Meiklejohn, the paradigm case of political speech is expression that is directed by one citizen to the rest of the community and that relates to
matters of public policy that it must decide. Political hate speech, however, is not
addressed to the citizenry as a whole, but only to a particular group of citizensÑfor
example, those who are white Christians. Of course, the speaker may also intend
to address members of the target group. Insofar as she does so, however, she ad-

514

M EIKLEJOHN, supra note 170, at 26-27.
274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
516 Id.
517 As I argue below, however, confidence in the ability of free debate to discern truth
and reject injustice depends on certain conditionsÑin particular, the requirement that
individuals recognize one another as free and rational participants in the process. See
infra note 521 and accompanying text. In the absence of mutual recognition, there is n o
sufficient reason to assume that the political process will work as Brandeis and Meiklejohn envision.
515
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dresses them not as citizensÑsince she does not recognize them as suchÑbut as
objects of hatred and contempt.518
When hate speech advocates extreme racist measures such as genocide, mass deportation, or enforced segregation, it lacks full political value for another reason as
well: it does not relate to a matter of public policy for the people to decide. This
is not merely because genocide and other extreme measures would violate constitutional guarantees. The Constitution may be amended; moreover, according to the
liberal tradition, the people always retain the right to alter or abolish it. But even
if the Constitution were amended or a new one adopted, it could not rightfully empower the government to commit genocide, because genocide is beyond the authority of any legitimate regime.
In sum, political hate speech lacks full value as political speech because it is not
addressed to the citizenry as a whole, and because (in cases where it proposes extreme racist measures) it does not relate to a matter for the people to decide. This
is not to deny that political hate speech has some value as political speech. Thus,
the protection of hate speech is sometimes defended on the ground that it may express genuine grievances or frustrations, although it attributes them to the wrong
causes and advocates the wrong solutions; or that it provides useful information
about the presence of dangerous views within the community; or that it shows the
ugliness of racism in its clearest light;519 or that it serves as a stimulus to developing the social virtue of tolerance.520
While hate speech may have some political value, that value is distinctly limited. None of these arguments view political hate speech as having value in itself,
or because it makes a contribution to political debate that is worthy of respectful
consideration. Instead, each of these arguments attributes to hate speech only an
indirect value. The expression is to be valued not for what it intends to contribute, but for something that we may be able to find in it. This indirect value does
not seem sufficient to justify treating hate speech as privileged in the face of the serious injuries that it causes both to its targets and to the polity itself.
Nor should public hate speech be protected because of its contribution to the
pursuit of truth. As I have argued, Justice HolmesÕs metaphor of the marketplace
of ideas is inadequate. Instead, the search for political truth is best understood in

518 Of course, much ordinary political speech is directed not to the public as a whole
but to some smaller group of citizens. Insofar as it is political, however, such speech i s
addressed to individuals as members of the larger polity, and urges them to adopt positions or to take actions within the polity. Such speech constitutes a stage in the
broader political process, a step toward interaction with the citizenry as a whole. Political hate speech is different: it does not urge its hearers to engage in political interaction with other citizens in general, but only with those who are not members of the target group. In an important sense, such speech does not address its hearers as members of
the political community, but only as members of some smaller group such as white
Christians.
519 See Farber, supra note 452, at 301-02.
520 See BOLLINGER, supra note 498.
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BrandeisÕ and MeiklejohnÕs terms, as a process of discussion among free and equal
citizens. More generally, the search for truth requires that people recognize one another as reasonable beings who are capable of participating in a common enterprise
of inquiring after truth.521 Because hate speech denies recognition to others, it can
make no direct contribution to this process. And, once more, while hate speech
may have some indirect value in this respect, that value does not seem sufficient to
outweigh the injuries that it causes to the rights of others.522
3. Conclusion
From a rights-based perspective, one may well conclude that there is no substantive right to engage in public hate speech, such as the Nazi march in Skokie.
That is not necessarily the end of the matter, however. Even when speech is substantively wrongful, regulation may be inappropriate for institutional reasons.523
Objections to hate speech regulation often take this formÑfor example, that the law
is incapable of drawing a sufficiently clear distinction in this context between protected and unprotected speech524 ; that if government had the power to regulate
some unpopular expression, there is a great danger that this power would be
abused; that the most effective response to hate speech is counterspeech; and that
hate speech laws are likely to be counterproductive, aggravating the racism they are
designed to combat.525
The rights-based theory is not intended to foreclose constitutional or political
arguments of this sort. How much force they have is largely a matter of practical
judgment, not theoretical reflection. Several observations can be made, however.
First, arguments of this sort often rely on the assumption that free speech is Òindivisibl[e]ÓÑthat Òthere is no principled basisÓ for distinguishing hate speech from

521

See supra note 381 and accompanying text.
One useful way to explore this question is to ask whether we believe that it is actually desirable that such views be publicly expressed, in the sense that the values underlying free speech and other rights are best served if those who hold such views
openly express them, rather than keeping those views to themselves. Meiklejohn, for
example, argues that if political views are Òresponsibly entertained by anyone, we, the
voters, need to hear themÓ; such views Òmust be expressed, not because they are valid,
but because they are relevant.Ó MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 170, at 28. Mill discusses the
search for truth in similar terms. See MILL, supra note 151, at 43-44. It seems highly
doubtful, however, that we would apply this position to public hate speech. Instead,
we would be more likely to say that such speech is so inconsistent with the respect
owed to others and with the requirements of reasonable discussion that it is improper t o
introduce it into public discourse, regardless of whether there is a right to do so. We
would regard the disappearance of hate speech as a gain rather than a loss for public
discussion. If this is true, then it is clear that the value of public hate speech does not
outweigh the injuries it causes.
523 See supra notes 224-26 and accompanying text.
524 See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 446, at 528.
525 See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 497, at 93-102.
522
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other forms of expression.526 If we reject this assumption, such arguments may
lose much of their force. Second, even if we were to conclude that there were institutional reasons for protecting hate speech, that would not alter the fact that such
speech constitutes a serious invasion of substantive rights. The effect of protecting
hate speech on these grounds would be to leave target-group members without legal protection against such injuries. This course should be taken only if, and insofar as, it is necessary from the standpoint of right as a whole. It also follows,
finally, that expression that is protected solely for institutional reasons is not necessarily entitled to the same high level of protection as other speech.527
However one resolves the difficult issues surrounding public hate speech, it is
clear that, under the rights-based theory, there is a realm of thought and expression
that is beyond the legitimate reach of the law. Thus freedom of thought can never
rightfully be restricted, since a personÕs inner thoughts can never violate the rights
of others.528 The same is true of expression that is not communicated to others.
This right of private thought and expression probably should also apply to private
conversations, and to internal expression within small groups.529 Scientific and
intellectual inquiry should also be protected;530 expression comes within the
sphere of law only when it is directed toward affecting the rights of others.

526

Strossen, supra note 446, at 533, 534.
For example, even if institutional concerns barred the government from outlawing
public hate speech, it would not necessarily follow that there should be no power t o
channel such expression so as to minimize its direct impact on target-group membersÑsay, by requiring the Nazis to hold their march somewhere other than in Skokie.
For a similar channeling approach to obscenity regulation, see Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73, 106-07, 112-13 (1973) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall &
Stewart, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that obscenity laws should be held unconstitutional
on vagueness grounds, but suggesting that states have power to regulate the manner of
distribution to protect juveniles and unconsenting adults).
528 See supra Part II.C.3.
529 For example, if a dozen Klansmen wish to gather on their own property to burn
crosses and make racist and anti-Semitic speeches, as in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969), they should probably have a First Amendment right to do so. In Brandenburg itself, however, this protection would not apply, because the defendants arranged
for a reporter and cameraman to attend the rally so that they could film it and broadcast i t
on television, thereby making the expression public. See id. at 445. Of course, this
does not mean that the holding of Brandenburg was wrong. As we have seen, Brandenburg held that a state may not proscribe speech on the ground that it advocates unlawful action unless it amounts to imminent incitement. See id. at 447. The argument
presented here does not advocate restricting hate speech because it may produce unlawful action (in circumstances broader than those defined by Brandenburg), but rather
because it violates a range of rights by denying recognition to others.
530 For a similar position, see Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the VictimÕs Story, in M ATSUDA ET AL., supra note 471, at 40-41.
527
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CONCLUSION
At the heart of contemporary disputes over the First Amendment is an apparent
conflict between freedom of expression and other fundamental values such as dignity, equality, and community. This conflict results from the tendency of modern
First Amendment theory to conceive of issues in terms of an opposition between
free speech and other social interests. Because of the difficulty of finding common
ground between these disparate values, First Amendment problems often appear to
be intractable.
This Article has offered an alternative account that draws on the natural rights
background of the First Amendment. According to this view, free speech is an essential form of human liberty. The same values that justify this right, howeverÑexternal freedom, individual self-realization, democratic self-government, and
the pursuit of truthÑalso give rise to other fundamental rights. Expression that
violates these rights may be regulated except where its value is sufficient to justify
the injuries that it causes.
The rights-based theory thus acknowledges what is most powerful in an absolutist approach to the First AmendmentÑits refusal to compromise the principles underlying free speechÑwhile at the same time recognizing that these principles also
justify protection of other rights. The value of free speech is ultimately strengthened rather than weakened by this recognition of its normative limits.
The Article then explored how the rights-based theory would apply to current
controversies over insults and hate speech. In addition to any threat they may pose
to the public peace, insults may violate their targetsÕ rights to personal dignity and
freedom from emotional distress. Hate speech may also violate these rights, as
well as those of personal security, equality, and citizenship. Above all, hate
speech violates the fundamental right to recognition as a person and a member of
the community. Insults and hate speech generally lack value sufficient to outweigh
the injuries they cause. For these reasons, they should generally be held unprotected under a rights-based approach to the First Amendment.
In conclusion, let us return to the case with which we began, that of Jake
Baker.531 Should BakerÕs publication on the Internet of a story graphically describing the rape, torture, and murder of a woman identifiable as one of his classmates be protected under the First Amendment? If one assumes that, when he
posted the story, Baker did not intend for it to be read by anyone who would reasonably regard it as an expression of a serious intention to harm an actual person,
he should not be held to have violated criminal laws forbidding threats. It does
not follow, however, that his actions should be constitutionally protected. First,
his conduct surely caused the woman to fear for her personal safety. If accompanied

531 See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text. For some other discussions of the
case, see Robert Kurman Kelner, Note, United States v. Baker: Revisiting Threats and
the First Amendment, 84 VA. L. REV. 287 (1998); David C. Potter, Note, The Jake
Baker Case: True Threats and New Technology, 79 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming June
1999).
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by other acts, it might give her reasonable grounds to seek a civil remedy, such as
an order of protection forbidding Baker to have any contact with her.
Besides their impact on personal security, BakerÕs actions also violated the
womanÕs rights of personality. In addition to recklessly inflicting severe emotional distress, his conduct constituted a profound violation of her right to personal
dignity and inviolability.532 Finally, a university might reasonably determine
that Baker had violated the standards of conduct it expects of its members.533
Of course, BakerÕs story was a work of fiction, which is generally entitled to
First Amendment protection. Writers of fiction are not immune to liability, however, when they infringe the rights of others (for example, by violating a copyright
or defaming an identifiable individual). Most importantly, whatever value BakerÕs
story may have had as self-expression or a contribution to the culture, it was not
necessary for him to use the name of an actual person. Because his conduct could
have achieved the same values without violating the rights of others, it should not
be protected under the First Amendment.
This Article has been able to explore how the rights-based theory would apply
to only a few First Amendment problems. Many other important questions remain. As I hope this Article has shown, however, the rights-based theory offers a
promising approach to developing a more coherent view of the foundations and
limits of freedom of expression.

532

In particular, Baker reasonably might be found to have appropriated the womanÕs
name for his own purposes without her consent. See supra note 329 and accompanying
text (discussing tort of misappropriation of name or likeness).
533 See, e.g., Stanford University Fundamental Standard (ÒStudentsÊ.Ê.Ê. are expected
to show both within and without the University such respect for order, morality, personal honor and the rights of others as is demanded of good citizens. Failure to do this
will be sufficient cause for removal from the University.Ó), quoted in Thomas C. Grey,
Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties: The Case of Discriminatory Verbal Harassment, 8
SOC. PHIL. & POLICY, Spring 1991, at 81, 106.

